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Chapter 1
Introduction
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1.1  Should we rethink the way in which long-term 
care is financed?
The rate at which population ageing will change the composition  
of the population can be predicted fairly well. But its consequences  
for health care, long-term care for the elderly (henceforth, ltc) and for 
other parts of the welfare state and the economy as a whole are harder  
to foretell and for this reason population ageing causes apprehension:
 “ Many people are afraid of aging – understandably of individual 
aging, but also of population aging. The expected demographic 
change is called an ‘age bulge’, pension systems are ‘at the verge of 
collapse’, economic growth of ‘Old Europe’ will ‘come to a halt for 
decades’ and society is expected to end up in a ‘war between gen-
erations’. All this creates anxiety, while ‘active aging’ […] is seen  
by many as a pure political euphemism.” (Börsch-Supan, 2013) 
Which challenges does population ageing pose for ltc financing and for 
other parts of the welfare state? Which are the most important mediating 
factors: do demographic, cultural and institutional differences mean 
that population ageing will differentially affect countries? And how may 
we change the ltc financing system and other institutions to limit any 
undesired effects? The answers to these questions may help to under-
stand the impact of population ageing and thus limit the uncertainty.
According to Eurostat (2014), population ageing will gradually increase 
the old-age dependency ratio – the number of dependent elderly persons 
divided by the working-age population – in the Netherlands from 0.26 in 
2013 to 0.47 in 2040. This trend will cause an increase in the prevalence 
of disability, which means that, other things equal, total expenditures  
on long-term care for the elderly per capita are expected to increase  
substantially over the next decades. 
In the Netherlands and in many other countries of the Organisation  
for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth, oecd),  
a large share of the ltc expenditures is financed through a mandatory 
public pay-as-you-go (henceforth, payg) system. In a payg system, con-
tributions are used to pay for expenditures in the same year. Therefore, 
the increase in ltc expenditures means that the ltc insurance premium 
will increase as well. LTC expenditures are concentrated among the elder-
ly (de Meijer et al., 2011; rivm, 2013) and hence the degree of intergenera-
tional redistribution that is generated by public payg financing is 
massive at any point in time. Population ageing is putting a strain on  
ltc financing: the intergenerational redistribution will increase because 
of population ageing and the increase in ltc expenditures may challenge 
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the support for public payg financing as well as fiscal sustainability  
(cpb, 2014). This is particularly true for the Netherlands because the 
Dutch public ltc insurance scheme is the most comprehensive within 
the oecd and public ltc expenditures are by far the highest (oecd, 2011a): 
in 2012 the Netherlands spent 2.9% of its Gross Domestic Product (gdp) 
on ltc, while the average for oecd countries was 1.2% (oecd, 2014). 
Population ageing is unavoidable and irreversible. What about excessive 
LTC expenditure growth?
ltc expenditures have been increasing and the share of the gdp that  
is spent on ltc will again double over the next decades, according to 
projections (Schut and van den Berg, 2010; European Commission, 2012). 
Population ageing and its impact on ltc expenditures are widely known. 
But ltc reforms are politically sensitive and many countries have not 
adopted major policy reforms to address the consequences of popu- 
lation ageing. This raises many questions, including: has the series of 
recent, often incremental, policy changes successfully and sufficiently 
addressed the consequences of population ageing and ensured the af-
fordability of ltc in the Netherlands? And if not, which other policies 
may the Dutch government use in the future? 
Changing the way ltc is financed, e.g. by increasing co-payments, by 
introducing uniform eligibility rules for public insurance benefits or  
by promoting health savings accounts, will affect who pays for current 
and future ltc use. But alternative modes of financing ltc may also 
change the incentives for insurers, providers, users and potential users. 
Thus, ltc financing alternatives will differentially affect the supply of 
and demand for each of the types of ltc and ultimately the amount  
of ltc expenditures. 
In the first part of this thesis, I investigate how alternative ways of finan- 
cing and organizing ltc are associated with differences in ltc use. What 
is the role of centralized eligibility assessment in determining ltc use? 
Do the characteristics of users of publicly financed ltc mirror the eligi-
bility criteria? Are policies that encourage and facilitate elderly to live  
at home indeed effective in keeping relevant groups of ltc users out of 
nursing homes and residential homes? And is broader and more gener-
ous insurance coverage associated with a fairer distribution of ltc use? 
LTC financing affects which groups use ltc and how intensively each  
of these groups uses it. To learn more about the association between  
the financing and use of ltc, I study the relationship between personal 
characteristics and choices on ltc use. There is much prior research 
about the determinants of ltc use. I build on this literature to show that 
differences in the importance of each of the determinants are associated 
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with ltc financing differences. If this association is strong, ltc financing 
may be used to reduce ltc use and thus the impact of population ageing 
on ltc expenditures. 
How to align incentives to keep LTC affordable and efficient?
In the second part of the thesis, I study how ltc financing arrangements 
affect the incentives for patients, insurers and providers of formal care 
and potential informal caregivers. These incentives are important be-
cause they shape how each of these groups of decision makers behaves 
and they thus affect who uses ltc, which types of ltc are being used  
and who pays for it. The government may try to ensure that the actions 
of these self-interested decision-makers are in the best interest of socie-
ty by setting the incentives for them such that their interests are in line 
with society’s interests. The incentives for Dutch decision-makers cur-
rently do not ensure full alignment (Schut and van den Berg, 2010).  
For example, when informal caregiving is costly to the caregiver but 
when these costs are lower than the marginal costs for hiring a profes-
sional caregiver, the informal caregiver would provide the care in the 
absence of insurance. But the informal caregiver would stop providing 
care if the formal care were paid for by public ltc insurance, even though 
his costs are lower than the costs of formal care: this option relieves the 
caregiver from the burden of caregiving and the care recipient only pays 
the co-payment.
Misalignment of interests threatens the efficiency of public ltc insur-
ance and therefore the incentives need to be changed. I analyze how 
policy measures may change the incentives for patients, insurers and 
providers. For example, how may a system of risk-adjusted capitation 
payments be designed to give competing, risk-bearing insurers incen-
tives to act in the best interest of their consumers? And how may the  
incentives for consumers be changed to encourage them to balance  
the marginal costs and benefits of formal and informal care?
Together, the two parts of this thesis describe ltc financing alternatives 
and their consequences for the allocation of ltc. Studying ltc financing 
helps to understand how ltc use and expenditures evolve and this knowl- 
edge may help to ensure efficient, high-quality and affordable ltc. 
1.2  What are the main characteristics of LTC and how 
do they affect the demand and supply?
There are four main groups of conditions that require ltc: i) psychoger- 
iatric and chronic somatic conditions, ii) chronic psychiatric conditions, 
iii) mental retardation and iv) sensory disabilities (see e.g. Ministry of 
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Finance, 2010; ser, 2008). These four groups have in common that  
recovery is not possible; they differ as to whether the condition occurs  
at an early stage of life or at a later stage and whether the patient is still 
able to make decisions independently after the onset of the condition. 
In addition, the incidence and the total amount of expenditures differ 
across these groups. This thesis is about financing ltc for patients with 
the first group of conditions. This group of patients encompasses about 
two-thirds of all patients needing ltc and accounts for about two-thirds 
of total ltc expenditures in the Netherlands (Schut and van den  
Berg, 2010).
LTC has been defined either positively or in comparison to curative care. 
A comprehensive positive definition is the definition by the US-based 
Institute of Medicine, which is quoted by Ikegami and Campbell (2002): 
 “ a variety of ongoing health and social services provided for in- 
dividuals who need assistance on a continuing basis because  
of physical or mental disability. Services can be provided in an in- 
stitution, the home, or community, and include informal services 
provided by family or friends as well as formal services provided 
by professionals or agencies.” 
This definition comments on five dimensions of the care: the period,  
the type of service provided, the type of condition, the location where 
the service is provided, and who provides the care.
Other authors indirectly define ltc by comparing it to curative care: 
 “ […] LTC is care for chronic illness or disability instead of treat-
ment of an acute illness.” (Norton, 2000)
 “ While health care services aim at changing a health condition 
(from unwell to well), ltc merely aims at making the current  
condition (unwell) more bearable”. (Martins and de la 
Maisonneuve, 2006)
Both definitions further clarify one of the above-mentioned charac- 
teristics of ltc. While Norton’s (2000) definition highlights that ltc is 
aimed at another type of condition than curative care, Martins and de  
la Maisonneuve (2006) point out that, because the type of condition  
is different, the goal of ltc is different as well.
As a result of these differences between ltc and curative care, the  
demand for and supply of ltc are somewhat different from the supply  
of and demand for curative care. The type of service provided and its 
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aim have implications for i) the type of provider and ii) the setting  
in which the care is supplied. With regard to the type of provider,  
Pauly (1996) pointed out that: 
  “[…] in contrast to curative care for acute illnesses, it appears to be 
relatively easier to substitute services provided by nonprofession-
als in the care of people with long term chronic illnesses, even in 
the provision of some services which might be labeled medical.” 
Because of these differences in the types of providers and because  
some of these services aim to enable patients to continue to live at  
home despite their helplessness, ltc may be provided in a different  
setting than curative care (Mot, 2010): while curative care is typically 
provided in an ambulatory or institutional setting, ltc may also be  
provided at home or in the community.
Demand for ltc differs from demand for curative care in three ways. 
First, in a given year, annual costs per user are typically high and only  
a small proportion of the population has any expenditures (van de Ven, 
2005). Second, the life-time costs will be high for persons who need ltc 
because the need for ltc will usually persist for the remainder of the  
patient’s life. Third, demand for professional ltc does not only depend 
on the need for care but also on the availability of a social support network 
that is able to provide informal care, which may be a substitute or com-
plement to formal/professional ltc (Norton, 2000; van de Ven, 2005). 
Table 1.1 summarizes the differences between curative care and ltc.
1.3  Why would the government intervene in  
LTC financing?
The amount and the types of ltc that an individual will need over  
his lifetime are uncertain, as are the costs and the timing of the need 
(van de Ven, 2005; Wong et al., 2007). Therefore, it is more efficient to 
pool risks than to save individually to protect oneself against the risk  
of ltc expenditures. 
While the need for ltc is at least partly an insurable event, private ltc 
insurance typically fails to provide coverage for more than a few percent 
of the population, even when there is no public ltc insurance for large 
subgroups of the population (Barr, 2010; oecd, 2011a). The reasons for 
the small market for private ltc insurance in the absence of public ltc 
insurance are investigated in a number of studies (Cremer et al., 2012; 
Cutler, 1996; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2007; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; 
Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Oster et al., 2010; Pauly, 1990). 
1 LTC insurance causes 
substitution of formal care  
for informal care: insurance 
gives the heirs an incentive  
to stop providing informal 
care and put their parent  
in a nursing home because 
the insurance policy protects 
the bequest. This intrafamily 
moral hazard is a problem to 
insurers because they cannot 
observe whether informal 
care is available nor can  
they force potential informal 
caregivers to provide care.  
In fact, the heirs are the main 
beneficiaries of ltc insurance 
(Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and 
Struwe, 1996).
2 And Zweifel and Struwe 
(1996), who used a similar 
argument.
3 It is difficult to predict  
the types of ltc that future 
users will desire and the  
costs of these types of care. 
Because an enrollee’s prefer-
ences are shaped by culture 
and institutions, preferences 
and changes in preferences 
are correlated across enroll-
ees. Hence, expected future 
ltc expenditures are corre- 
lated as well.
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The low uptake of private ltc insurance may be the result of rational 
consumer choice stemming from the desire by elderly people to be sup-
ported by their own children rather than receiving formal care covered 
by insurance (Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Struwe, 1996)1. Pauly (1990) argues 
that if this is the reason for the low uptake of private ltc insurance, there 
is no need for government intervention. Yet, Pauly (1990)2 neglects an-
other potential reason for government intervention: the difference be-
tween the costs and benefits for the individual for society. For ltc users 
it may be optimal to free ride on their family and friends rather than  
to take precautionary measures, while for the family and friends there 
are opportunity costs to providing the care. If this is the case, the lack  
of demand for ltc insurance itself is the problem.
The other studies mentioned above (Cremer et al., 2012; Cutler, 1996; 
Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2007; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; Finkelstein 
and McGarry, 2006; Oster et al., 2010) explain the small size of private  
ltc insurance markets from five sources of market failure: i) adverse  
selection, ii) moral hazard, iii) the insurers’ inability to handle the cor- 
related (intertemporal) risks 3, iv) state-dependent utility and v) demand 
side deviations from rational behaviour, i.e. myopia or the denial of the 
possibility of heavy dependence. Consequently, private ltc insurance 
markets fail in four ways: a) coverage is limited, b) uptake is low, c) pre-
miums are high, and d) the outcomes are often perceived as inequitable. 
The government has several instruments to ensure that an appropriate 
level of ltc insurance is achieved: price subsidies, income transfers,  
regulation of private ltc insurance, and public provision (Barr, 2004). 
The former three instruments complement private insurance. Publicly 
provided insurance, however, substitutes for private insurance. Public 
insurance has the following basic features: i) it is compulsory for at least 
part of the population, ii) it includes cross-subsidies by design and iii) 
the insurance contract is usually not specific about premiums, other 
contributions and future benefits (Barr, 1992). 
Providing public insurance is the only solution for some of the problems 
associated with private ltc insurance (see also: Barr (1992, 2010)). First, 
in case of mandatory coverage, low uptake is not an issue any longer. 
Second, if mandatory coverage is combined with a single-payer system, 
adverse selection is impossible so the pooling equilibrium is reached. 
Third, as there is no need for an explicit and specific contract, public 
insurance can provide protection against risks that can change over  
time and are privately uninsurable. While neither private insurers nor 
the government can take away the intertemporal correlation of risks, 
public insurance may handle these correlated risks more effectively  
because, unlike for private insurance, the government does not need  
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to be specific about either the contributions (e.g. premiums) to the  
insurance scheme in the future or the benefits that it will provide  
(Barr, 2010). Furthermore, as the public insurance premium paid by  
an individual does not need to be related to the individual’s risk, pub- 
lic insurance may involve cross-subsidies between different risk and  
income groups and hence solve access problems and accommodate  
societal preferences for equity.
Public insurance solves many of the problems that are associated with 
private ltc insurance, yet it does not solve the moral hazard problem. 
Consequently, the negative consequences of moral hazard – higher- 
than-optimal ltc expenditures and a suboptimal allocation of resources 
in the ltc sector – need to be limited by providing suboptimal quality of 
ltc or incomplete ltc insurance or by additional policy measures or  
instruments (Cremer et al., 2012). These additional efforts may be target-
ed at the supply or the demand of ltc. Supply-side measures include 
budget restrictions and barriers to market entry, among other things; 
examples of demand-side strategies are cost sharing and coverage re-
strictions, which target the consumer, and managed competition,  
which targets the insurer. 
1.4  Outline 
Part 1: How is LTC use related to LTC financing?
In order to examine how ltc financing is associated with ltc use,  
I look at how differences in ltc financing coincide with differences  
in the relationship between ltc use and personal characteristics. 
This part of my thesis mainly builds upon the literature on the deter- 
minants of ltc use. Many earlier papers have described which personal 
characteristics are related to ltc use and expenditures, given the institu-
tional context. To approximate informal care availability, these previous 
studies often included information on whether a respondent lived alone. 
Chapter 2 describes which personal characteristics explain ltc use.  
It highlights the importance of informal care availability within the 
household, which so far had not gained much attention and shows that 
the characteristics of users of publicly financed ltc fairly closely mirror 
the eligibility criteria that are used to determine whether applicants are 
entitled to publicly financed ltc and that is a major instrument to influ-
ence public ltc expenditures.
Subsequently, I examine how ltc use may be influenced by ltc financ-
ing. I focus on two types of variation in ltc financing: cross-sectional 
differences and differences over time. First, I illustrate how cross-sec-
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tional differences in ltc financing are linked with differences in ltc  
use by comparing the Netherlands and Germany (chapter 3). While dif-
ferences in ltc use across countries have been described before, they are 
not very well understood. For example, may the differences between ltc 
use in the Netherlands and Germany be explained by differences in the 
characteristics of the population or by other differences? And is broader 
and more generous insurance coverage associated with a fairer distri- 
bution of ltc use?
The second type of variation in ltc financing is variation over time.  
In chapter 4, I examine how changes in ltc financing over time in the 
Netherlands are related to ltc use by comparing ltc use in 2000, 2004 
and 2008. Are these changes related to changes in the composition of 
ltc users admitted to nursing homes and residential homes? And may 
the substitution of home care for institutional care by these groups  
fully explain the simultaneous increase in home care use?
Chapters 3 and 4 are among the first studies that describe how differ- 
ences in financing are related to differences in the relative importance  
of each of the determinants of ltc use. Describing this relationship helps 
to understand which subgroups of the population are affected by differ-
ences in ltc financing. Knowledge about this relationship will be help- 
ful when evaluating the impact of similar future changes: who may  
be affected and what may be the magnitude of this impact? 
Part 2: How can the government intervene to achieve its goals?
Public insurance does not solve the moral hazard problem and therefore 
additional policy measures are needed to align the interests of decision 
makers and society. The second part of my thesis addresses how these 
measures may change the incentives for potential ltc users and insur-
ers. To explore how ltc financing in the Netherlands may be changed  
in the future and how these changes may affect financial incentives for 
ltc users and insurers, I describe how various demand-side strategies 
have been implemented in four European countries with public ltc  
insurance: Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.  
Chapter 5 aims to contribute to a better understanding of the conse-
quences of design choices regarding demand-side measures, which  
play a key role in keeping public health care budgets in check. This 
chapter informs policy makers in these countries – and other countries 
with similar policies – by reviewing current policies. I answer three ques-
tions. First, which measures have been implemented? Second, what is 
the expected impact of the measures on the incentives for efficiency? 
And third, what negative side effects do they have? The answers to  
these questions generate information that helps to assess options for 
reform because, given the similarities in ltc financing, the policies  
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may be transferable across these four countries. More importantly,  
the answers generate testable hypotheses about causal relationships 
between ltc financing and outcomes in terms of efficiency and equity.
One demand-side strategy that may improve the incentives for 
insurers to act as prudent buyers of care is to introduce managed com-
petition. Elements of this strategy have been implemented in Belgium 
and Switzerland and were be introduced in the Netherlands in 2015.  
One of the necessary conditions for effective managed competition is 
that insurers have no financial incentives for risk selection. In chapter 6, 
I examine the feasibility of appropriate risk adjustment in ltc insurance 
in the Netherlands: would risk adjustment based on the currently avail- 
able administrative data sufficiently reduce the insurers’ incentives for 
risk selection for subgroups of enrollees without compromising the in-
surers´ incentives for efficiency? Furthermore, I use the findings from 
chapter 2 about the personal characteristics that are associated with  
ltc use to provide suggestions on how the risk adjustment system may 
be improved.
Part 1 
How are the financing and  
use of long-term care related? 
Chapter 2 The link between the spouse’s ability  
to provide informal care and long-term care use
 Submitted. 
 With Claudine de Meijer 
Chapter 2 The link between the spouse’s ability  
to provide informal care and long-term care use
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Abstract
Informal care substitutes for or postpones formal ltc use, especially  
in the Netherlands, where informal care supply affects eligibility for 
public ltc. The association between potential informal care supply  
within the household and formal ltc use has received little attention.  
We examine how the spouse’s physical ability to provide informal care  
is linked with ltc use and transitions.
We used Dutch respondents aged 65 and over from waves 1 and 2 of the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. A mixed multinomi-
al logit regression is used to model the choice between no ltc use, infor-
mal ltc use only, and formal ltc use. Transitions into formal care use  
are modeled with a logit regression.
The spouse’s ability is associated with less formal ltc use but living 
alone remains important after controlling for the spouse’s ability.  
Other important determinants of use are having a child, age, disability 
and health status. Transitions are explained by informal care supply  
and changes therein, health and disability and the respondent’s age. 
The spouse’s ability to provide informal care is associated with less use 
of formal ltc, which implies that future compression of disability would 
lower demand for ltc, directly and through an increase in the spouse’s 
ability to provide informal care.
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2.1  Introduction 
In view of ageing populations and limited public budgets, ltc financing 
and provision has increasingly become a source of concern in developed 
countries. Two common concerns are to keep ltc affordable and to pro-
vide it according to need. These concerns are especially pressing in the 
Netherlands, where spending on ltc for the elders is high (2.3% of Gross 
Domestic Product) compared to the European average (1.5%) and a long- 
standing tradition of universal and comprehensive public coverage 
makes reforms politically sensitive (Martins and de la Maisonneuve, 
2006; ser, 2008). A key issue is the appropriate public-private mix:  
ltc may be formal care that is financed either publicly or privately or 
may be informal care. This study improves the insight in the determi-
nants of ltc use and changes in ltc use in the Netherlands. Improving 
knowledge about the choice for formal or informal care is important as 
informal care substitutes for or postpones home care use and serves as  
a complement to nursing home care and a set of other types of health 
care (Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009).
In the Netherlands, ltc expenditures are universally and comprehen-
sively covered by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act and, since  
2007, the Social Support Act. LTC use is curbed through income-related 
co-payments and through regulating access. Patients apply for publicly 
financed care at the Needs Assessment Agency. This agency decides 
about the applicant’s eligibility on the basis of two sets of criteria:  
criteria regarding the patient’s need and criteria regarding the availa- 
bility of informal care. These criteria are based on international classi- 
fications, including the World Health Organization International 
Classification of Diseases for diseases and related health problems  
and the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and 
Health, which also considers contextual factors such as the availability 
of informal care. Patients who are eligible for publicly financed ltc can 
choose to receive either care in kind or a cash benefit. This cash benefit 
may be spent on formal and informal care, whereas benefits in kind 
consist of formal care only. Next to these demand-side measures, the 
government regulates supply through regional budgets and entry re-
strictions that are set at the national level (ciz, 2009; Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport, 2007). Beyond the system of publicly financed care, 
patients may use privately financed ltc, yet privately financed ltc ac-
counts only for a few percent of the total ltc expenditures (rivm, 2011).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we study the association between  
potential informal care supply and use of formal and informal ltc in the 
Netherlands in more detail. While previous studies have often approximat-
ed the effect of informal care supply by measuring the influence of 
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co-residence status, we investigate the association between informal 
care supply and ltc use more directly using information on the spouse’s 
or partner’s (henceforth, spouse’s) ability to provide informal care and 
information on whether the respondent has children. Focusing on one 
country rather than studying ltc use in entire Europe makes the results 
easier to interpret because institutional differences within the sample 
are small and the eligibility rules in the Netherlands are uniform.
Our second contribution is that we model the probability of a transition 
from no formal ltc use to formal ltc use as a function of changes in  
personal characteristics. Looking at changes in these variables enhances 
knowledge of the relationship between health, disability and transitions 
in ltc use.
2.2  Previous findings
Andersen and Newman distinguish three categories of characteristics 
that influence health-seeking behavior: predisposing, enabling and 
need-related characteristics (Andersen and Newman, 1973). Of these 
three categories, the influence of need-related personal characteristics 
on ltc use has been studied most (Luppa et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 
2009, 2011; Manton et al., 2006, 2007; Portrait et al., 2000). Previous  
studies reported a strong association between need and ltc use. 
Need-related determinants are classified as either disability or health 
measures. Of these, disability is considered the main determinant of  
ltc use. More specifically, the level of disability influences which type  
of ltc is chosen (de Meijer et al., 2009). De Meijer et al. (2009) found that 
elders using institutional ltc are substantially more disabled than elders 
relying on home care; the difference in disability between home care 
users and elders who did not use ltc was much smaller. Like disability, 
health status also affects ltc use but it is unclear whether health status 
affects ltc use only when it increases disability or if it also has an inde-
pendent effect on ltc use.
The probability of ltc use is not only associated with need-related  
characteristics, but also with predisposing and enabling characteristics, 
e.g. demographic and socio-economic determinants such as being female, 
age, living alone and co-payments. (Luppa et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 
2009, 2011; Manton et al., 2006, 2007; Portrait et al., 2000). In contrast  
to the association between need and ltc use, the association between 
informal care supply and ltc use has not often been studied in detail. 
Informal care within the household has often been instrumented or  
approximated by the presence of a co-resident or spouse; informal  
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care from outside the household by the presence and proximity of chil-
dren and by network size (Bonsang, 2009; Bolin et al., 2008; Weaver et 
al., 2008; Nihtilä and Martikainen, 2008a; Portrait et al., 2000). 
Informal care provision is time-consuming and may adversely affect  
the physical and emotional health of the caregiver (Coe and van Houtven, 
2009). Despite this burden, informal care may be a viable alternative to 
formal care because of affection, because caregivers may feel that it is their 
duty to care for a sick family member, because of the bequest they expect 
or because publicly funded formal care is insufficient and the family lacks 
financial resources to pay for private ltc (Pauly, 1990; Oudijk et al., 2011). 
In addition, whether someone provides informal care may depend, 
among other things, on their opportunity costs, the presence of other 
potential caregivers and (strategic) interactions with these other indi- 
viduals (Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Knoef and Kooreman, 2011; 
Pauly, 1990). Because of these reasons, not everyone is equally likely  
to be an informal caregiver and not everyone who needs ltc receives 
informal care. Unlike previous studies, which focus on the role of infor-
mal care from outside the household, this study examines the role of 
potential informal care supply within the household in more detail.
A number of studies examined determinants of transitions from one 
care setting to another. The majority of these studies, however, restricted 
attention to the curative setting (e.g. Coleman et al., 2004). A number of 
studies from the United States on nursing home admissions use a cox 
proportional hazard model (e.g. Bauer, 1996; Freedman, 1996; Tomiak  
et al., 2000). Due to this set-up, these studies make inferences on the 
association between the respondents’ baseline characteristics and a 
transition to a nursing home, and not on how changes in the respond-
ents’ characteristics are associated with the time-to-transition. Another 
approach is to assess the probability of a transition from one care setting 
to another. Using this approach, Greene et al. (1993) found that the prob-
ability of a nursing home admission in the United States was affected  
by age, living alone, disability status and using home care. Knol et al. 
(2003) found that while disability is associated with ltc use among 
Dutch elders, transitions are not determined by baseline disability  
but by poor baseline health. This finding, they argue, shows that  
poor health is a precursor of disability and, hence, need for ltc. 
Few studies explicitly study the effect of changes in health and disability 
on ltc use. Geerlings et al. (2005) and Glaser et al. (2006) reported that  
a divorce or the death of a respondent’s spouse affected the probability 
of a transition to formal ltc use for the elders in the Netherlands and  
the United Kingdom, respectively, while Nihtilä and Martikainen (2008b) 
found that the death of a spouse increased the probability of institution-
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alization in Finland. Geerlings et al. (2005) furthermore concluded that 
changes in need-related and resource-related factors influence the prob-
ability of a transition in the use of informal care and formal care. This 
article, like Geerlings et al. (2005), Glaser et al. (2006) and Nihtilä and 
Martikainen (2008b), examines the effect of baseline characteristics and 
subsequent changes on the probability of a transition to formal ltc use.
2.3  Methods
2.3.1  Data
The data comes from the first two waves of the Dutch sample of the 
Survey on Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (share). SHARE is  
a cross-national panel collecting micro data on health, socio-economic 
status, and other personal and household characteristics of individuals 
aged 50 years and above and their spouses. 2979 Dutch individuals were 
interviewed in 2004 (see Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 2005 for sampling 
methods and inclusion criteria). Of these respondents, 1766 were inter-
viewed again in 2006. In 2006, a refreshment sample added 895 new  
respondents to compensate for attrition. The individual response rate 
was 87,8% in 2004 (‘SHARE Data access and documentation’, n.d.).  
If the individual was not able to answer the questions himself, a proxy 
respondent was allowed to answer all questions that we used in the 
analysis, except for questions on cognitive ability and mental health 4. 
But the number of excluded observations resulting from missing infor-
mation on these variables was small and a sensitivity check showed  
that selection bias did not affect the results. 
As explained in the introduction, we estimate two models: one for util- 
ization of ltc and one for transitions from no formal ltc use to formal 
ltc use. The study sample for the utilization model consists of obser- 
vations in 2004 and 2006 for all respondents who were 65 years of age  
or older, who live alone or with a spouse or a partner and for whom  
information is available on all variables of interest. As a result, the sam-
ple contains 1815 observations. The study sample for the transition mod-
el is restricted to respondents who participated in both waves of the 
survey and does not include individuals who used formal ltc in 2004 
because we only study transitions from no formal ltc use to formal ltc 
use. As a result, the sample that is used for the transition model consists 
of 453 respondents.
2.3.2  Variables
The utilization model
The dependent variable measures the type of ltc service that the  
respondent used in the twelve months preceding the interview.  
4 A proxy respondent  
answered at least one  
set of questions in 205  
interviews (3.05%).
5 Caregivers within the 
same household only report 
personal care in the share 
questionnaire.
6 Sensitivity checks revealed 
that assigning informal care 
from outside the household 
differently did not affect the 
final results.
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People take one decision on the mix of ltc they consume rather than  
a sequence of decisions for each type of care. Therefore, the dependent 
variable consists of three mutually exclusive alternatives: no care; only 
informal care; and formal care, possibly combined with informal care. 
Informal care was defined as domestic help, help with paperwork or  
personal care provided by informal caregivers within the household  
and caregivers from outside the household 5. Informal care from outside 
the household is only reported on the household level; respondents 
were not asked to specify which household members received this  
type of informal care. Therefore, we assigned informal care from outside 
the household to one household member if and only if this household 
member was the only person in the household with a health problem  
or disability. Otherwise, informal care from outside the household was 
coded missing 6. Formal care comprised home care or institutional care, 
both publicly and privately financed. Formal home care consisted of 
professional or paid help with domestic tasks, personal and nursing 
care. Institutional ltc included temporary and long-term admissions  
to residential or nursing homes. 
The set of explanatory variables contains the variables that are related  
to the determinants of ltc use that were mentioned in section 2.2:  
predisposing, enabling and need-related characteristics. All variables  
are self-reported. The predisposing characteristics include the age and 
gender of the respondent and whether the respondent lives alone; the 
enabling determinants that are included are whether the respondent  
has a child and two measures of socio-economic status: the amount  
of net household assets and income. These variables test whether the 
financial situation and income-related co-payments are associated with 
ltc use. The level of health insurance coverage, which is usually correlat-
ed with these measures, was not included in this study because public 
ltc insurance coverage in the Netherlands is universal and comprehen-
sive and hence there is barely any variation in coverage. 
The predisposing and enabling characteristics that indicate whether  
the respondent lives alone and whether the respondent has a child may 
be proxies for the availability of someone who may provide informal 
care. To capture informal care availability better, we also include varia-
bles that proxy for the spouse’s physical ability to provide informal care. 
The spouse’s ability to provide informal care was measured using infor-
mation on the health and disability status of the spouse as well as his or 
her age. If this information was not available because the respondent did 
not have a spouse, in the case of a continuous variable, the average value 
for non-missing observations was taken; discrete variables were set to 
zero (Allison, 2002). These characteristics are associated with the physi-
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cal ability to provide informal care but are not affected by the burden  
of informal care. This burden has been found to mainly impact the care- 
giver’s mental health and general health/well-being, not disability status 
(Coe and van Houtven, 2009). Hence, the variables that we used to meas-
ure the spouse’s ability are not directly affected by caregiving activities. 
The need-related characteristics measure the respondent’s disability  
and health status. Disability was measured by limitations in 23 Activities 
of Daily Living (Katz and Akpom, 1976), Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living (Lawton and Brody, 1969) and mobility items, which are partly 
overlapping and partly complementary. To capture these complex rela-
tionships among all disability measures, all items were combined into 
one disability score using the polychoric principle component analysis 
method, which assigns weights indicative for the severity of disability  
of each of these items. Subsequently, the weighted scores on the 23 lim- 
itations were summed into one measure for disability (Kolenikov and 
Angeles, 2009). As a final step, the disability score was rescaled and  
is bounded between 0 (no disability) and 10 (most disabled). 
The health status measures that are included are an indicator for having 
at least 4 symptoms of depression as measured by the euro-d measure 
(Prince et al., 1999), the number of chronic conditions out of a list of 14, 
self-perceived health, having been hospitalized in the past 12 months 
and cognitive ability according the Mini Mental State Examination 7 
(Folstein et al., 1975).
The transition model
As a result of the small number of transitions between 2004 and 2006, 
we only considered changes from no care/informal care to formal care. 
This approach is similar to the approach used by Geerlings et al. (2005). 
The dichotomization between formal and no formal care is a natural 
one and this specification only excluded respondents who used formal 
ltc in 2004 (n = 75) or who died between 2004 and 2006 (n = 27).
Like in the utilization model, in the transition model we included three 
types of independent variables: predisposing, enabling and need-related 
determinants. Yet, because of the small number of transitions in the data, 
some variables that were used in the utilization model but turned out 
not to affect the probability of a transition were not used, while in some 
other cases answer categories were merged. 
Among the independent variables, we distinguish between time-variant 
and time-invariant variables. For both types of variables, the value for 2004 
was included in the regression. In addition, for each time-dependent var-
iable a second variable was included representing the change that had 
7  The score range was 
rescaled from 0-30 to 0-10.
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occurred. To represent the change between 2004 and 2006, for contin- 
uous time-dependent variables – disability and cognitive ability – the 
value in 2006 was included; for categorical variables, dummy variables 
indicated the direction of the change. For indicators of perceived chang-
es in characteristics, e.g. self-perceived health, the direction of the causal 
effect is unclear because the timing of the changes in the independent 
variables and the transition within the two-year interval is unknown. 
In addition to these variables, the transition model included a dichot- 
omous variable measuring informal care use at baseline in order to  
account for state dependency (Martinez-Granado, 2002). State depend-
ency is plausible in the context of transitions because a change from no 
care to formal care may be more drastic and therefore less likely to occur 
than a change from informal care to formal care: informal care may be  
a stepping stone towards formal care (Geerlings et al., 2005).
2.3.3  Model specification
The utilization model
Data analyses for both the utilization and transition model are performed 
in Stata 12.0. To analyze ltc use, we selected a user written program (Hole, 
2007) for mixed multinomial logit models (Train, 2003). This model was 
most appropriate for several reasons. First, it is more flexible than other 
multinomial models and does not rely on the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives assumption (Train, 2003). Second, it does not impose any 
decision structure upon the data set. Third, the mixed multinomial logit 
model has the advantage that it allows for unobserved correlation over 
time through random effects. Therefore, it properly handles panel data 
and filters out unobserved personal characteristics, e.g. assertiveness 
and beliefs, in case of multiple observations (Train, 2003; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). A likelihood-ratio test indicated that the mixed multino-
mial logit model performed significantly better than the multinomial 
logit model. Cluster robust standard errors were used to correct for  
correlation within households (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
The transition model
Because the dependent variable was dichotomous, we analyzed the 
transitions with a logit regression model. Like in the utilization model, 
observations were clustered at the household level.
2.4  Results
2.4.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for the study sample of the utiliza-
tion model stratified by the type of ltc respondents used. Compared  
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to the full sample, ltc users were on average older, more often female, 
more often living alone, had fewer assets and were less likely to have  
a spouse or children. Spouses of ltc users were older, less healthy and 
more disabled than spouses of non-users. In addition, they had a lower 
income, were more disabled, more ill and were in worse general health. 
Table 2.2 contains descriptive statistics for the study sample that we 
used for the transition model. This sample only contained the respond-
ents who were interviewed twice: the balanced panel. Compared to the 
total sample – the unbalanced panel, the balanced panel was on average 
younger and the spouses of these respondents were more disabled. 
Furthermore, the balanced panel had less chronic illnesses and hospital-
izations, a better self-perceived health and cognitive functioning, was less 
disabled and used less ltc in 2004 than the unbalanced panel. Table 2.2 
also shows that on average, the respondents who experienced a transition 
were older than the balanced panel, lived alone in 2004 more often, had 
a lower amount of assets and had more often received informal care in 
2004. Furthermore, they were more disabled, faced a larger deterioration 
in disability and were more often hospitalized in 2006.
2.4.2  Use of care
The results for the utilization model are reported in table 2.3. Because 
the coefficients are difficult to interpret, we also list the empirically  
derived average partial effects (ape) (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). These APEs equal the difference in predicted probabilities if  
the independent variable changes by one unit. No R2-scores were cal- 
culated; the pseudo R2-score for a comparable simple multinomial  
model was 0.38 for a pooled regression.
Of the predisposing characteristics, age was positively associated with 
the probability of using informal and formal ltc. The ape of age on the 
probability of using informal care was negligible; a one-year increase in 
age was linked with an increase of 1.0 percentage point of the probability 
of using formal care. Being male was only associated with a lower proba-
bility of using formal care. The coefficients related to the dummy for liv-
ing alone compare the probability of use of informal and formal care for 
an individual living alone with an individual co-residing with a partner 
of average age, disability and cognitive ability and no chronic disease 
and no hospitalization in the past 12 months. The APEs for living alone 
on using informal and formal care were 5.6 and 21.8 percentage points, 
respectively.
Only one enabling determinant was associated with the probability  
of informal care and formal care use: the spouse’s disability. The APEs  
for spouse’s disability were large compared to the average probability  
8 The positive relationship 
between spouse’s disability 
and informal care use seems 
counterintuitive but is the 
result of two partly offsetting 
associations: a negative asso-
ciation between the spouse’s 
disability and informal care 
received from a household 
member and a positive  
association with informal 
care received from someone 
outside the household.
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of using informal or formal ltc. For example, a 1-point increase in the 
spouse’s disability score is associated with an increase of the probability 
of using formal ltc by 2.3 percentage points 8. This positive association 
may have either of the two following causes. First, use of informal care 
and use of formal care are negatively correlated because the eligibility 
for some types of public home care is conditional on the absence of a 
potential caregiver in the household. The eligibility criteria thus reduce 
the price for formal care that someone pays who does not live together 
with a potential caregiver relative to the price paid by someone who 
lives together with a potential caregiver. As a result, other things equal, 
demand for formal care is lower within the latter group. Second, infor-
mal care and formal care are substitutes, even in the absence of govern-
ment intervention.
Of the need-related characteristics, disability was associated with  
a higher probability of using informal and formal ltc. A one-point  
higher disability score was associated with a 2.4 percentage point and  
6.5 percentage point higher probability of using informal care and for-
mal care, respectively. A recent hospitalization was also associated with 
an increase in the probability of using informal and formal ltc. Poor  
or very poor general health was associated with formal care use.
2.4.3  The transition model
Table 2.4 presents the estimated coefficients and average partial effects 
for the transition model. The pseudo R2-score of the model was 0.35.  
The average probability of a transition was 11.9 percent. Age, initially  
living alone and a change in co-residence status were important deter-
minants of a transition. The probability of starting to use formal ltc was 
33.3 percentage points higher for respondents who were no longer living 
together than for respondents who did not experience a change in the 
co-residence status and was 15.2 percentage points higher for respond-
ents who were initially living alone than for co-residing respondents. 
Furthermore, elders whose disability status or self-perceived health deteri-
orated or who were admitted to a hospital in the 12 months preceding the 
2006 interview were significantly more likely to start using formal ltc.
2.5  Discussion
This article covers two related topics. First, we discuss which personal 
characteristics and which characteristics of the respondent’s spouse or 
partner determine the type of ltc use – no ltc, informal care or formal 
care (+ informal care) – among the Dutch middle-aged and elders. 
Second, we study the determinants of a transition from no formal  
ltc use to formal ltc use. 
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The main findings are as follows. First, the presence of potential informal 
caregivers is important. Our regression results highlight that the spouse’s 
ability to provide informal care matters for decisions regarding ltc use. 
Similarly, the transition model shows that the probability of a transition 
is associated with no longer living with a spouse. 
Earlier studies concluded that there was a strong association between 
living alone and ltc use (e.g. de Meijer et al., 2009, 2011; Portrait et al., 
2000), which was attributed to the ability of the partner or spouse to 
provide informal care. The spouse’s physical ability to provide informal 
care is a better proxy of informal care availability than the mere presence 
of a spouse and complements the latter: the indicators of the spouse’s 
physical ability distinguish according to ability to provide informal care 
within the population of respondents who live with a spouse, while the 
indicator for respondents who live alone distinguishes between single- 
living respondents and respondents who live with a spouse with an aver-
age ability to provide informal care. The observed associations between 
living alone and informal and formal ltc use may however also result 
from differences in health status that are associated with co-residence 
status and that are not picked up by the other independent variables 
(Lillard and Panis, 1996)9. 
Other measures of informal care availability further reconfirm its impor-
tance. That is, the probability of using formal care is lower for respond-
ents having a child, which approximates informal care supply from 
outside the household. In addition, the probability of formal care use  
is higher for females than for males, which may not only reflect gender 
differences in morbidity, but might also capture gender-related differ-
ences in the willingness and ability to provide informal care to a partner. 
Gender-specific regressions that we performed as a robustness check 10 
confirm previous findings (de Meijer et al., 2011): living together with  
a spouse and the spouse’s ability are associated with ltc use for males 
but not for females. The negative associations between informal care 
availability and formal care use suggest that these types of care may be 
substitutes, which may in turn be induced by the eligibility assessment 
criteria that entail that informal care availability within the household 
lowers public ltc benefits. 
Second, disability and health status are important determinants of ltc 
use and transitions. Unlike de Meijer et al. (2009, 2011), we find that bad 
self-reported health and a recent hospitalization are strongly associated 
with ltc use. These health status measures might be significant because 
unlike de Meijer et al. (2009), we could only include presence, and not 
severity, of disability. The transition model shows that increased disa- 
bility, worse health and poor baseline mental health determine the 
9 Similarly, when health  
is partly unobserved and 
when the respondent’s  
health status is correlated 
with the health status of the 
spouse, differences in health 
status may cause an upward 
bias of the estimated coeffi-
cients for the variables related 
to the spouse’s disability and 
the spouse’s health status.
10 Results are available  
upon request.
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probability of starting to use formal care. While Knol et al. (2003) find 
poor baseline health to be the main determinant of transitions, we find 
that changes in health, disability and co-residence status are more  
important than baseline characteristics when explaining transitions.
Age is an important determinant of ltc use and transitions in this  
study. The effect of age on ltc is subject of debate (Werblow et al., 2007; 
Weaver et al., 2008; de Meijer et al., 2011). According to these studies, age 
(Werblow et al., 2007) and time-to-death (de Meijer et al., 2011) may 
merely be proxies for what really drives ltc demand: disability and  
poor health. The significant effect of age may therefore reflect that  
some dimensions of disability and frailty were not completely captured. 
The findings summarized here show that the allocation of formal 
care is consistent with the guidelines that the Needs Assessment Agency 
uses to assess eligibility for publicly funded care: disability, potential 
informal care supply and, to a lesser extent, illness and general health 
are determinants of formal ltc use. These findings are also relevant for 
other countries that aim to keep ltc affordable and distribute it accord-
ing to need. The relatively large role of need-level determinants and the 
presence of informal caregivers and the negligible effect of assets and 
income likely reflect the central role of the independent Needs 
Assessment Agency, the eligibility criteria and the comprehensiveness  
of the Dutch social insurance system in distributing ltc according  
to need rather than ability to pay. If the institutional structure indeed 
affects ltc use and transitions, the relative importance of determinants 
of ltc use will be different for countries with less comprehensive sys-
tems. These international differences in ltc use and transitions are  
not well understood.
Our results also show that the demand for ltc would be reduced if 
(spouse) disability and its impact can be reduced, e.g. through preven-
tion and by improvements in durable medical equipment. Demographic 
trends may not only affect the demand for ltc by raising the share of the 
population that is impaired but may also affect the supply of informal 
care. That is, larger gains in life expectancy for males than for females 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002), and changes in female labor partici-
pation and retirement policies may affect the availability of informal 
care. Future compression of morbidity would lower ltc use, not only 
directly but also indirectly because it increases the spouse’s ability  
to provide informal care.
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Abstract
International differences in ltc use are well documented, but not well 
understood. Using comparable data from two countries with universal 
public ltc insurance, the Netherlands and Germany, we examine how 
institutional differences relate to differences in the choice for informal 
and formal ltc. Although the overall ltc utilization rate is similar in both 
countries, use of formal care is more prevalent in the Netherlands and 
informal care use in Germany. Decomposition of the between-country 
differences in formal and informal ltc use reveals that these differences 
are not chiefly the result of differences in population characteristics but 
mainly derive from differences in the effects of these characteristics that 
are associated with between-country institutional differences. These 
findings demonstrate that system features such as eligibility rules and 
coverage generosity and, indirectly, social preferences can influence the 
choice between formal and informal care. Less comprehensive coverage 
also has equity implications: for the poor, access to formal ltc is more 
difficult in Germany than in the Netherlands.
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3.1  Introduction
Patterns of utilization of ltc differ across Europe. Two phenomena in ltc 
utilization have received particular attention in the literature: differences 
in the relative importance of formal and informal care and differences  
in rates of institutionalization (oecd, 2005; Huber et al., 2009; Rodrigues 
and Schmidt, 2010). Although cross-country variation in ltc use is well 
documented, it is not very well understood. Studies on ltc using the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 11 (share) do not  
go beyond including country dummies to account for cross-country  
differences. We aim to explain international differences in ltc use by 
investigating the impact of differences in public ltc insurance on house-
hold decisions. We focus on Germany and the Netherlands because both 
countries have a similar system of financing and organizing universal 
coverage for ltc but with some interesting differences in their degree  
of comprehensiveness. Despite the similarities in financing and organi-
zation, there are large differences in the mix of ltc use. We hypothesize 
that (part of) these differences in ltc use between the Netherlands and 
Germany stem from two important differences in the design of the pub-
lic insurance system: i) the use of the spouse’s ability to provide informal 
care as a criterion in determining eligibility for publicly funded care and 
ii) comprehensiveness of public ltc coverage.
To test our hypotheses, we model ltc use as a function of personal  
and household characteristics and decompose the difference in formal 
and in informal ltc use into contributions of differences in population 
characteristics and of differences in coefficients. These differences in 
coefficients show that the association between population characteris-
tics and ltc use is different and may result from institutional and cul- 
tural differences. Previous studies on which characteristics are impor-
tant determinants of formal ltc use (e.g., Manton et al., 2006, 2007; 
Nihtilä and Martikainen, 2008b; de Meijer et al., 2009; Weaver et al., 
2008; Luppa et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 2011) have obtained qualita- 
tively similar findings, regardless of the institutional setting. Need-
related characteristics, such as measures of health status and disability, 
are invariably the most important determinants in terms of size and  
significance and have therefore received most attention. The second 
most important determinant is typically the availability of informal  
care, a close substitute to formal ltc. Informal care availability within 
the household is approximated by the respondent’s co-residence status 
in all of these studies. Chapter 2 shows that living alone is indeed a proxy 
for informal care availability in the Netherlands: the importance of living 
alone is reduced when variables are included that indicate the spouse’s 
physical ability to provide informal care. Spouse age increases use of 
formal and informal ltc and that spouse disability lowers the probability 
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of spouse caregiving and increases the probability of receiving other 
types of ltc (Chapter 2; Goeree et al., 2011). Meng (2010) finds that 
spouse problems with activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental 
activities of daily living (iadl) have a small effect on ltc choices of disa-
bled persons: it increases the probability that the respondent does not 
use any ltc, possibly because the spouse cannot provide informal care.
A related strand of the literature has addressed the relationship between 
informal care (from children) and formal ltc (Van Houtven and Norton, 
2004; Charles and Sevak, 2005; Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Kalwij 
et al., 2009; Knoef and Kooreman, 2011). One of the main findings is that 
the relationship between informal care and formal care differs between 
countries and between types of formal care. Informal care is always 
found to be a substitute for formal ltc, but the magnitude of the sub- 
stitution effect differs. Bolin et al. (2008) attribute the difference that 
they find between northern, central, and southern Europe to differences 
in the strength of family ties and norms regarding family responsibility. 
Our research does not directly assess substitution of formal and infor-
mal care but investigates what specific factors may explain some of 
these between-country differences.
When testing the hypotheses regarding eligibility and comprehensiveness, 
we also highlight differential equity implications of alternative systems 
by examining the effect of institutional differences on horizontal equity 
in ltc use. Horizontal equity is defined as equal use in case of equal 
need, that is, irrespective of income or wealth. Hence, horizontal equity 
holds if ltc use is not associated with income after controlling for other 
characteristics. That is, we assume that vertical equity – appropriately 
unequal treatment in unequal situations – is not an issue: on average, 
each system gets it right (van Doorslaer et al., 2000). This assumption is 
reasonable because within both countries, eligibility criteria are uniform 
and explicit. To our knowledge, horizontal equity in ltc use has not been 
studied before. Previous studies have only examined equity consequenc-
es of alternative ltc arrangements either by looking at the extent to 
which needs are assumed to be met (Kemper et al., 2008; Gannon and 
Davin, 2010) or by assessing perceived financial protection (Keese et al., 
2010; Zuschandke et al., 2010).
3.2  LTC financing in Germany and the Netherlands
The Netherlands and Germany share several characteristics in the way 
they finance ltc. First, both countries have a separate mandatory public 
ltc insurance system with legal entitlements. Public ltc insurance cov-
erage is (nearly) universal: it covers 100% of the population in the 
12 Eligibility assessment  
of the privately insured  
is carried out by a private 
company (Schulz, 2010).
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Netherlands (although income-related co-payments do exist) and  
90% of the German population. In Germany, high-income individuals 
may opt out but have to buy mandatory private insurance that has the 
same benefit package as public ltc insurance. Public insurance ac-
counts for the great majority of total ltc expenditures: 68% in Germany 
and 90% in the Netherlands. Voluntary ltc insurance only plays a small 
role in Germany and no role at all in the Netherlands: uncovered care is 
paid for out-of-pocket (Rothgang, 2010; Schut and van den Berg, 2010; 
cvz, 2011). 
Second, insurance companies jointly negotiate prices (both countries) 
and volume (the Netherlands only) with each provider (ser, 2008; 
Rothgang and Igl, 2007). Insurance companies have little incentive  
to negotiate down prices because they are fully reimbursed for all  
ltc expenditures.
Third, eligibility for public ltc is assessed by independent officials  
and is based on objective eligibility criteria that are set centrally, and  
the outcomes of the eligibility assessment are legally binding. The offi-
cials are employed by either the association of health insurers (Germany)12 
or the government (the Netherlands). Eligibility for publicly funded ltc 
is not affected by the use of private formal ltc. Upon established eligi-
bility, the patient may choose to receive care either in kind or through  
a cash benefit. Cash benefits can be spent freely in Germany but only  
on formal and informal care in the Netherlands (Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport, 2007; ciz, 2009; Schulz, 2010).
However, there are also two important differences in ltc financing.  
First, patient cost sharing is much higher in Germany than in the 
Netherlands. In Germany, the patient pays the difference between  
the lumpsum insurance benefit and the cost of care, neither of which 
depends on income. In addition, the patient pays for board and lodging 
and investment costs (if applicable) (Rothgang, 2010). Private expendi-
tures amount to 31% of total expenditures in Germany and 8% in the 
Netherlands (oecd, 2011a). When in Germany a patient is unable to  
pay the bill, his or her children or, ultimately, social assistance steps  
in (Schulz, 2010). In the Netherlands, the level of co-payment depends 
on the type of ltc used and on income. The co-payment never exceeds 
the household income (cak, 2012).
Second, the rules for eligibility differ with respect to the availability  
of informal care. In Germany, ltc is publicly financed regardless of the 
presence of a potential informal caregiver if ltc is needed daily for at 
least 90 min (e.g., Schulz, 2010; mds, 2011). In the Netherlands, eligibility 
is contingent not only on medical need but also on the availability of 
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informal care: ltc is not publicly funded if an informal caregiver has  
already been providing it. Furthermore, unskilled ltc is not financed 
publicly if there is someone in the household who is able to provide  
it 13. Unskilled ltc is domestic help and supportive guidance; skilled ltc 
is nursing, activating guidance, and treatment of an ailment. Personal 
care – help with ADLs – is at the border and is only paid for if it is needed 
for at least 3 months (ciz, 2005; Schut and van den Berg, 2010). No objec-
tive criteria have been defined to assess physical ability to provide infor-
mal care. Ability depends on the household member’s health but not  
on employment status and preferences, unless the combination of pro-
viding care and having a job causes (mental) health problems for the 
caregiver or if the caregiver is often away from home for a long period 
for work (ciz, 2005).
3.3  Expected implications of the  
institutional differences 
The differences in the treatment of informal care and the level of out- 
of-pocket payments may affect a household’s decisions on ltc use. 
When a family member needs ltc, the family essentially makes a make-
or-buy decision: buy formal care or provide informal care, which may  
be provided by someone from either inside or outside the household. 
The cost of formal care is the sum of i) the price that is borne by the  
user and ii) the cash benefit that the user foregoes and that the user may 
partly have spent freely otherwise; the cost of informal care is foregone 
leisure or, if not yet retired, the wage rate. In case of compensation for 
informal care, for example, through cash benefits, the cost of informal 
care is lower. More comprehensive coverage of formal care increases  
the probability of using formal ltc for everyone (Stabile et al., 2006).  
But we hypothesize that there may be differences in the magnitude of 
the increase between subgroups for which the increase in probability  
is higher because differences between the Netherlands and Germany 
will impact ltc use in two indirect ways. That is, ceteris paribus, differ-
ences in comprehensiveness and eligibility may affect i) the effect of 
spouse characteristics on ltc use and ii) the effect of income on ltc  
use. The first hypothesis means that the effect of spouse characteristics 
on ltc use may be affected by the difference in eligibility rules between 
the Netherlands and Germany – although in the Netherlands, public 
coverage is contingent on the availability of informal care within the 
household, in Germany, it is not. That is, in the Netherlands, the house-
hold’s cost of (some types of) formal care depends on the spouse’s ability 
to provide informal care. According to the former hypothesis, spouse 
ability will be more important in explaining formal ltc use in the 
Netherlands than in Germany.
13 Voluntary informal care 
may, however, substitute  
for usual care provided. 
Hence, if someone provides 
personal care to his spouse 
for more than 3 months, they 
are eligible for compensating, 
publicly financed domestic 
help.
14 According to the share 
team, the sample only  
includes nursing home  
residents if they had been 
interviewed before they 
moved to an institution.
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Differences in comprehensiveness and eligibility may affect the effect of 
income on ltc use because when public coverage is not comprehensive, 
the cost of formal care can be substantial. If, in addition, co-payments 
and cash benefits are not income related, this situation may differential-
ly affect the decisions of the rich and the poor (Newhouse et al., 1981;  
van Doorslaer et al., 1992; Ellis and McGuire, 1993).
A higher co-payment implies an increase in the out-of-pocket price  
of formal care. This price increase has two effects. First, it leads to  
substitution of informal care for formal care. Furthermore, the price  
increase implies lower real income and may therefore have a negative 
effect on demand for both goods (in case of positive income elasticities). 
The net price effect on formal care is therefore negative (e.g., Doehner  
et al., 2007); the price effect on informal care use is unclear. With dimin-
ishing marginal utility of income, the impact of a price increase is small-
er for households with a higher income because the income effect will 
be smaller for these households. Furthermore, the difference between 
income groups is larger for formal care than for informal care if formal 
care is a more luxury good implying that the income elasticity of formal 
care is higher than the income elasticity of informal care, which is likely 
if formal care is more expensive. As a result, income is expected to have 
a stronger effect on formal ltc use in Germany than in the Netherlands. 
More specifically, in Germany, low-income households will more often 
forgo formal ltc than high-income households.
3.4  Empirical analysis
3.4.1  Data
We use data from the first and second wave of the share. The share  
collects microdata on health, socioeconomic status, and other personal 
and household characteristics of individuals 50 years and older and their 
spouses irrespective of age 14. If the individual was not able to answer  
the questions, a proxy respondent was allowed to answer (part of) the 
questions. The final sample consists of both respondents living alone 
and respondents living together with their spouse. Respondents who 
reported having a spouse but whose spouse was not interviewed were 
also excluded from the sample. Table 3.1 shows the size of the sample 
and composition for both countries.
3.4.2  Variables
The dependent variable indicates self-reported use of ltc: no ltc,  
informal care only, or formal ltc with or without informal care. Informal 
care includes domestic help or help with paperwork provided by family, 
friends, or relatives from outside the household only and personal care 
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provided by caregivers living within or outside the household. Because  
it was unclear from the survey which household member(s) benefited 
from informal care from outside the household, we attributed this type 
of informal care to a household member if and only if this household 
member was the only person in the household with a health problem  
or disability. Informal care from outside the household was coded miss-
ing if the main respondent indicated that someone within the household 
received informal care from outside the household and if there were 
more persons with a health problem in the household. Otherwise, this 
variable was coded zero. Formal care comprises home care or institution-
al care, both publicly and privately financed. Formal home care consists 
of professional or paid help with domestic tasks, nursing, and personal 
care. Institutional ltc includes (temporary) admissions to residential or 
nursing homes. We do not model level of use because hours of informal 
care provided within the household are not measured in share.
Explanatory variables include health status and disability, age, gender, 
and whether the respondent has a spouse. Other covariates are house-
hold net worth (assets), year-specific and country-specific income quar-
tiles, and the presence of an informal caregiver either inside or outside 
the household. Income and household wealth are imputed if missing. 
Presence of informal care outside the household is approximated by  
a variable indicating whether the respondent has children; the presence 
of an informal caregiver within the household is measured by the spouse’s 
physical ability to perform caregiving tasks conditional upon the presence 
of a spouse. The spouse’s physical ability to provide informal care is ap-
proximated by the health and disability status of the spouse while we 
control for his or her age. These characteristics are related to the ability 
to provide informal care but not affected by the burden of informal  
care: this burden has been found to mainly impact the caregiver’s  
mental health and well-being (self-rated health), not disability status 
(Coe and Van Houtven, 2009). Hence, the variables we use to measure 
spouse’s ability are not directly affected by caregiving activities.
3.4.3  Model specification and decomposition
We use a multinomial probit model to analyze ltc use. Although alter-
native specifications can allow for correlated error terms and correct  
for unobserved heterogeneity over time for respondents with multiple 
observations, we chose not to exploit the panel structure of the data be-
cause it would unnecessarily 15 complicate the decomposition (e.g., van 
de Poel et al., 2009). Instead, standard errors are adjusted for correlation 
of choices over time by clustering observations at the individual level.
Institutional differences are expected to contribute to between-country 
differences in ltc use as described in Section 3.3. They will do so be-
15 Regression results  
of models that do account  
for unobserved heterogeneity 
by including random effects 
were similar to the results 
from the multinomial probit 
model presented here.
45
cause they lead to differences in the relationship between ltc use  
and the covariates rather than to differences in means of covariates 
themselves. As a first step, we compare coefficients and average partial 
effects (APEs) resulting from separate regression analyses for both coun-
tries. But differences in APEs estimated by nonlinear models may result 
from both between-country differences in coefficients and differences  
in the distribution of other independent variables included in the mod-
el. Therefore, we use a decomposition method for nonlinear models pro-
posed by Yun (2004) to examine whether differences in ltc use between 
the Netherlands (nl) and Germany (de) result from differences in means 
of covariates or in the functional relationship. The decomposition is:
where Y is ltc use and X and β are the sets of covariates and coefficients, 
respectively. F denotes the multinomial probit. The first part represents 
the contribution of the difference in covariates to the difference in out-
comes, and the second part represents the contribution of the difference 
in coefficients. Subsequently, both terms can be broken down further  
to identify the contribution of each variable. The detailed decomposi-
tion is based on a Taylor expansion at the sample averages YNL βNL and 
XDE βDE and results in sets of weights W that measure the contributions 
of between-country differences in means and coefficients:
where K is the number of independent variables in the model,  
and for variable i 
and hence 
(Yun, 2004). It is customary to decompose the conditional expectation 
into the relative contributions, but in a multinomial outcome model, 
3.1
3.2
Y NL – Y DE = F  (X NL βNL ) – F  (X DE βDE )
F  (X NL βNL ) – F  (X DE βNL )  + F  (X DE βNL ) – F  (X DE βDE )
Y NL – Y DE = ∑ W∆X F  (X NL βNL ) – F  (X DE βNL )
∑ W∆X  = ∑ W∆ β  = 1
i
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i = 1
i
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X DE ( βNL – βDE )
ii
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iii
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i = 1
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+
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this approach is not feasible. Because the values of the choice alter- 
natives are arbitrary, the conditional expectation of this model cannot 
be interpreted (Bauer and Sinning, 2008). Therefore, we focus on decom-
posing the differences in predicted probabilities for informal care (ic) 
and formal care (fc) separately instead. That is, rather than decom- 
posing Y NL  – Y DE , we decompose P (IC )NL – P (IC )DE  and 
P (FC )NL – P (FC )DE , where P () denotes denotes the probability of use. 
In other words, we treat each part of the multinomial probit as if it were 
a binary probit model. The interpretation of the results changes accord-
ingly. Following Yun (2008), the contribution of differences in coefficients 
of dummy variables is normalized, and standard errors are calculated 
using the delta method.
3.5  Results
3.5.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics stratified by country. The proba- 
bility of not using any ltc is similar in both countries, but the probabil- 
ity of using any formal care is much higher in the Netherlands (10.23%) 
than in Germany (3.64%), which is in line with macro figures reported  
by Huber et al. (2009). The opposite holds for informal care: the average 
probability of using informal care is 6.7 percentage points higher in 
Germany (11.57%) than in the Netherlands (4.85%).
Between-country differences in the levels of covariates are indicative for 
the extent to which these differences could contribute to variation in ltc 
use patterns. Between-country differences in sample averages are statis-
tically significant only for age, wealth, income in 2006, presence of a child, 
disability, and health status. Spouse characteristics show the same pat-
tern, which is not surprising as spouses are also included as respondents.
The higher share of respondents with a child in the Netherlands and  
the similar shares of single-living respondents seem counterintuitive 
with the fact that informal care is twice as high in Germany than in the 
Netherlands. Worse health and higher disability in Germany are reflect-
ed in the hospitalization rate but not in ltc use. Although a number of 
between-country differences in means are statistically significant, they 
are fairly small in economic terms, except for the differences in income 
and assets.
3.5.2  Analysis
Table 3.3 presents the results for the regression analyses, run separately 
for each country. Because nonlinearity complicates the interpretation of 
the coefficients, the table also includes estimates of APEs. Comparing 
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APEs between the Netherlands and Germany in Table 3.3 reveals that 
differences in the coefficients primarily reflect differences in eligibility 
rules. Spouse disability, for instance, is taken into account in the 
Netherlands but not in Germany when assessing eligibility and posi- 
tively affects the probability of formal care use in the Netherlands but 
not in Germany: in the Netherlands, a one-point increase in the spouse’s 
disability score leads to a 1.6-percentage point increase in the proba- 
bility of using formal care. In Germany, higher cognitive ability of the 
spouse is associated with a slightly lower probability of using formal  
ltc. Having a child decreases the probability of using formal ltc. The 
role of living alone in explaining ltc use is reduced but still significant 
once spouse ability is included (Chapter 2).
A disabled spouse positively affects the probability of informal care use 
in the Netherlands; in Germany, the coefficient is positive but insignifi-
cant. Informal care includes informal care from within the household 
and informal care given by someone from outside the household.  
As expected, the influence of spouse disability on informal care within 
the household is negative (but not significant in the Netherlands) but 
are offset by the positive (insignificant) influence of spouse disability  
on informal care from outside the household (regression with separate 
categories not shown). Having an income below the median decreases 
the probability of using formal ltc in Germany but not in the Netherlands. 
Access to formal ltc is therefore less constrained by income in the 
Netherlands than in Germany. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, wealthier 
respondents use more informal care in the Netherlands.
The signs of the other coefficients are as expected and are similar for 
both countries: worse health and disability scores increase the proba- 
bility of receiving care. Yet, the size of the APEs does differ in some  
cases. The ape of disability on formal care use is three times higher  
in the Netherlands, which may be caused by higher co-payments or 
stricter eligibility rules in Germany. This finding may indicate that  
vertical treatment norms differ between the Netherlands and Germany. 
Reporting a hospitalization or bad health increases the probability of 
using informal care in Germany, whereas in the Netherlands, it mainly 
affects formal care use. Although eligibility rules matter, other factors 
matter too. In Germany, only the number of adl and iadl limitations 
was used to assess need for public ltc (Rothgang, 2010). Yet, other meas-
ures of health and disability, such as a hospitalization, chronic diseases 
and depression, or having children, which measures informal care avail-
ability outside the household, affect (formal) ltc use as well.
3.5.3  Decomposition
We know from the descriptive statistics (Table 3.2) that the average  
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probability of using informal care was 6.7 percentage points lower in  
the Netherlands (4.9%) than in Germany (11.6%). Of this difference, only 
0.6 percentage points could be explained by differences in means of co-
variates (Table 3.4, first column). This contribution of covariates is rein-
forced by the much larger contribution of the difference in coefficients 
(Table 3.4, second column). That is, if the Dutch sample had the charac-
teristics of the German sample, the average probability of using informal 
care would still be 6.1 percentage points lower in the Netherlands than  
in Germany. The use of formal care is 6.6 percentage points higher in  
the Netherlands (10.2% vs 3.6%) than in Germany.
The decomposition results in Table 3.4 show that the contribution of 
differences in means of covariates to variation in formal ltc use is nega-
tive: given the observed distribution of population characteristics, the 
German sample is expected to have a 3.1-percentage point higher use  
of formal care (third column) than the Dutch sample. However, the con-
tribution of differences in means of covariates is more than offset by the 
contribution of differences in coefficients (fourth column). As a result, 
most of the between-country gaps in use of formal and informal ltc  
are explained by differences in coefficients (91% for informal care and 
146% for formal care) as opposed to differences in means of covariates 
(9% for informal care and 46% for formal care).
Table 3.4 furthermore shows the contribution of (groups of) variables  
to the aggregate contribution of both differences in coefficients and  
differences in means of covariates.16 The differential impact of age is  
by far the largest contributor to the gaps between the two countries. 
Differences in the age coefficients for informal and formal ltc account 
for a difference of 30.2 percentage points (452.1%) in informal care use 
and 13.3 percentage points (200.2%) in formal care use (not significant). 
Differential income effects – especially at the low end of the income 
scale – also explain a large part of the differences: the variation in for- 
mal ltc use would be 2.7 percentage points (41%) lower if having a low 
income would have the same effect in Germany as in the Netherlands. 
The differential low-income effect is partially offset by the differential 
high-income effects: high-income respondents in Germany are more 
likely to use formal ltc and less likely to use informal care than high- 
income respondents in the Netherlands. As a result, the aggregate con-
tribution of differences in the relationship between income and ltc use 
is 1.2 percentage points for formal care (19%) and 0.2 percentage points 
(3%) for informal care.
Differences in eligibility rules also matter. The differential effect of dis- 
ability contributes 1.5 percentage points (22%) to the discrepancy in the 
probability of formal care use. The differential association of spouse  
16 A number of robustness 
checks – reversing the de-
composition and using  
another model specification, 
that is, two jointly estimated 
probits – showed that the 
results were very similar: 
none of the important signs 
changed, and the estimated 
magnitudes remained very 
comparable.
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disability – which is taken into account in determining eligibility for for-
mal ltc in the Netherlands but not in Germany – and formal ltc use also 
contributes to the gap in formal ltc use: it explains 1.4 percentage points 
(22%) of the aggregate difference.
6  Conclusion and discussion
We have exploited the availability of comparable data to perform a  
detailed comparison of formal and informal ltc use in the Netherlands 
and Germany and a decomposition analysis of the differences. Our start- 
ing point is the observation that in the Netherlands, there is more use  
of formal care and a less use of informal care than in Germany. We then 
set out to unravel the sources of these differences. Do we observe these 
differences because the observable characteristics differ between  
Dutch and German users? Or because institutions differ between  
these countries?
Our findings are as follows. First, next to demand-related character- 
istics such as needs and supply factors, for example, informal care  
availability, ltc use is also strongly affected by country-specific eligi- 
bility criteria for public ltc coverage and comprehensiveness of the 
public ltc system. These institutional differences translate into very  
different relationships between ltc use – formal and informal – and  
personal characteristics. For instance, the spouse’s ability to provide  
informal care, which is an eligibility criterion in the Netherlands but  
not in Germany, affects the use of public formal ltc in the Netherlands. 
In Germany, it does not. Furthermore, the role of income is very differ-
ent in both countries, with low income deterring use of formal care in 
Germany much more because of higher co-payments for public ltc.  
As a result, access to formal care for low-income users in Germany with-
out an able spouse is much lower than that in the Netherlands, and this 
group is much less likely to use formal care. Future research on the tim-
ing of the onset of ltc might indicate whether lower access means that 
low-income users more often postpone formal ltc use or that they do 
not use it at all.
Second, the decomposition results show that the difference in formal 
ltc use between the Netherlands and Germany is largely (for 90%)  
explained by differences in coefficients of covariates, that is, reflecting 
mostly differences in eligibility rules, while differences in means of co-
variates play a minor role. This finding confirms that institutional differ-
ences as embodied in these coefficients account for much more of the 
between-country difference than patient characteristics. This is most 
clearly brought out by the greater importance of spouse characteristics 
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in the Netherlands in determining eligibility for public care services  
that was described previously. The decomposition results demonstrate 
that the choice between formal and informal care can substantially be 
influenced through system features such as eligibility and coverage gen-
erosity and, indirectly, by social preferences. Our findings suggest that 
use of formal care in the Netherlands would be 9.7 percentage points 
lower and informal care use 6.2 percentage points higher if the German 
system were in place and unobserved differences in preferences do  
not play a role.
Third, there is no difference in ltc use between rich and poor in  
the Netherlands. By contrast, being in the bottom income quartiles  
in Germany is negatively related to formal ltc use, indicating that  
conditional on health, disability, and other covariates, the rich use  
more formal ltc than the poor. Horizontal equity is achieved in the 
Netherlands but not in Germany. Our results for the German sample 
show that even with universal public ltc insurance, horizontal equity  
is not achieved if total expenditures are relatively low and co-payments 
are large and unrelated to income. However, horizontal equity in the 
Netherlands appears to come at a price. Total expenditures on ltc for 
the elderly are much higher in the Netherlands (2.4% of gdp in 2009) 
than in Germany (1.3% in 2008) (cvz, 2011; oecd, 2011b). Whereas 
Germany has recently expanded ltc insurance coverage, recent  
government proposals in the Netherlands involve a substantial reduc-
tion of coverage and entitlement to ensure the sustainability of the ltc 
system (e.g., Rothgang, 2010; Rijksoverheid, 2012). The results of this pa-
per suggest that if the ability to pay and the ability to care are not taken 
into account when deciding on cost sharing for formal care, undesirable 
disparities in use may emerge as system features have a strong influence 
on who ends up taking the burden of caregiving.
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Abstract
The use of ltc is changing rapidly. In the Netherlands, rates of institu-
tional ltc use are falling, whereas homecare use is growing. Are these 
changes attributable to declining disability rates, or has ltc use given 
disability changed? And have institutionalization rates fallen regardless 
of disability level, or has ltc use become better tailored to needs?  
We answer these questions by explaining trends in ltc use for the  
Dutch 65+ population in the period 2000-2008 using a nonlinear variant 
of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. We find that changes in ltc use 
are not due to shifts in the disability distribution but can be traced back 
almost entirely to changes in the way the system treats disability. Elderly 
with mild disability are more likely to be treated at home than before, 
whereas severely disabled individuals continue to receive institutional 
ltc. As a result, ltc use has become better tailored to the needs for such 
care. This finding suggests that policies that promote ltc in the commu-
nity rather than in institutions can effectively mitigate the consequences 
of population aging on ltc spending. 
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4.1  Introduction
Aging populations have pushed up the demand for ltc. As a result,  
ltc expenditures in oecd countries have soared in recent decades 
(oecd, 2011a). In the Netherlands, for instance, real ltc expenditures 
grew on average by 3.9% annually in the period 1995-2010 (Pommer, 
2012). This trend challenges the future accessibility and affordability  
of ltc services. 
Two issues have attracted particular attention in the literature on ltc. 
One strand of research has focused on identifying the determinants  
of ltc use (e.g., Portrait et al., 2000; Manton et al, 2007; de Meijer et al., 
2009; Weaver et al., 2008; Luppa et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 2011). Some 
of these studies apply the estimated ltc use function to the future dis- 
tribution of these determinants to forecast ltc use. In all studies, disa- 
bility is one of the key determinants of ltc use; age and informal care 
availability are other important determinants. These studies suggest  
that population aging, both directly and indirectly through its impact  
on population health, will further mount the pressure on the public  
ltc sector. A second strand of research has investigated the options to 
cope with the rising demand for public ltc. One of the options that has 
featured prominently is the substitution of less expensive ltc services 
for expensive alternatives. This research mostly addresses the question 
whether formal and informal ltc and institutional ltc and homecare  
are complements or substitutes. With regard to the former, the majority 
of studies found that informal care is a substitute for formal ltc, particu-
larly for lower-skilled ltc services (e.g., Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; 
Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Balia and Brau, 2014). Although the 
growing demand for publicly financed ltc can therefore to some extent 
be absorbed by informal care, the substitution effect appears small  
in relative terms (Balia and Brau, 2014). With respect to the latter and 
despite ltc deinstitutionalization policies being very popular in many 
oecd countries (oecd, 2011a), studies on the substitutability of institu-
tional ltc by homecare have almost exclusively focused on the usa  
(e.g., Kemper, 1988; Muramatsu et al., 2007; Kaye et al., 2009; Weissert 
and Frederick, 2013; Guo et al., 2014). Although higher (state-level or  
individual-level) spending on homecare has consistently been found  
to lower the probability of nursing home admission, evidence on  
whether the decrease in institutional ltc expenditures offsets the  
increase in homecare expenditures is less conclusive.
As in many other oecd countries, the Dutch government has been  
encouraging ltc recipients to substitute homecare for institutional ltc 
for decades. In spite of population aging, institutional ltc use rates in 
the Netherlands and elsewhere have fallen in recent decades (oecd, 
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2005; Statistics Netherlands, 2013), which may be the result of deinsti- 
tutionalization policies. Other potential explanations for this decline 
include improved health, enhanced well-being, or better-educated el-
derly (oecd, 2005). Did these changes in the composition of the elderly 
population indeed result in the decline in institutionalization? To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on what explains 
the trend in declining institutional ltc use. This paper aims to shed 
some light on this issue for the Netherlands. We start by explaining the 
decrease in the probability of being institutionalized among the Dutch 
elderly in the period 2000-2008. We then explain the trend in homecare 
and institutional ltc use jointly. This extension to the literature is impor-
tant because these two types of care are to some extent substitutes.  
We use a data set that is unique because it contains detailed information 
on disability and ltc use for both the independent living population and 
the institutionalized population.
LTC use may change for two reasons (Figure 4.1). The first reason is  
that the distributions of ltc determinants, for example disability trends, 
change. With population aging, the average disability level is expected to 
increase between t1 and t2. Hence, the disability density will shift to  
the right (arrow A). As ltc use rates generally increase with the degree  
of disability, the use of ltc is also expected to rise. Second, structural 
and behavioral changes may alter the relationship between ltc use  
and its determinants. These changes in the relationship between ltc  
use and its determinants may be the result of changes in policies and 
patient preferences. Deinstitutionalization policies, for instance, may 
alter the relationship between disability and institutional care use  
(arrow B) and shift the eligibility threshold for institutional ltc to the 
right. Consequently, fewer individuals are eligible for institutional ltc,  
as indicated by the smaller area under the shifted density curve to  
the right of the shifted threshold, raising the average level of disability  
of institutional care users. The growing number of individuals located  
to the left of the threshold may become dependent on homecare as it 
will act as a substitute for institutional ltc. Although Figure 4.1 focuses 
on disability, similar arguments can be made for other determinants  
and their relationship to ltc use.
Employing a nonlinear variant of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method, we decompose changes in ltc use for the Dutch 65+ popula- 
tion into a part due to changes in determinants and a part due to their 
changed impact. We demonstrate that changes in the relationship  
between use and its determinants (henceforth, structural changes)  
explain most of the changes in ltc use. This finding is important for 
forecasts of ltc use. Most forecasting efforts for ltc use only account  
for the part that is due to trends in the determinants of ltc use while 
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neglecting the role of structural changes (Spillman, 2004; Lafortune  
et al., 2007; Manton et al., 2007; oecd, 2011a; de Meijer et al., 2012). 
Although some studies do acknowledge the role of structural changes 
(oecd, 2011a), none has quantified their role. Structural changes are  
likely to continue to play a substantial role given the high frequency  
of regulatory reforms in the ltc sector.
4.2  Institutional context
In a heavily regulated sector like ltc, the institutional context strongly 
affects which factors are important predictors of use (Chapter 3). Policy 
changes are one important source of structural change. In order to  
explain which structural changes may have contributed to trends in  
ltc use, and how, this section describes the institutional context and the 
major changes in ltc policy in the Netherlands during the study period.
4.2.1  Long-term care in the Netherlands
All Dutch citizens have mandatory public ltc insurance covering both 
homecare and institutional ltc. Homecare services include domestic 
help, social assistance, personal care, and nursing care. Institutional  
ltc consists of temporary and permanent admissions to residential  
or nursing homes. Residential homes provide assistance with (instru-
mental) activities of daily living, whereas nursing homes also provide 
nursing care. Institutional ltc accounts for approximately 70% of total 
ltc spending (de Meijer et al., 2011). Access to public ltc is regulated  
by the Needs Assessment Agency 17, which employs strict guidelines  
for eligibility. In addition to disability and health, eligibility for some 
types of homecare also depends on the living situation and informal 
care availability of the applicant (van Gameren and Woittiez, 2005; 
Chapter 3). Empirical evidence indeed confirms that ltc use is largely 
determined by the eligibility criteria for disability and informal care 
availability (e.g., de Meijer et al., 2009; Chapter 3). Public ltc is  
subject to an income-related copayment.
4.2.2  Changes in long-term care policy
During the study period, the capacity of institutional ltc fell by approx- 
imately 11,000 beds (6.3%), whereas the production in the homecare  
sector was increased by 50% (de Klerk, 2011; Dumaij, 2011). These op- 
posite trends are likely to be associated with two ltc policy shifts in  
particular. First, a budget increase in the period 2000-2005 facilitated  
a swift expansion of homecare services. Until 2000, the volume of ltc 
was constrained by fixed global budgets, but rising demand resulted in  
a gradual lengthening of waiting lists. In 1999, a court ruling reconfirmed 
the enforceable right to timely care for those who were eligible for public 
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ltc. Subsequently, additional resources were deployed to reduce the 
waiting lists. In practice, budgets became open ended until 2005 (European 
Court of Justice, 2001; van de Vijsel et al., 2011). Because homecare capac-
ity is expanded more easily than institutional capacity, homecare produc-
tion grew much faster during this period. Homecare waiting lists 
decreased by no less than 35,000 patients and nursing homes waiting 
lists by 4000 patients from 2000 through 2003. This policy change also 
drastically accelerated ltc expenditure growth, which averaged an an-
nual 7.5% in the period 2001-2003 (Pommer, 2012).
Second, the government had been encouraging substitution of home-
care for institutional ltc for several decades. To further promote sub- 
stitution, a new series of policy reforms was enacted between 2000  
and 2008 (de Klerk, 2011). The new policies were in accordance with 
strong patient preferences to stay and live in the community as long  
as possible and made homecare more demand driven (Pommer, 2012). 
First, from 2003, eligibility for ltc care was no longer tied to the place  
of delivery – at home or in an institution – but was instead defined in 
terms of the type of ltc required, for example, personal or nursing care. 
Second, public homecare provision was no longer restricted to certified 
homecare suppliers; residential and nursing homes and organizations 
that had previously not been certified to provide publicly financed ltc 
could also provide public homecare (Pommer, 2012).18 As a result,  
the sharp division between homecare and institutional care suppliers 
gradually disappeared. The third reform that encouraged homecare use 
was that, from 2007 onwards,19 elderly who were eligible for institutional 
ltc could choose to receive homecare instead (Pommer, 2012). Alongside 
these reforms, eligibility criteria were standardized, for example, through 
the centralization of the eligibility assessment and the introduction  
of the notion of ‘usual care’ 20 in 2003. Yet, the eligibility criteria for  
institutional ltc use did not become stricter, at least not explicitly.
4.3  Methods
4.3.1  Data and sample selection
For all three observation periods, we pooled two cross-sectional surveys: 
the Facilities Use Survey (fus), a quadrennial population survey among 
private households, and the Elderly in Institutions Survey (eis), a quad-
rennial survey among residents of ltc institutions. The questionnaires  
of both surveys were identical for the variables of interest.
For fus, households were sampled from a national sample of postal  
addresses.21 Of the gross samples of fus, 66-69% of the households  
participated, containing 2029 individuals aged 65+ in 2000, 2302 in  
18 Before 2003, homecare 
suppliers that did not offer  
all homecare services were 
not certified to provide pub-
licly financed ltc. From 2003, 
agencies that offer at least 
one homecare service could 
enter the market, which 
resulted in an expansion  
of homecare capacity 
(Varkevisser et al., 2007).
19 Note that this reform is  
of limited relevance for our 
study period given that it took 
place in 2007 and may not 
immediately have had a large 
impact on ltc use decisions.
20 Usual care is the part  
of care household members 
are expected to provide and  
is therefore not publicly 
financed.
21 The sample selection 
design in 2000 differed  
from that in 2004 and 2008.  
In 2000, households were 
randomly selected in one 
stage; in 2004 and 2008,  
a two-stage sampling design 
has been used. First, munici-
palities stratified by region 
and interviewer area were 
selected with selection proba-
bility proportional to their 
size. Second, households 
within the selected munici-
palities were randomly 
selected. 
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2004, and 2064 in 2008. Item non-response further reduced the samples 
to 1514, 1827, and 1374 respondents in 2000, 2004, and 2008, respectively.
The sample selection of eis consisted of two stages. First, institutions 
stratified by region and type of institution (residential home and somatic 
or psychogeriatric ward of a nursing home) were selected with selection 
probability proportional to their capacity. Second, in all selected institu-
tions, a sample of five to seven permanent residents and two reserve 
samples were randomly selected. To obtain the desired number of  
participants, respondents who refused participation were replaced  
by a resident from one of the reserve samples. A proxy respondent  
was interviewed when the respondent was not capable of answering  
the questions. In total, 967, 1126, and 1381 residents participated in eis 
2000, 2004, and 2008, respectively, resulting in 937, 1005, and 1217 com-
plete cases. The pooled study samples of 2000, 2004, and 2008 therefore 
comprised 2451, 2832, and 2591 respondents, respectively.
We applied a two-step weighting procedure. First, post-stratification 
weights were derived to correct for selection caused by item non-response. 
The weighting variables were self-reported health * institutional setting. 
Second, iterative proportional fitting (ipf) weights were computed  
to correct the marginal distribution of the weighting variables in our 
sample to those of the Dutch 65+ population (Battaglia et al., 2004).  
In this second step, the weighting variables were age * sex * marital  
status and institutional setting. This procedure ensured that the decline 
in institutional ltc use in our weighted sample is identical to the actual 
decline observed among the entire Dutch 65+ population. Final weights 
were obtained by multiplying the post-stratification and ipf weights.
4.3.2  Variables
LTC use consists of the alternatives no use, homecare use, and insti- 
tutional ltc use. Homecare includes formal personal or nursing care. 
Institutional ltc includes permanent admissions to residential and 
nursing homes. Informal care, domestic care, and temporary admissions 
to ltc institutions were not considered. Disability is measured by activ- 
ities of daily living (adl), mobility, and the global activities limitation 
indicator (gali), all self-reported. ADL includes the following activities: 
getting in/out bed, (un)dressing, washing face and hands, washing one-
self completely, and toileting. The following mobility items were includ-
ed: getting up/sitting down, walking stairs, walking for 10 min, leaving/
entering the house, and moving outdoors.22 The gali comprises one 
question that measures to what extent respondents were hampered  
in daily activities by chronic conditions: not at all, mildly, or severely 
(van Oyen et al., 2006). We constructed a disability index, using all items, 
by means of a polychoric principal component analysis (Kolenikov and 
22 Levels: without difficulty, 
with difficulty, or unable to 
perform.
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Angeles, 2004), which is appropriate for ordinal variables as it allows  
for nonlinearity in the scale of individual items. The advantage of this 
method is that it exploits information on all disability items and answer 
categories and that it acknowledges that not all items contribute equally. 
The index was rescaled from 0 (not disabled) to 10 (severely disabled).  
To allow for nonlinearity of the relationship between disability and ltc 
use, we use six dummy variables for being non-disabled and for having  
a disability score of 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, and 9-10, respectively.
In addition to disability, we added health, socio-demographic charac- 
teristics, and educational attainment as other determinants. Health  
was included as the number of chronic conditions of a pre-specified  
list of chronic conditions.23 Cognitive functioning could not be included 
as one of our samples (fus) lacked information on cognitive functioning 
The socio-demographic determinants include age (5-year categories), 
sex, and living alone status. The latter is a proxy for informal care avail- 
ability. For the institutionalized respondents of eis, living-alone status 
was recorded at the time of admission. Some of the covariates are poten-
tially endogenous to ltc use. Therefore, we do not interpret the average 
partial effects obtained from the estimates as causal effects but rather  
as partial associations that can be used to decompose the trend in ltc 
use. The decomposition technique (Section 4.3.3) is used to statistically 
account for the changes in ltc use.
4.3.3  Model specification and decomposition
As discussed in the introduction, both changes in determinants and 
their changed association with ltc use contribute to trends in ltc use.  
In order to quantify the contribution of both sources of change to  
trends in ltc use, we employed a nonlinear variant of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition technique proposed by Yun (2004). Formally,
where X and β represent vectors of determinants and coefficients,  
respectively. t denotes the year 2008, and t - 1 represents either the year 
2000 when decomposing the predicted probability of institutional ltc 
use or the year 2004 when decomposing trends in the predicted proba-
bilities of no use, homecare use, and institutional ltc use.24 F denotes 
the logit function in the first case and the multinomial logit function  
in the second.25 The first term on the right-hand side represents the con-
tribution of changes in covariates (determinants), whereas the second 
represents the contribution of changes in coefficients. Subsequently,  
a more detailed decomposition identifies the contribution of each  
23 Chronic conditions  
included asthma; chronic 
bronchitis; lung emphysema; 
chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disease; cancer; heart 
disease; narrowing vessels  
in abdomen or legs; cere- 
brovascular accident or 
stroke; serious disease of  
the kidney, gall bladder,  
liver, or thyroid; osteoar- 
thritis; rheumatoid arthritis; 
diabetes; serious disease  
of the spine, neck, shoulder, 
elbow, wrist, or hand; epilep-
sy; and diseases of the skin.
24 No comparable data  
were available for homecare 
use in the year 2000.
25 The multinomial logit 
relies on the independence  
of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption. A mixed multi-
nomial logit model that does 
not require this assumption 
provided very similar average 
partial effects as the ones 
reported in this paper by 
multinomial logit models. 
Given the similarities of the 
average partial effects (APEs), 
we chose the multinomial 
logit model as decomposing 
predicted probabilities ob-
tained by a mixed multino- 
mial model that involves 
decomposing a random 
effect, which is very complex.
LTC t – LTC t - 1 = F  (X t βt) – F  (X t - 1 βt - 1)
F  (X t βt) – F  (X t - 1 βt)  + F  (X t - 1 βt) – F  (X t - 1 βt - 1) 4.1
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determinant.26 As in Yun (2008), we normalize the contribution of the 
changed coefficients for dummy variables. The standard errors are  
calculated using the delta method and are clustered at the household 
level, or at the homecare level.
4.4  Results
4.4.1  Trend in long-term care use
Table 4.1 shows that institutional ltc use dropped significantly be- 
tween 2000 and 2008. The 1.50 percentage point reduction is almost  
entirely due to a decrease in residential homes admissions. This implies 
a relative reduction of nearly 25%, which is substantial, especially when 
considering that institutional ltc accounts for approximately two-thirds 
of ltc expenditures. The fall in institutional ltc use is more than com-
pensated by an increase in homecare users. Homecare use increased 
from 5.34% in 2004 to 8.70% in 2008, in line with ltc policy aims at  
the time.
4.4.2  Trends in determinants
None of the distributions of the core determinants, that is, disability, 
age, and co-residence status, significantly changed during the periods 
2000-2008 and 2004-2008 (Table 4.1). This is consistent with earlier re-
ports of a stable or slightly increasing disability rate between 2000 and 
2008 (van Gool et al., 2011; Hoeymans et al., 2012). Changes in disability 
therefore cannot explain the fall in institutional ltc use. Although the 
slightly increased share of the older age groups suggests that the popu- 
lation is aging, none of these increases were significant.27 Interestingly 
and despite the aging, the average number of reported chronic condi-
tions significantly decreased between 2004 and 2008. Elderly in 2008 
were also significantly better educated than in 2000. The absence of  
significant trends in most of the determinants suggests that the con- 
tribution of changes in determinants to the explanation of the trend  
in ltc use must be small.
4.4.3  Changes in the association between long-term care use and  
its determinants
As disability is the key determinant of ltc use, any change in the asso- 
ciation between disability and use will strongly contribute to the trend 
in institutional ltc use. Figure 4.2 presents the probability to be institu-
tionalized as a function of disability for each of our observation years.  
It shows a marked reduction in the overall probability of residing in an 
institution between 2000 and 2008. But the decline was not identical 
across levels of disability: use declined most for those with a disability 
score between 3 and 8, and it even slightly increased for the most severe-
26 See Yun (2004) for a  
more detailed description  
of the aggregate and detailed 
decomposition technique.
27 Note that although the 
mean age of the 65+ popu- 
lation did not increase, the 
mean for the entire Dutch 
population did. Changes in 
the age composition reported 
in this paper are in line with 
those reported by Statistics 
Netherlands.
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ly disabled. Institutional ltc in 2008 therefore has become more  
concentrated among those in greatest need.28 The added density  
plot highlights the fact that the large majority of respondents have  
low levels of disability.
Figure 4.3 displays the trends in no use and homecare use by severity  
of disability and the density distribution of homecare use. Note that the 
probability of receiving homecare first rises with disability and then falls 
for respondents with a disability score exceeding 8 (Figure 4.3b). The prob-
ability of not receiving any ltc at all fell for all disability levels in the  
period 2004-2008, confirming growth in overall ltc use (Pommer, 2012). 
However, use increased most among the elderly with a disability score 
below 8. This subgroup also became less likely to be institutionalized, 
suggesting that institutional ltc has indeed been substituted by home-
care for those with lower disability levels. The most severely disabled 
elderly continued to use institutional care: for this group, homecare 
does not seem to be a viable alternative.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 strongly suggest that the relationship between disa-
bility and ltc use has indeed changed, but other, potentially confound-
ing determinants are not controlled for in these figures. Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 present the APEs that are based on regressions of homecare use  
and institutional ltc use on all determinants.
The changes in the APEs of determinants on institutional care use and 
homecare use are similar in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The level of disability,  
age, being a female, and living alone all raise the probability of using 
institutional care. Additional analyses (results not shown) made clear 
that the probability of residing in a residential home first rises and then 
falls with disability level as the most severely disabled more often live  
in a nursing home. The ape of low to moderate levels of disability on  
institutional care use fell between 2000 and 2008. Also the ape of age 
decreased, especially among the older subgroups.
For homecare, the APEs of nearly all covariates on the probability  
of using homecare increased between 2004 and 2008. The ape of dis- 
ability among elderly with a disability score of 3 or higher increased  
substantially in the period 2004-2008, but the change was not significant. 
Chronically ill elderly in 2008 were more likely to receive homecare than 
those in 2004 and were less likely to receive no care at all.
4.4.4  Decomposition of the trend in institutional long-term care use
Table 4.4 presents the decomposition of the trend in institutional ltc 
use.29 The first rows show that the decrease in the probability to be in- 
stitutionalized is entirely attributable to the changes in the coefficients 
28 The time since admission 
of eis respondents decreased 
across the survey years, which 
rules out that the observed 
incline in average disability 
level of the institutionalized 
sample is the result of an 
increase in the time since 
admission. 
29 Decomposition results  
are similar for the periods 
2000-2004 and 2004-2008.  
A slight difference is that the 
detailed decomposition does 
not return any significant 
contributions because the 
observed change in institu-
tional ltc use is rather small 
over a 4-year period.
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of determinants. In fact, changes in the distribution of determinants 
contributed negatively to the decline in institutional ltc; in other words, 
in the absence of structural changes, institutional ltc use rates would 
have risen by 0.31 percentage points.
The detailed decomposition reveals that nearly 11 percentage points  
of the negative contribution of trends in determinants (20.47%) can  
be attributed to changes in the age composition and 15 percentage points 
to changes in the disability distribution. The latter finding indicates that 
if the relationship between disability and institutional ltc had remained 
as it was in 2000, the trend in disability would have resulted in a 0.22 
percentage point higher use of institutional ltc in 2008 (compared  
with 2000).
Concerning the changes in the association between institutional ltc  
use and its covariates, it is clear that the changed coefficients of non- 
disabled and mild disability on institutional ltc use are responsible  
for the majority of the decrease in institutional ltc use. Interestingly, 
changes in the coefficients of being more severely disabled (3-10)  
contributed negatively to the observed trend in institutional ltc use. 
Had the association between institutional care use and a disability  
score above 3 remained as in 2000, institutional ltc use rates would 
have been 0.13 percentage points lower in 2008 than actually observed.
4.4.5  Decomposition of the changes in long-term care use
Table 4.5 presents the decomposition of changes in ltc use, including 
homecare use, between 2004 and 2008. The second and third columns 
show the decomposition of the observed change in homecare use, the 
last two columns the decomposition of the observed change in insti- 
tutional ltc use. The point estimates for institutional ltc are virtually 
identical to those in Table 4.4. However, the observed change (0.69  
percentage points) is probably too small to detect any significant 
contributions.
For homecare, changes in both the determinants and in their coeffi- 
cient estimates contribute positively to the increased homecare use,  
but only the latter contribution is significant and explains 91% of the 
increase. The detailed decomposition does not identify any significant 
contribution of individual determinants to either of the aggregate con-
tributions. This may be due to the small numbers of homecare users in 
our samples (87 and 92 in 2004 and 2008, respectively; Table I presents 
weighted descriptives).
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4.5  Conclusion and discussion
Recent shifts in ltc use among the Dutch elderly are explained by 
changes in how the ltc system treats disabled elderly, not by shifts in  
the prevalence of disability among the elderly. This conclusion derives 
from a decomposition analysis that splits the change in ltc use into two 
parts: one part that is explained by changes in the determinants of ltc 
and another part that is explained by structural changes in the relation-
ship between ltc use and its determinants, such as policy reforms and 
changed patient preferences. Our findings are as follows.
First, the overall drop in institutional ltc use between 2000 and 2008  
is not equal across the disability distribution. The propensity to use  
institutional ltc has fallen primarily among non-disabled or those with 
a mild disability, whereas it has even increased for the most severely  
disabled. This suggests that ltc use is better tailored to needs in 2008 
than it was in 2000.
Second, a joint analysis of changes in home care and institutional care 
use demonstrates that the reduction in institutional ltc was (more than) 
compensated by a rise in homecare use. This finding is in accordance with 
the Dutch ltc policy goal of encouraging ltc use in the community rath-
er than in institutions. It also squares with stronger population preferenc-
es to remain living at home independently.
Third, observed trends in ltc use are almost entirely explained by chang-
es in their association with determinants. For homecare use, the changed 
association with determinants explains 91% of the 3.36 percentage point 
higher use of homecare in 2008 than in 2004. For institutional ltc, the 
decrease is entirely attributable to changes in the (partial) association 
between institutional care use and its determinants. In the absence  
of structural changes in the responsiveness of use to disability, institu-
tional ltc use would have risen – not fallen – between 2000 and 2008. 
Unfortunately, the method does not allow us to identify which structural 
changes have contributed most to trends in ltc use. Because the chang-
es in estimated coefficients are in line with the ltc policy objectives 
(Section 4.2.2) and with the preferences of the elderly to live at home, 
they are likely to both have played a role. Technological developments, 
including telemedicine and information and communication technol- 
ogy, and housing adaptations to facilitate living at home with disability 
may also have played their part (oecd, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2013).
Finally, a more detailed decomposition reveals that elderly with no  
or mild disability became far less likely to reside in a ltc institution, 
which accounts for most (67%) of the fall in institutional ltc use. 
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Without this reduced probability of institutionalization, use rates  
would have decreased by 0.5 percentage points instead of the observed 
1.5 percentage points. The most severely disabled were unaffected: the 
probability to receive institutional ltc only fell for the less disabled  
elderly. The fall may either reflect stricter eligibility criteria, that is,  
a shift of the eligibility threshold for institutional ltc in Figure 4.1 to  
the right, or a stronger preference for receiving ltc at home. In the latter 
case, ltc policy reforms have played a role by accommodating this shift 
in preferences. One other potential explanation why homecare use has 
risen is related to the so-called woodwork effect that has been shown  
to have played a role in experiments in the usa that evaluated the cost 
effectiveness of setting up a homecare program to postpone nursing 
home entries (Weissert and Frederick, 2013). The woodwork effect refers 
to a situation where an expansion of the entitlement (e.g., to home care) 
induces individuals who had already been eligible but not exercised 
their rights, to sign up for homecare merely because of the increased 
attention, thereby ‘coming out of the woodwork’. A similar phenomenon 
may have occurred in the Netherlands because the decrease in institu-
tional ltc use is more than offset by the increase in homecare use and 
homecare use also grew among respondents with low levels of disability, 
who are less likely to use institutional care. These observations suggest 
that at least part of the increase is not likely to result from substitution  
of homecare for institutional care. Further research is required to inves-
tigate the causes of the observed changes in ltc use patterns.
Other limitations of our study are as follows. First, as we lack infor- 
mation on ltc expenditures, our conclusions only hold for ltc use. 
Structural changes affecting the prices and the amount of ltc are  
therefore not taken into account. In the period 1995-2008, price increas-
es, mainly due to quality improvements and rising salaries, were respon-
sible for a significant part of the growth in ltc expenditures (Dumaij, 
2011). From 2000 onwards, greater emphasis was placed on improve-
ments in the quality of care and the living situation of the elderly 
(Dumaij, 2011). For instance, multi-person nursing home rooms were 
largely replaced by two-person or private bedrooms. Second, our data 
do not register domestic help, a common type of homecare use. As these 
are relatively low cost compared with other ltc services, the types of ltc 
that we study account for the vast majority of ltc expenditures. Third, 
our sample may contain too few homecare users to be able to detect 
significant contributions of changes in single determinants and their 
effects on the trend in homecare use.
We conclude that the changes in the association between ltc use and  
its determinants, in particular the responsiveness of use to disability, 
rather than changes in the determinants are responsible for the  
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observed changes in ltc use. This finding highlights that forecasts  
of ltc use based only on trends in determinants are on shaky ground.  
In our case, such a forecast would have estimated a 0.31 percentage 
point increase in institutional ltc use instead of the actually observed  
1.5 percentage point decrease between 2000 and 2008. Adequate ltc  
substitution policy that is capable of moving ltc users from institutions 
to the community can accommodate the consequences of population 
aging and may be successful in containing ltc expenditure growth.
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Part 2 
How can the government  
intervene to achieve its goals?
68
An abridged version of this chapter is forthcoming  
in the Journal of Health Services Research and Policy. 
With Dov Chernichovsky, Francesco Paolucci, Erik Schokkaert,  
Maria Trottmann, Juergen Wasem, Erik Schut. 
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Abstract
Moral hazard in public ltc insurance may be counteracted by strate- 
gies influencing the supply or the demand. Demand-side strategies may 
include cost sharing and coverage restrictions, which target the consum-
er, and managed competition, which targets the insurer. We analyse the 
pros and cons of the various demand-side strategies to counteract moral 
hazard and to what extent these are implemented in four European 
countries with public ltc insurance: Germany, Belgium, Switzerland  
and the Netherlands. 
Consumer-oriented strategies to counteract moral hazard in public  
ltc insurance are used in all four countries but their net impact on  
efficiency is unclear and crucially depends on their design. In Germany 
and Switzerland, cost sharing is higher and less related to income than 
in Belgium and the Netherlands. Higher cost sharing may have a larger 
impact on moral hazard but the net impact on efficiency is not clear. 
Furthermore, it may negatively affect access to ltc. 
Demand-side strategies targeted at insurers are much less popular:  
only Belgium and Switzerland have introduced elements of managed 
competition for some types of ltc. Because only elements of managed 
competitions have been introduced, it is unclear whether it improves 
efficiency. Its effect will depend on the feasibility of setting appropriate 
financial incentives for insurers using risk equalization and the willing-
ness of governments to provide insurers with instruments to manage ltc.
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5.1  Introduction
Affordable, universal, comprehensive insurance helps to ensure access 
to ltc. But public and private insurance against ltc expenditures suffer 
from ex-post moral hazard because consumers do not bear the full cost 
of the services that they consume and because insurance gives the heirs 
an incentive to stop providing informal care. Moral hazard makes the 
resource allocation less efficient: moral hazard may lead to use beyond 
the point where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs because 
moral hazard may cause substitution of more expensive formal ltc for 
informal care and less expensive ltc and may increase the group of in- 
dividuals who claim benefits. As a result, ltc expenditures grow fast. 
Public ltc expenditures are a matter of concern in many countries  
because of population ageing and increasing constraints on public 
budgets. Therefore, controlling the consequences of moral hazard is  
a major policy issue. The negative consequences of moral hazard may  
be mitigated by strategies limiting the supply or the demand for ltc.  
In this article, we focus on the demand-side strategies, which may target 
either the consumer or the insurer. Consumers may be targeted by cost 
sharing and coverage restrictions that change their marginal cost of use; 
insurers may be turned into prudent buyers of care by introducing man-
aged competition. Managed competition is a system in which supply 
and demand determine the allocation of insurance contracts sold by 
competing insurers to individuals, subject to government regulation  
of the benefit package and premium setting (e.g. through compulsory 
community rating), an open enrolment requirement, and a system  
of risk equalization (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). 
Managed competition may enhance efficient health care provision  
by giving insurers financial incentives to act as prudent buyers of health 
services on behalf of their enrolees. The role of managed competition  
in health care and its proper scope have been a major topic in health 
economics. Elements of managed competition have been introduced  
in public health insurance by a number of countries (Enthoven, 1998; 
van de Ven and Ellis, 2000; van de Ven and Schut, 1994; van de Ven et  
al., 2007). So far, however, experience with managed competition in ltc 
is limited to a few countries in which health care and some ltc services 
are integrated into a single public insurance scheme. Whether managed 
competition may, under certain conditions, be an appropriate way to 
finance some types of – or all – ltc is an unanswered question. The an-
swer depends, among other things, on whether the insurers can be pro-
vided with the appropriate instruments and incentives to act as prudent 
buyers of ltc and on whether a sufficient proportion of consumers will 
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(be able to) act as critical buyers of ltc benefits offered by insurers  
(van de Ven and Schut, 1994). 
In practice, several versions of the demand-side strategies have been 
implemented in four European countries that finance ltc through  
public insurance as opposed to subsidizing ltc from general taxation – 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In Germany and 
the Netherlands, ltc is covered through a separate public mandatory  
ltc insurance scheme; Belgium and Switzerland have integrated cover-
age for medical ltc services into their system of health insurance while 
non-medical ltc is organized by local or regional governments. Medical 
ltc is defined as the evaluation of needs, and provision of advice,  
direct medical care and support with Activities of Daily Living (adl)  
in Switzerland (Weaver, 2012); in Belgium, a similar definition applies 
(Willemé et al., 2012).
The main research question of this article is: do the ways in which the 
demand-side strategies are currently implemented in these countries 
help to curb the impact of moral hazard on allocative efficiency and  
expenditures? And do these strategies have negative side effects on  
universal access to basic ltc? The answers to these questions highlight 
the consequences of design choices regarding demand-side measures. 
These answers generate hypotheses about causal relationships between 
demand-side measures and outcomes and suggest how each of these 
countries – and other countries with similar policies – may change their 
policies. The variation in demand-side measures may have many rea-
sons, including political reasons, compatibility with other government 
programs and the relationship between the central or federal and the 
local and regional governments. However, the variation in demand-side 
measures is not likely to be explained by differences in the technical fea-
sibility of these measures because all four countries have a similar ltc 
financing system and because this system to a large extent determines 
which measures are technically feasible. Hence, the experience with  
the various measures may be transferable across these countries.
5.2  Strategies to reduce moral hazard
Policies targeting consumers aim to limit their demand. One of these 
policies is independent eligibility assessment. In medical care, eligibility 
is usually determined by providers. But to limit the influence of provid-
ers on the type and amount of ltc used, in ltc this task is often entrust-
ed to independent assessment agencies. Eligibility assessment aims to 
reduce excessive ltc use resulting from ex-post moral hazard by only 
granting the insured access to the ltc services that they need. Eligibility 
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assessment criteria related to health and disability help to ensure the 
allocation of formal care according to need; criteria related to the avail- 
ability of informal care prevent – undesired, and possibly, desired – sub-
stitution of formal care for informal care. Thus, independent eligibility 
assessment limits expenditures and may improve the resource 
allocation. 
In addition to independent eligibility assessment, governments may  
also curb demand for public ltc through cost sharing, providing ben- 
efits in-kind, reimbursement limits, coverage restrictions and means 
testing. Cost sharing reduces the demand by increasing the price of  
formal ltc for ltc users, their informal caregivers or both parties.  
As a result, cost sharing reduces the gap between the total marginal 
costs and the marginal costs of the consumers and thus limits moral 
hazard and its negative consequences. A potential drawback of cost 
sharing is that the consumers’ reactions to the price increase resulting 
from cost sharing are heterogeneous, which will affect the impact of cost 
sharing on efficiency. If, for example, some consumers who need formal 
care forego it, this formal care will not be used by the individuals who 
would benefit most from it. The impact of cost sharing measures de-
pends on their design. In absence of transaction costs, the ideal cost 
sharing arrangement is tailored to the price sensitivity of each consumer 
given his income and wealth, the amount of ltc that he uses and the 
availability of substitutes, among other things. Cost sharing designs  
that take into account at least some of these differences are therefore 
more efficient than having a single tariff for everyone. More sophisti- 
cated designs that take differences in income and wealth into account 
are also superior to plain tariffs because they guarantee financial  
access to ltc for low-income individuals.
Providing benefits in-kind rather than handing out cash benefits  
may limit moral hazard as they make claiming unnecessary benefits  
less attractive. When the insurance benefits can for example only be 
spent on formal care, it will only be attractive to claim these benefits  
for who need these services; patients for whom the net marginal benefit 
of receiving formal care is smaller than or equal to zero will not claim 
benefits, while they may have claimed them anyway when the benefits 
could have been spent on other things. The net impact of in-kind trans-
fers on efficiency is unclear. While in-kind transfers limit moral hazard 
because they make it less attractive to claim unnecessary benefits, unre-
stricted cash benefits may help to improve coordination between formal 
ltc and informal care and to ensure efficient substitution of formal and 
informal ltc: they may lower demand for formal ltc as they enable and 
encourage consumers to search for the most efficient alternative, which 
may be informal care or formal care provided by a lower-skilled provid-
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er. A major underlying assumption is that the consumers are sufficiently 
informed and capable to take on this task. In-kind transfers are unlikely 
to have a direct impact on universal access to based ltc.
Reimbursement limits and coverage restrictions limit the amount and 
the type of benefits that ltc users may claim and therefore may improve 
the allocation by preventing excessive use. Strict reimbursement limits 
and coverage restrictions may have a negative impact on universal  
access to basic ltc: while high-income are able to pay for the basic  
care that is not covered, low-income may not be able to do this. 
A means test limits the group of potential beneficiaries to individuals 
who meet the income-related or asset-related eligibility criteria. 
Therefore, a means test may reduce ltc expenditures but does not  
affect the allocation in other ways; a means test does not prevent inef- 
ficient substitution and overuse by eligible individuals. The means-test-
ed benefits need to be set at a low level to prevent strategic behaviour, 
e.g. through transfers within the family (Cremer and Pestieau, 2014). 
When the benefits need to be set at a very low level, means testing  
may impede universal access to basic ltc.
Another demand-side strategy is managed competition. This strategy  
is different because it targets the insurer, unlike the previous strategies, 
which target the consumer. Managed competition aims to provide insur-
ers or other third party payers with incentives to act as prudent buyers 
of care on behalf of their enrolees. Insurers’ incentives to counteract 
moral hazard come from capitation payments that depend on the risk 
profile of their insured. Because of this capitation payment, insurers 
may bear the full financial risk – i.e. they retain all of the difference  
between the capitation payment and any expenditures – or part of it. 
Other things equal, insurers that bear risk would therefore benefit from 
limiting moral hazard, improving allocative efficiency and keeping costs 
down. In addition to improving the allocative efficiency, managed com-
petition may also cause technical efficiency improvements. But only if 
the market for ltc insurance works well, these efficiency gains result  
in benefits for consumers (van de Ven et al., 2013).
5.3  Current policies targeting the consumer
In this section we discuss how each of the four countries uses  
demand-side measures targeting consumers to limit the negative  
consequences of moral hazard. 
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5.3.1  Differences in LTC financing
All four countries that we study have a public ltc insurance system and 
at least some public insurance coverage for home care and institutional 
care is mandatory. But the financing and organization of ltc differs in 
four other aspects between these countries. First, as shown in Table 5.1, 
the overall share of gdp spent on ltc for the elderly differs substantially, 
ranging from 1.4% in Germany to 2.5% in Belgium. Part of these expendi-
tures are government expenditures, yet the share of public spending  
differs, both as a proportion of total ltc expenditures and in nominal 
terms. Second, these differences in public spending on ltc are associ- 
ated with differences in public insurance coverage for ltc (table 5.1).
Third, the ltc financing mix differs: in Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands public insurance accounts for the largest share in ltc  
financing, whereas Switzerland primarily relies on out-of-pocket  
payments (Table 5.1). Fourth, the public ltc financing system is set  
up differently: Germany and the Netherlands have separate public  
insurance for ltc, while Belgium and Switzerland have an integrated 
public insurance scheme for both health care and medical ltc. 
5.3.2  Demand constraints in Belgium and Switzerland
In Belgium and Switzerland, coverage for medical ltc is integrated in  
the public health insurance scheme (Table 5.1). Non-medical home care 
services, which are not covered through the integrated public insurance 
scheme, are financed by local and regional governments. Cantons in 
Switzerland, for example, provide subsidies for domestic care and fur-
thermore cover part of the ltc costs that are not paid by health insurers, 
whose contribution is fixed at roughly 55% of the costs of medical ltc. 
In Belgium, the organisation and funding of non-medical home care  
is taken up by the regional governments and there are cash allowances 
to pay for assistance. A cash allowance is paid out to the disabled who 
are at least 65 years of age. The amount depends on the recipient’s use  
of care and on their financial situation. In Flanders, a complementary 
cash allowance is a fixed amount for all disabled, regardless of their age, 
income or wealth (Willemé, 2010).
Belgium and Switzerland heavily rely on cost sharing as a strategy  
to counteract moral hazard. About 30 to 40 percent of ltc expenses have 
to be paid out of pocket (Table 5.1). The percentage of ltc expenditures 
paid out-of-pocket is the highest in Switzerland, where cost sharing for 
medical ltc is high and consists of deductibles and co-payments. These 
co-payments are independent of income but poor individuals are eli- 
gible for subsidies. In Belgium, co-payments are income-related and 
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capped while the additional cash benefits at the national level  
are means-tested. 
In both countries demand is further constrained by excluding ltc ser- 
vices from the benefit package: ltc insurance does not cover room and 
board costs for nursing home residents (Willemé, 2010; Willemé et al., 
2012). Furthermore, benefits are provided in kind. Yet, in Belgium addi-
tional cash benefits are available to compensate elderly for additional 
costs of living in bad health and domestic help is subsidised by govern-
ment-issued service vouchers (Willemé et al., 2012).
In Belgium, eligibility for medical ltc and the means-tested national- 
level cash allowances for assistance is assessed by a federal government 
service doctor according to national-level guidelines that focus on health 
and disability, whereas eligibility assessment for cash benefits for non- 
medical ltc occurs at the regional level. Home care providers are re-
quired to give priority to low-income patients (Wallonia) and patients 
not receiving informal care (Flanders) (Willemé, 2010). In Switzerland, 
eligibility is assessed by providers and is based not only on criteria re- 
lated to disability and health status, but, for non-medical ltc only, also 
on criteria related to the availability of informal care. Both Swiss and 
Belgian insurers have a formal role in the need assessment procedure by 
conducting audits and thus they can influence the eligibility decisions.
5.3.3  Demand constraints in the Netherlands and Germany
The Netherlands and Germany both have separate public ltc insurance 
schemes and either regional single payers (the Netherlands) or sickness 
funds and private insurers (Germany) organize ltc and contract ltc  
providers. Eligibility assessment is based on national guidelines and  
entrusted to independent agencies, although in the Netherlands pro- 
viders may do the reassessment in some cases. Consequently, providers 
and insurers can only indirectly, if at all, influence eligibility decisions. 
Eligibility is based on criteria related to disability and health status.  
In the Netherlands, eligibility for non-medical services also depends  
on the availability of informal care. 
In Germany, the amount of ltc benefits depends on the level of disabil- 
ity – individuals who are eligible for ltc insurance benefits are divided  
in four groups according to their level of disability – and on the care  
recipient’s choice to live at home or to move to a nursing home. That is, 
the benefit levels are not related to income or actual use. The benefits 
usually do not suffice to cover the costs of ltc, so the care recipients 
have to pay the difference. These substantial out-of-pocket payments 
are believed to cause patients to be cost-conscious and therefore moral 
hazard is currently not considered a major issue (Rothgang and Igl, 
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2007). The out-of-pocket payments may be too high for low-income  
individuals and therefore a separate means-tested program covers part 
of the out-of-pocket payments for this group. In the Netherlands, co- 
payments are lower than in Germany and income-related. Furthermore, 
coverage is more restricted in Germany than in the Netherlands. For in-
stance, the costs of board and lodging in ltc institutions are covered  
by ltc insurance in the Netherlands but not in Germany (Schut and  
van den Berg, 2010; Rothgang, 2010). 
Extensive demand rationing through cost sharing may endanger access 
to good quality ltc, particularly for low-income groups. Indeed, low- 
income individuals in Germany have less access to formal ltc than 
high-income individuals, while in the Netherlands, where out-of- 
pocket payments are much lower, ltc use is not associated with  
income (Chapter 3).
In both countries, users can opt for cash benefits rather than in- 
kind benefits but the cash benefit is lower than the monetary value  
of in-kind transfers: there is a discount of 25% in the Netherlands and  
of 50% in Germany (Schut and van den Berg, 2010; Rothgang, 2010).  
In an experiment in Germany, participants were randomly assigned  
to either a voucher for formal ltc that enables the recipient to choose 
freely which care-related services to purchase, or to their previous enti-
tlement, consisting of in-kind benefits (i.e. formal ltc of the same mon-
etary value that is contracted by the insurer) or a cash benefit equal to 
50% of the monetary value of the voucher. Arntz and Thomsen (2011) 
find that vouchers, compared to cash benefits, improved health out-
comes and led to substitution of formal ltc for informal ltc. However, 
whether this substitution is the result of the higher monetary value  
of the vouchers or of the difference in rules on what they could be  
used for is unclear because of the set-up of this part of the experiment. 
Compared to in-kind benefits, vouchers led to substitution from rela-
tively few hours of expensive ltc services to relatively many hours of 
cheaper ltc services but had similar health outcomes. The difference 
between the bundle of services that the voucher group chose to buy and 
the bundle of services that was consumed by the group that continues to 
receive in-kind benefits shows that the in-kind benefit system induces 
inefficient substitution of expensive ltc services for cheaper services: 
the introduction of the vouchers engendered a welfare increase. 
Ramakers and van den Wijngaart (2005) report similar findings regard-
ing substitution for the Netherlands based on a survey among recipients 
of cash benefits and their informal caregivers; a randomised controlled 
trial in the uk about the impact of receiving cash benefits or in-kind  
services on the quality of life of the beneficiaries shows mixed results 
(Netten et al., 2011).
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5.4  Current policies targeting the insurer
Managed competition among risk bearing insurance carriers may  
encourage insurers to promote efficiency while guaranteeing access.  
But the potential of managed competition depends on the ability to  
empower the competing insurers and to mitigate potential negative side 
effects of the financial incentives for efficiency. To act as prudent buyers 
of ltc, insurers need appropriate incentives: being a prudent buyer  
of ltc and ensuring an appropriate allocation of ltc should positively 
affect their financial position. One of the crucial questions is therefore: 
can risk equalization and the integration of health and ltc insurance 
provide insurers with appropriate incentives? Three important deter- 
minants of the insurers’ incentives are i) whether the insurers bear  
any financial risk and, if so, ii) whether risk adjustment ensures that  
this financial risk provides appropriate incentives for efficiency; and  
iii) whether health insurance and ltc insurance are integrated.
5.4.1  Financial risk and risk adjustment
Managed competition involving mandatory cross-subsidies between 
risk groups (e.g. through community-rated premiums), financial risk  
for insurers and competition among insurers may give these insurers 
strong financial incentives for selection. In public health insurance 
schemes with managed competition, these incentives for risk selection 
are typically reduced by a system of risk equalization (van de Ven and 
Ellis, 2000). An important question, therefore, is whether adequate risk 
equalization is also feasible for ltc insurance.
As I will explain in more detail in chapter 6, achieving adequate risk 
equalization for ltc insurance may be more difficult than for health  
insurance for three reasons. First, ltc expenditures are concentrated in  
a smaller part of the population. Second, most users have high expen- 
ditures and their demand is stable, particularly once someone is insti- 
tutionalized. Third, demand for formal ltc depends on the availability  
of informal care, which is usually not routinely measured for the entire 
population and can therefore not be included in the risk adjustment 
model, but may be known to insurers. As a consequence of these three 
differences, it is easier and more profitable for insurers to select profita-
ble subgroups of the population based on prior use of services and basic 
demographic characteristics in ltc insurance than in health insurance. 
Good risk adjusters reduce insurers’ incentives for risk selection. The 
quality of risk adjusters furthermore depends on their appropriateness, 
fairness and feasibility (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). A major category  
of good risk adjusters for future ltc expenses are personal characteris-
tics that are correlated to ltc use (van Barneveld et al., 1997). Finding 
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good risk adjusters is difficult because data on many of these personal 
characteristics, e.g. disability and informal care availability, is not col-
lected routinely at the population level. Because of the strong positive 
correlation between current and past ltc use and because data on past 
ltc use is often readily available, using information past ltc use for risk 
adjustment appears attractive. However, including past entitlements  
in the risk-adjustment formula might lead to reduced incentives for  
efficiency if not done carefully and may therefore be suboptimal.  
That is, including these variables eliminates incentives for insurers to 
select against these subgroups but also dilutes the insurers’ incentives 
for prevention. When the risk adjustment subsidy is positively related  
to past entitlements, the insurer may not be interested in preventing or 
reducing excessive use because the insurer will (partly) be reimbursed 
for these expenditures in the future. On top of this, risk adjusters based 
on prior use may even generate perverse incentives as risk adjustment 
may encourage insurers to organize excessive use. For instance, if next 
year’s risk-adjusted payment depends on whether the individual re-
ceived nursing care for three months and if an enrolee needs nursing 
care at home for two months, the insurer might encourage the enrolee 
to use care for another month if the reward in terms of an increased 
risk-adjusted subsidy exceeds the costs of an additional month of  
nursing care at home. Despite these drawbacks, introducing past enti- 
tlements is superior to payments to the insurer based on actual costs, 
both from the point of view of efficiency and from the point of view  
of risk selection (Marchand et al., 2003).
So far, the experience with financial risk and risk equalization in ltc  
insurance is limited. In the separate public ltc insurance schemes in  
the Netherlands and Germany, insurers do not compete for customers 
and are retrospectively compensated from a central fund for providing 
ltc coverage and therefore they are not at risk. Consequently, they hard-
ly play any role in promoting efficient use or provision of ltc (van de  
Ven and Ellis, 2000; chapter 6). By contrast, in Belgium and Switzerland 
ltc is partly covered by health insurance and health insurers compete 
and bear financial risk. In these countries, health insurers receive risk- 
adjusted subsidies for their clients. In Belgium the financial risk for  
insurers is limited to 8% of losses incurred on medical expenses.  
In Switzerland, insurers bear the full financial risk.
To date, Belgium is the only country having specific ltc-related risk  
adjusters in its risk equalization scheme: past ltc entitlements, and  
demographic and (chronic) medical conditions that are associated with 
ltc use. Hence, Belgium is currently the only country with a risk equali-
zation scheme that compensates health insurers for having enrolees 
who use ltc. However, it is unclear whether this compensation is ade-
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quate and thus counteracts risk selection because insurers bear only 
limited financial risk and competition among insurers is weak (Paolucci 
et al, 2007; Schokkaert and van de Voorde, 2011). Whether the current  
risk adjusters would be sufficient to prevent risk selection if the degree 
of financial risk and competition are substantial is therefore not sure. 
Evaluating the Belgian risk adjustment scheme is further complicated 
because the adequacy of the risk adjustment scheme may depend on 
the type of ltc services covered. Medical ltc may be better predictable 
than non-medical ltc personal care because the latter is more contin-
gent on the availability of social support. 
Of the six variables in the current Belgian risk-adjustment formula  
that are clearly related to ltc use, two meet the criteria mentioned 
above: living alone and being a widow, widower or orphan. Yet, their  
validity is doubtful because it includes individuals of all ages. The other 
variables included in the risk adjustment formula are based on past or 
current entitlements, e.g. having a chronic condition, which is deter-
mined using drug prescriptions (Schokkaert and van de Voorde, 2011).  
To date, there is no evidence that the insurers’ behaviour has been  
affected by the perverse incentives that risk adjustment based on  
past ltc use may have caused.
In contrast to the extensive risk adjustment scheme in Belgium, the 
Swiss formula for risk-adjusted subsidies only includes age, gender and 
last year’s inpatient stays, which also include nursing home admissions, 
and hence picks up only some variation in expected ltc expenditures. 
Therefore, Swiss health insurers have strong incentives to select against 
ltc users. Furthermore, because inpatient stays increase next year’s cap-
itation payment but home care does not, insurers have incentives to  
institutionalize their enrolees, even more so if institutionalization may 
also lower medical expenditures. From the comparison of the sets of risk 
adjusters and the percentage of the financial risk that insurers bear,  
we conclude that incentives for Swiss insurers are strong and wrong, 
whereas incentives for Belgian insurers are much more right but weak.
5.4.2  Integration of health and LTC insurance
Expanding managed competition among insurers to include ltc may  
be done either by integrating ltc into the public health insurance scheme 
with managed competition or by introducing managed competition in  
a separate public ltc insurance scheme. 
Financing ltc and health care services through separate schemes may 
result in coordination problems and cost shifting. Substitution of formal 
ltc for medical care may be desirable if ltc is more efficient than ongo-
ing medical treatment, e.g. a prolonged hospital stay. When both medi-
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cal care and ltc services are paid for by the same insurer and it has  
been provided with appropriate financial incentives, it is rewarded  
for efficient substitution. 
But integration is only beneficial if it is compatible with the strategies 
that have been chosen to improve the efficiency of ltc and health care. 
That is, if insurers are at risk for both types of care, integration of health 
and ltc insurance may enhance efficient substitution of ltc and health 
care. However, if insurers are only at risk for health care expenditures,  
as is currently the case in Germany and the Netherlands, integration 
may result in inefficient substitution of ltc for medical care as long  
as insurers are not at risk for ltc expenses.
5.5  Conclusion and discussion
Comprehensive, affordable and universal public ltc insurance ensures 
that everyone has financial access to ltc. Yet, if demand and supply are 
unconstrained, public ltc insurance is likely to suffer from moral hazard, 
which may result in inefficient allocation and excessive expenditures. 
The negative consequences of moral hazard on allocative efficiency  
may be limited through demand-side strategies, among other things. 
These demand-side strategies may target the consumer or the insurer. 
In all four countries that we have studied, the negative impact of moral 
hazard on efficiency is controlled through demand-side measures,  
yet the importance of each of these measures and their design varies. 
Although these measures are likely to reduce moral hazard, their net  
impact on efficiency and universal access may depend on their design. 
For instance, the experience with cost sharing in these four countries 
indicates that the net effects of cost sharing on allocative efficiency  
and access to basic ltc may depend on whether the characteristics  
of the users, e.g. their income and wealth, are taken into account.  
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the demand-side measures as they  
are implemented in each of the countries and the effect that they are 
expected to have on the efficiency of the system and the access to ltc. 
These expectations may guide future research into the causal impact  
of these demand-side measures on the outcomes in terms of efficiency 
and access to ltc. 
Whereas most demand-side strategies to counteract moral hazard  
traditionally focus on the consumer, one strategy to solve the efficiency 
problems while maintaining universal access to basic ltc is to ensure 
that insurers act as prudent buyer of ltc on behalf of their subscribers 
through extending managed competition in health insurance to ltc  
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insurance. This strategy – managed competition – is pursued in Belgium 
and Switzerland, and the Dutch government aims to integrate home 
healthcare into the health insurance scheme in 2015.
A crucial precondition for the effectiveness of managed competition  
in ltc is to provide insurers with appropriate incentives. We argue,  
however, that the prospects of fulfilling this precondition are unclear.  
To ensure that the incentives for insurers are appropriate, adequate risk 
adjustment is essential. However, the specific actuarial features of ltc 
use may make developing adequate risk adjusters difficult and little  
is known about the feasibility of adequate risk equalization for ltc. 
In case of managed competition, the insurers’ incentives for efficiency 
not only depend on the risk adjustment system but also on whether 
health insurance and ltc insurance are integrated. Integration is nec- 
essary in order to avoid inefficient substitution of care, discontinuity  
of care, and excessive hospitalisation. But integration only has a positive 
impact if the insurers have the appropriate incentives. Currently, in all 
four countries that were surveyed, there is managed competition in health 
insurance. Hence, in these countries integration means managed com-
petition in ltc insurance too. However, integration in a health insurance 
scheme with managed competition may come at the cost of increased 
risk selection if risk adjustment for ltc is not adequate.
Appropriate risk adjusters for ltc use are a necessary precondition  
for effective managed competition in a public ltc insurance scheme. 
But such risk adjusters may also be important for managed competi- 
tion in health insurance if, after risk equalization, ltc users have  
higher expected costs than non-users. In this case, even in a separate 
health insurance scheme competing health insurers have an incentive  
to select against ltc users. This situation seems to be relevant for all 
countries with such a scheme, since empirical research demonstrates 
that even in case of the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization scheme 
health insurers are likely to incur a substantial loss on the medical cost 
of ltc users. For example, Dutch health insurers are expected to lose  
650 euro annually on providing health insurance to a person using  
home health care (Stam and van de Ven, 2008). When health insurers  
sell both health insurance and ltc insurance, inadequate risk adjust-
ment for ltc in health insurance may also discourage insurers to con-
tract good quality ltc providers and to adapt to the preferences of ltc 
users, even when insurers are not at risk for ltc expenditures. Hence, 
adequate risk adjusters for ltc are not only a crucial precondition for 
introducing managed competition in public ltc insurance, but may  
also be important for improving the risk adjustment formula for  
health insurance. 
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In addition to the preconditions that ensure appropriate incentives  
for insurers – financial risk, risk adjustment and integration of ltc and 
health care –, there are other necessary preconditions for successful 
managed competition and it is not clear whether these other precon- 
ditions can be fulfilled. Managed competition also requires, among  
other things, that insurers are able to counteract supplier-induced  
moral hazard (van de Ven et al., 2007). That is, insurers have to be able  
to prevent that providers supply excessive (or excessively expensive)  
services because people are covered by public ltc insurance. Hence, 
insurers need to be able to negotiate prices, volume and quality with 
providers. But governments may be reluctant to give up price and supply 
regulation and to provide insurers with sufficient room and instruments 
to influence the allocation of ltc. Currently, individual insurers negotiate 
contracts with ltc providers in none of the four countries we studied; 
volume and prices are largely or fully determined by the government.  
In Belgium, the government restricts the number of nursing home  
beds (Willemé, 2010; Willemé et al., 2012) and all the price negotiations 
between providers and insurers are at the collective level. Individual in-
surers have no role in setting price and volume. In Switzerland, nursing 
homes and providers of domestic care are contracted by local authorities. 
Insurers are obliged to reimburse all contracted providers according to 
regulated prices (gd, 2011). In the Netherlands, regional single payers 
contract with regional ltc providers within a regional budget constraint 
and maximum prices set by the government. Only in Germany, insurers 
collectively negotiate prices with each provider and have somewhat 
more room for negotiations than in other countries as there are no  
supply constraints (Rothgang and Igl, 2007). So at best, insurers can  
negotiate quality and steer consumers towards well-performing pro- 
viders. Putting insurers at risk for ltc expenses while giving them  
strong incentives for risk selection but without providing them with  
appropriate tools to influence the provision of ltc, as is currently the 
case in Switzerland, is unlikely to lead to outcomes that are efficient  
and equitable. 
In addition to these concerns about incentives and instruments, there 
are institutional and cultural preconditions for managed competition, 
e.g. the presence of a sufficient number of well-informed critical con-
sumers who can discipline insurers to contract efficient and good qual- 
ity ltc (van de Ven et al, 2007). It is not clear whether these other  
preconditions can be fulfilled. Further research is required to address 
these uncertainties. Finally, even when managed competition is tech- 
nically and institutionally and culturally feasible, the broader question  
is which model is the most appropriate for financing and organising the 
provision of ltc services. To answer this question, a full comparison of 
alternative options for publicly funding and purchasing ltc is required.
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Chapter 6 
Can universal access and com
petition  
in long-term
 care insurance be com
bined?
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Abstract
In countries with a public ltc insurance scheme administered by mul- 
tiple non-competing insurers, these insurers typically lack incentives  
for purchasing cost-effective ltc because they are not at risk for ltc  
expenses. Plans to introduce these incentives by allowing competition 
among risk bearing ltc insurers are likely to jeopardize universal access. 
Combining universal access and competition among risk bearing ltc- 
insurers requires an adequate system of risk adjustment. While risk  
adjustment is now widely adopted in health insurance, ltc-specific  
features cause uncertainty about the feasibility of risk adjustment for  
ltc insurance. We examine the feasibility of appropriate risk adjustment 
in ltc insurance by using a rich set of linked nationwide Dutch adminis-
trative data. As expected, prior ltc use and demographic information 
are found to explain much of the variation in individual ltc expenses. 
However, we find that prior health care expenditures are also important 
in reducing predicted losses for subgroups of health care users. 
Nevertheless, incentives for risk selection against some easily identifiable 
subgroups persist. Moreover, using prior utilization and expenditure as 
risk adjusters reduces incentives for efficiency, creating a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. To ease this trade-off, data on individuals’ under- 
lying needs for ltc are required.
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30 Definitions of ltc vary 
internationally. In this paper 
we focus on elderly care, 
which in the Netherlands 
(and elsewhere) accounts  
for the majority of total ltc 
expenditure covered by ltc 
insurance (cvz, 2011). Elderly 
care is defined as home care, 
social assistance, assistance 
with activities of daily living 
and inpatient stays in either  
a residential home or a nurs-
ing home. This definition 
comprises both ‘medical’  
and ‘non-medical’ ltc: unlike 
in some other European 
countries, in the Netherlands 
there is no sharp distinction 
between medical and non-
medical ltc.
6.1  Introduction
Worldwide, health policy makers are confronted with ageing popula-
tions and rising demand for ltc 30 and are looking for ways to guarantee 
access to ltc services in a sustainable way. Barr (2010) argues that there 
is a strong case for public provision of ltc insurance. Indeed, virtually  
all oecd countries have at least some publicly provided mandatory cov-
erage against ltc expenditures. Several of these countries have integrat-
ed some ‘medical’ ltc services in their public health insurance schemes, 
e.g. Belgium, Switzerland and the US Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
Other countries have a separate public ltc insurance scheme, e.g. the 
Netherlands (since 1968), Germany (since 1995), Japan (since 2000) and 
South-Korea (since 2002). 
Typically, public ltc insurance is provided by public non-competing 
insurers who are not at risk for the ltc expenses of their enrollees 
(Costa-Font and Courbage, 2012). For instance, in the Netherlands  
ltc insurance is administered by about 30 regional insurers that are  
fully reimbursed for the ltc expenses of their clients that are covered  
by the public scheme. As a consequence, these public insurers have  
no incentives to secure that high-quality ltc services are provided at low 
cost. To control expenditures in public ltc insurance, governments have 
traditionally relied on demand rationing (e.g. means testing, copayments 
and coverage restrictions), and supply rationing (e.g. price regulation, 
provider budgets, and capacity restrictions) (Costa-Font and Courbage, 
2012). Both types of rationing, however, have important drawbacks, 
which are likely to be exacerbated by the expected increase in demand 
for ltc. Demand-side rationing may result in access problems for low- 
income individuals who need ltc; supply-side rationing may result  
in waiting lists and substandard quality of care. 
In several countries, another way to encourage efficient use of ltc has 
been introduced or proposed: to provide ltc insurers with incentives  
to contract efficient ltc providers. This could be achieved by putting ltc 
insurers at risk for providing ltc coverage and allowing them to compete 
for customers. However, competition among risk-bearing insurers is 
likely to jeopardize universal access because ltc expenses are typi- 
cally high and correlated over time (van Barneveld et al., 1997) and  
consequently actuarially fair premiums will be unaffordable to many 
people needing ltc. 
To combine competition with universal access in social health insurance 
markets, several countries have introduced a system of managed com-
petition in which insurers cannot reject applicants and are required  
to charge community-rated premiums to all applicants. To guarantee 
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affordable access to coverage, insurers receive risk-adjusted premium 
subsidies 31 that eliminate or at least reduce incentives to increase profits 
through risk selection 32. These subsidies reduce differences in expected 
costs between individuals and thus make all applicants equally attractive 
for an insurer (Enthoven, 1988; van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). 
Managed competition has been proposed and implemented to ensure 
equitable access to public ltc insurance (Medicaid) in the us and in-
crease its efficiency (Lucas, 1996). In Switzerland and Belgium, medical 
ltc is integrated in social health insurance coverage that is offered  
by risk-bearing competing health insurers, although the financial risk  
for Belgian insurers is quite limited (oecd, 2011a; Schokkaert and van  
de Voorde, 2011; Weaver, 2012; Willemé et al., 2012). Recently, the Dutch 
government launched a similar proposal. According to this proposal, man-
aged competition will be introduced for home care in 2015 and after two 
years insurers should bear the full risk for covering home health bene-
fits. To this end, coverage for home care is included in the social health 
insurance benefit package. Managed competition may also be introduced 
for nursing home care after 2017 (Rijksoverheid, 2013).
An appropriate system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies is crucial  
to safeguarding universal access in a competitive ltc insurance market. 
However, whereas risk adjustment in health insurance has been studied 
extensively, empirical research on risk adjustment in ltc insurance is 
nearly nonexistent. The aim of this paper is to examine how and to  
what extent a system of risk adjusted subsidies can reduce the financial 
incentives for risk selection in ltc insurance within the context of man-
aged competition. To this end, the following five questions are 
addressed: (1) How do ltc expenditures differ from expenditures on 
medical care and how do these differences affect the options to use  
risk adjustment to reduce risk selection? (2) What are the predicted loss-
es and gains on ltc for insurers in case of annual contracts, community 
rating and no risk adjustment? (3) To what extent are the predicted loss-
es and gains reduced by the most comprehensive risk-adjustment model 
based on data on: i) demographic characteristics, ii) prior ltc use and 
iii) prior health care expenditures (hce) and inpatient hospital diagno-
ses? (4) What is the contribution of each of these sets of risk adjusters  
to the reduction of the predicted losses and gains in the most compre-
hensive risk-adjustment model? (5) How are the predicted losses and 
gains affected when the risk adjusters that provide substantial perverse 
incentives to insurers are removed from the risk adjustment model? 
31 See van de Ven and Schut 
(2011) for a description of  
how these subsidies are 
organized and for a full  
overview of strategies that  
are used to ensure affordable 
access to coverage.
32 Insurers may engage  
in risk selection by differen- 
tiating their benefit packages 
or, if the benefit package is 
fixed, the level of service or 
the quality of the contracted 
provider network that they 
offer to each type of patient 
(Cao and McGuire, 2003). 
Thus, an insurer may discour-
age individuals who need or 
desire a particular service to 
join its plan by limiting access 
or by contracting unattractive 
providers. Risk selection is 
undesirable because it may 
lead to welfare losses if i) 
resources are employed for 
risk selection rather than for 
improving care; ii) inefficient 
health plans that are success-
ful in risk selection survive; 
and/or iii) good quality ltc is 
underprovided (van de Ven 
and Ellis, 2000).
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6.2  What is already known about risk adjustment  
in long-term care?
The experience with risk adjustment in health insurance cannot be read-
ily used to develop an appropriate risk adjustment system for ltc insur-
ance. LTC expenditures differ from health care expenditures (hce) in  
at least two important aspects (van de Ven, 2005). First, ltc expenditures 
are concentrated among a limited group of beneficiaries, and are, condi-
tional upon use, high and stable over time. Consequently, in the absence 
of risk adjustment, risk selection based on prior expenditures is much 
easier in ltc insurance than in health insurance. Second, the availability 
of informal care is expected to have a much larger impact on ltc expen- 
ditures than on hce. But there is little experience with including infor-
mal care availability in risk adjustment and the availability of informal 
care is difficult to quantify with administrative data. Hence, differences 
in informal care availability cannot be fully captured by the risk adjust-
ment formula. 
Little is known about how these issues can be dealt with and about  
how to design appropriate risk adjustment for ltc insurance. To date, 
there is only one study about the feasibility of risk adjustment in Dutch 
ltc insurance (van Barneveld et al., 1997). With prior ltc expenditure as 
a risk adjuster and using data from one sickness fund, van Barneveld et 
al. (1997) examine the remaining potential for risk selection in the Dutch 
public ltc insurance scheme. They find an R2-statistic of 0.90, which 
indicates that ltc expenditures are highly predictable at the individual 
level when information on prior expenditures is available.
Using prior expenditures as a risk adjuster means that the insurer will  
be partly or fully compensated for higher expenditures through higher 
future risk-adjusted capitation payments. This compensation may give 
insurers incentives for overprovision. Hence, compared to the situation 
of capitation payments that are not based on prior expenditures, insur-
ers face fewer incentives for an efficient provision and allocation of ltc. 
Marchand et al. (2003) show that despite this drawback, if insurers com-
pete on quality, they receive stronger incentives to be efficient when risk 
adjustment is based on prior expenditures or prior use than when  
they are fully reimbursed for all expenditures .
Several studies on risk adjustment in US Medicare and Medicaid have 
tackled similar issues. While the Medicare benefit package does not  
include ltc, the target population of Medicare is similar and studies  
on risk adjustment in Medicare therefore provide a number of relevant 
insights. First, risk adjustment for Medicare Advantage plans and for the 
Medicaid Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (pace) takes into 
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account frailty as measured by the number of Activities of Daily Living 
(adl) problems; a risk adjustment model without frailty was found to 
systematically underestimate expenditures for the frail elderly and  
might therefore induce risk selection against this group (Kautter et al., 
2009). Second, the relationship between health care use in the past, de-
mographic characteristics and future health expenditures changes upon 
institutionalization and it is different for those who became eligible for 
Medicare by reaching the age of 65 and those who became eligible be-
cause they were disabled (Pope et al., 2004). This finding implies that 
risk adjusters should be interacted with institutionalization and age. 
Third, incentives for risk selection persist despite extensive risk adjust-
ment: while risk selection on expected costs decreased after expanding 
the risk adjustment formula beyond age and gender, insurers now select 
profitable enrollees by focusing on characteristics not included in the 
model. Consequently, the Medicare program has become more expen-
sive and spending on those in good health increased vis-à-vis spending 
on those in bad health (Brown et al., 2014).
Outside the us, experience with risk adjustment in ltc insurance is  
limited to Switzerland and Belgium. In these countries, medical ltc is 
included in social health insurance. In Switzerland, the risk adjustment 
formula comprises age, gender and a dummy variable accounting for a 
recent stay of at least three days in a hospital or a ltc facility (Von Wyl, 
2014). This dummy variable is likely to pick up some of the variation in 
expected ltc expenditures. The Belgian risk adjustment formula includes 
more ltc-specific risk adjusters. The capitation payment is adjusted for 
receipt of certain allowances (e.g. for handicapped or because of a need 
for assistance) or nursing care at home during 3 months (category B or  
C on the Katz-scale (Katz and Akpom, 1976)). In addition, the risk adjust-
ment formula includes a number of indicators related to ltc use, e.g. 
living alone, being widow/widower, physiotherapy for a severe illness, 
and Parkinson’s disease (Schokkaert and van de Voorde, 2011). While the 
Belgian risk adjustment formula is more sophisticated than the one used 
in Switzerland, the financial risk is much more limited for Belgian than 
for Swiss health insurers (Schokkaert and van de Voorde, 2011; Paolucci 
et al., 2007). Therefore, risk selection against ltc patients appears to be 
financially attractive in Switzerland but not in Belgium. It is, however, 
unclear whether the more sophisticated Belgian model would suffice  
to prevent risk selection if financial risk for insurers were expanded.
33 See de Meijer et al. (2011) 
for a more detailed description 
of the data.
34 Until 2006 enrollment  
was mandatory for two  
thirds of the population with 
an income below a threshold; 
the remainder of the popula-
tion was not eligible for social 
health insurance and could 
buy private insurance. By 
contrast, public ltc insurance 
was (and is) mandatory for 
the entire population.
35 The selection of sub-
groups is based on data 
availability.
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6.3  Data and methods
6.3.1  Data
We use information from five nationwide administrative registries and 
one survey which are all linked by Statistics Netherlands at the individ- 
ual level 33 . The administrative data would be readily available if risk ad-
justment were implemented and include (1) health care expenditures  
in 2000-2004 from the health insurance data collected by Vektis; (2) use 
of ltc in 2004 and 2005, which includes home care, social assistance, 
assistance with activities of daily living and inpatient stays in either a 
residential home or a nursing home and which comes from the Central 
Administration Office of the ltc insurance scheme (cak); (3) hospital 
admissions in 2002, 2003 and 2004 from the hospital discharge register 
(lmr); (4) demographic information for 2004 from the municipal register 
(gba) and (5) mortality from the cause-of-death registry (cbs). In addition, 
the General Survey of Living Conditions (pols) held in 2004 provides 
details on health, disability, and other individual characteristics for a 
randomly drawn, representative sample of the non-institutionalized 
population. Prior health care expenditures are registered for sickness 
fund enrollees only (two-thirds of the population)34 and ltc use is reg- 
istered for adults only (≥ 18 years of age); the other administrative data 
sets comprise the entire Dutch population.
The sample was further reduced for two reasons. First, the records for 
one third of those eligible for sickness fund coverage cannot not be 
linked. Second, 1.7% of the sample was excluded because of item non- 
response which always was the result of missing co-residence status.  
As a result, the final sample consists of individuals who were insured 
through a sickness fund, did not die in 2004 and whose records could  
be linked to the municipality register. The total study population was 
5,719,934 which is 45% of the Dutch adult population in 2004. From this 
subset of the population, 7790 individuals were included in the 2004 
pols survey; 3619 of these respondents also completed the more  
specific health module.
6.3.2  Methods
A good risk adjustment system should reduce insurers’ incentives for 
risk selection while maintaining their incentives for efficiency. Ideally, 
after risk adjustment there are no easily identifiable subgroups for  
which insurers are undercompensated or overcompensated. In addition 
to an accurate prediction of individual expenditures, good risk adjusters 
should provide appropriate incentives and should be administratively 
feasible (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Partly following Beck et al. (2010) 
and Shen and Ellis (2002) among others, we identify the extent to which 
a risk adjustment model can reduce incentives for risk selection in three 
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steps. First, we measure the insurers’ incentives to select against sub-
groups 35 based on individual characteristics in case of community- 
rated annual contracts but in the absence of risk adjustment. To quan- 
tify the insurers’ incentives for risk selection, we calculate the difference 
between the average actual expenditures by subgroup and the average 
expenditures for the entire population in 2005. We consider the incen-
tives for risk selection to be strong when the number of users in the sub-
group is substantial (> 300), the predicted loss for a person in this group 
– the difference between observed expenditures for this subgroup and 
average expenditures for the entire population – is large (> 1000 euro) 
and significantly (p < 0.05) different from zero. When these criteria are 
met, the benefits of risk selection are likely to exceed the costs and 
therefore the subgroup is included in the risk-adjustment model.
Second, we build the full risk adjustment model in a stepwise manner  
to examine to what extent each set of individual characteristics contrib-
utes to explaining individual variation in ltc use. To this end, we estimate 
a series of four models. We first test the impact of a basic model based 
on demographic characteristics on the predicted loss for all subgroups. 
Next, we add subgroups based on i) prior ltc use, and ii) prior health 
care expenditures and hospital admissions to this basic model. The full 
model includes all subgroups that were identified in the first model.  
For each risk adjustment model, the remaining predicted loss is the  
difference between the observed expenditures for these subgroups  
and the expenditures predicted by the risk adjustment model.
Third, for each subgroup that is included in the full model, we assess  
the impact of including this subgroup in the risk adjustment formula  
on the insurers’ incentives for efficiency – a commonly used selection 
criterion (see e.g. van Kleef and van Vliet, 2010; van de Ven and Ellis, 2000; 
Pope et al., 2000). Subgroups that are likely to have a negative impact on 
the insurers’ incentives for efficiency are those for which conditions of 
eligibility can be easily manipulated by insurers and for which it is high-
ly attractive for them to do so. Manipulation may be financially attrac-
tive when the expected benefits exceed the costs, which consist of the 
required effort and the cost of the additional treatment that the enrollee 
is required to receive to be eligible for the subgroup. Excluding these 
subgroups from the full model results in an incentive compatible risk 
adjustment model. This third step thus sheds light on the tradeoff be-
tween creating incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection. 
All five models described above are estimated by ordinary least squares 
regression (ols) in order to facilitate interpretation of the results (van  
de Ven and Ellis, 2000)36. Moreover, currently all Dutch risk adjustment 
36 Other commonly used 
specifications did not provide 
a strictly better fit than ols. 
Results for the other speci- 
fications are available from  
the corresponding author.
37 The remaining 5%  
consisted of cash transfers, 
which are not in the dataset.
38 These four categories 
include domestic care i – 
cleaning, domestic care ii 
– cleaning and help with 
organizing the household, 
personal care and nursing. 
Information on assistance 
and support is not available 
for 2005.
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models use ols, so using ols increases the comparability and compat- 
ibility with these models. 
The pols sample was very small compared to the population of sickness 
fund enrollees and therefore the subgroups based on detailed information 
about health status, disability and socio-economic status from the pols 
survey are not included in the risk adjustment model. Instead, these 
subgroups are used as a benchmark to evaluate the impact of the risk 
adjustment model on incentives for risk selection.
6.3.3  Variables 
In each of the models, the dependent variable measures public ltc ex-
penditures in 2005. In case the individual dies in 2005, expenditures are 
annualized by dividing expenditures by the share of the year the indi- 
vidual was alive. The data set provides information on the quantity of 
ltc that was provided in kind, which was 95% of the publicly financed 
ltc in the Netherlands in 2006 37 (cvz, 2011). The quantities provided, i.e. 
days institutionalized or hours of home care, are multiplied by the maxi-
mum prices as set by the government in order to calculate expenditures; 
co-payments are not taken into account. The data contains information 
about institutional care use in 2004 and 2005 and about all use of six 
types of home care in 2004. For 2005, the data contained information 
about use of only four out of six types of home care 38. 
The set of subgroups that make up the basic model are based on three 
demographic characteristics: age, gender and co-residence, i.e. whether 
someone lived in a single-person household. Age and gender are the 
backbone of any risk-adjustment model, while co-residence proxies  
informal care availability. Informal care availability is an element of  
the eligibility assessment procedure for homecare (ciz, 2005) and formal 
ltc use is known to be correlated with informal ltc use (Bonsang, 2009; 
van Houtven and Norton, 2004). 
The subgroups of ltc users are based on prior ltc use rather than expen- 
ditures because using prior ltc use as a risk adjuster rewards insurers for 
negotiating lower prices with providers. Subgroups are created for each 
type of home care and each type of institutional care separately. Each  
of the subgroups of home care users consists of individuals who used 
this specific type of home care at least one hour per week on average.  
In selecting subgroups of institutional care users, we aim at balancing 
responsiveness to changes in ltc use against incentives for overreport-
ing and oversupply resulting from the (partial) reimbursement of addi-
tional expenditures in the future. Therefore, for each of the four types of 
institutional care, four subgroups are generated consisting of individuals 
who stayed in an ltc institution for ≥ 1 day, 91-180 days, 181-365 days,  
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and the entire year (366 days), respectively. These subgroups reflect  
differences in expected future expenditures between long-term and 
short-term residents: future expenditures are positively correlated with 
the number of days that the individual is institutionalized. Furthermore, 
following van Barneveld et al. (1997), two subgroups are created consist-
ing of patients who received home care and institutional care, respec-
tively, on the last day of 2004, which shows the size of the predictable 
loss for enrollees who only use a very small amount of ltc in the  
prior year.
We also include subgroups based on prior hce. Each of these subgroups 
measures health care expenditures 39 that are associated with ltc use: 
expenditures on hospital and outpatient care, prescription drugs, para-
medical care, transportation, and durable medical equipment. For each 
of these categories, three subgroups are constructed that consist of  
persons who are among the 15% who had the highest expenditures  
during the last year (omitted for hospital and outpatient expenditures), 
during each of the last three years, and during each of the last five years. 
Because the data only includes hce covered by sickness funds, we also 
include a variable indicating which persons were not insured through  
a sickness fund in one of the four years preceding 2004. If someone  
was no longer registered with a sickness fund during a year, e.g. because 
of losing his/her eligibility status due to exceeding the income threshold, 
and hence is not in the data set for the entire year, expenditures  
are annualized.
In addition to the subgroups based on prior hce, we also create sub-
groups based on hospital admissions because information on hospital- 
ization and diagnosis information may help to predict ltc use (Wong  
et al., 2010). Subgroups are based on 94 diagnoses (based on a grouping 
algorithm of icd-9 codes, see Polder et al., 2002) and on 48 types of treat-
ments (based on icd-9-cm volume 3 codes) using hospital admission 
data from 2002-2004. In addition, we create 12 Diagnostic Cost Groups 
(DCGs). DCGs are used for risk adjustment in the Dutch health insur-
ance scheme and consist of clinically homogenous inpatient diagnoses 
for chronic health problems that have similar future hce (van de Ven and 
Ellis, 2000). Using the ICD-code of the main diagnosis and the medical 
specialty that set this diagnosis, each individual is assigned to either  
the reference group (dcg 0) – people with no hospital admission or an 
incidental admission (e.g. fractures) – or the highest dcg they are eligi-
ble for (Rijksoverheid, 2005; Prinsze and van Vliet, 2007)40. We include 
the DCGs but not the separate subgroups based on diagnoses and treat-
ments in the risk adjustment model because the subgroups based on 
diagnosis and treatments and the DCGs overlap. Furthermore, the im-
pact of the DCGs on the incentives for efficiency is known to be limited 
39 As for ltc, risk adjust- 
ment based on health care 
use rather than expenditures 
would reward insurers for 
negotiating lower prices but 
data on health care use was 
not available, except for the 
data needed to construct 
Diagnostic Cost Groups.
40 The assigned dcg does  
not match with the actual 
dcg for some individuals 
because of two limitations  
of the data set: 1. not all hos-
pitals reported information 
on patients to the national 
medical registry; 2. infor- 
mation on two relevant  
‘side treatments’, dialysis and 
artificial respiration at home 
was not available at all.  
As a consequence, dcg 13 
(dialysis) is empty and the 
reference category consists  
of dcg0, dcg13 and patients 
who needed artificial respira-
tion and should therefore be 
in dcg12. Furthermore, infor-
mation on radiotherapy and 
chemotherapy was not specif-
ic enough to ensure that no 
patients who do not belong  
in the related dcg are 
excluded. 
41 Appendix 1 contains  
descriptive statistics and  
all regression results. 
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in the context of health insurance (Lamers, 1998) while including  
all subgroups separately will increase incentives for oversupply  
and over-reporting.
As the administrative data do not provide detailed information on  
personal characteristics, subgroups based on health, disability and  
socio-economic characteristics could only be created using the smaller 
set of respondents that completed the pols survey. Although it is much 
smaller and persons in nursing homes are not sampled, this survey al-
lows investigating incentives for insurers to use such questionnaires for 
risk selection purposes. The same subgroups are used as in de Meijer  
et al. (2011), who study determinants of ltc expenditures among the el-
derly, and in Stam and van de Ven (2008), who identify subgroups that 
generate losses for health insurers. Of these subgroups, only those are 
selected for which the predicted loss deviates significantly from zero  
in the absence of risk adjustment. Because the average predicted profit 
without risk adjustment for the pols sample and the subsample answer-
ing the health module are positive, the predictions for these samples  
are adjusted by subtracting the mean deviation from zero for the relevant 
sample multiplied by the ratio of the individual’s observed expenditures 
to the sample mean observed expenditures in order to ensure that the 
average predicted profit was zero for this subsample.
6.4  Results
6.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Figure 6.1 and table 6.1 show that the distribution of ltc expenditures  
is highly skewed. The median is at 4,598 euro; 2 out of 3 ltc users spend 
less than 10,000 euro. Furthermore, there are two spikes, one at 32,000 
euro (a full year of care in a residential home) and one at approximately 
91,000 euro (a full year of care in a nursing home). The average cost per 
ltc user (15,677 euro) is much higher than the average cost per user of 
medical care (about 2000 euro in 2004). Furthermore, ltc expenditures 
are strongly correlated with prior use of ltc: average ltc expenditures  
in 2005 are higher for home care users in 2004 than for non-users and 
highest for nursing home residents in 2004 (table 6.1).
6.4.2  Analysis
The regression analysis reveals that the included covariates explain  
a large share of the variation in aggregate expenditures of ltc use in 
2005: the R2-statistics are generally higher than those obtained in similar 
studies on medical care and mental health care (see e.g. van de Ven and 
Ellis, 2000)41. Most of the explanatory power derives from the demo-
graphic variables and prior ltc use. The model that only includes  
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demographics has an R2 of 0.23. Including prior ltc use increases the 
R2-statistic to 0.73, while variables related to prior hce contribute only 
marginally to the overall goodness of fit, regardless of whether prior ltc 
use is included. A Copas test (Copas, 1983) did not detect overfitting and 
therefore we do not need to split the sample in two. Nearly all coefficients 
are significant in each of the models and show the expected sign.  
The DCGs sometimes violate the monotonicity requirement: being as-
signed to a higher dcg with a more severe diagnosis does not in all cases 
lead to a higher capitation payment. This is undesirable as it generates 
disincentives for providing more care in cases in which more care might 
be desirable. The most prominent example is dcg 4, which includes di-
agnoses related to a cardiovascular accident; myocardial infarct; and 
angina pectoris among other things, and which has the third largest  
coefficient. These results highlight that the relationship between prior 
hospital stays and ltc expenditures is different from the relationship 
between prior hospital stays and hce, on the basis of which these  
DCGs were constructed. 
No risk adjustment model
In case of annual contracts with community rated premiums but no  
risk adjustment, the predicted losses would be very large for subgroups 
based on prior ltc use or based on prior health care expenditures  
(table 6.2)42. These predicted losses, together with the large size of most 
of these subgroups (last column), signal that incentives for risk selection 
against these subgroups would be huge. Other results (available upon 
request) show that some diagnoses are indicators of a persistent loss:  
for four diagnoses that yield a large predicted loss in the next year,  
the predicted loss is still larger than 1000 euro two years later and  
three years later.
Demographic model
The results for the Demographic Model, which adjusts subsidies for the 
age, gender and co-residence status of the enrollee, show that including 
demographic characteristics in the risk adjustment model does not suf-
ficiently reduce the predicted losses for subgroups based on prior ltc 
use and prior hce (table 6.2). Therefore, it seems imperative to include 
the latter subgroups in the risk adjustment model to reduce incentives 
for risk selection.
Prior LTC model
Including variables on prior ltc use as risk adjusters by definition reduc-
es the predicted losses on these subgroups to zero. But risk adjustment 
based on prior ltc use not only reduces predicted losses for prior ltc 
users but also for many subgroups based on prior hce and for several 
subgroups of individuals who were hospitalized for diagnoses that were 
42 The appendix contains  
the predicted losses for all the 
subgroups that were included 
in the final model, 20 sub-
groups based on diagnosis 
from information on hospital 
admissions in 2004 and sub-
groups that were based on  
the pols survey data; results 
for other subgroups are avail-
able from the corresponding 
author.
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associated with the highest predicted loss without risk-adjustment  
(table 6.2). This finding implies that it is no longer attractive for  
insurers to select against any of these groups of patients. 
For some other subgroups based on prior health care use and on hce, 
however, including variables on prior ltc use as risk adjusters does  
not substantially reduce the predicted losses. Therefore, insurers have 
an incentive to detect and avoid these subgroups, which are not includ-
ed in the risk adjustment formula and which are expected to generate  
a loss to the insurer.
Prior HCE and DCG model
Subsequently, we examine the effect of adding information on prior 
health care use and hce patterns in the risk adjustment formula on  
the predicted losses. The predicted losses for the subgroups of insured 
that used ltc in 2004 all remain above the threshold of 1000 euro when 
DCGs are added to the model, along with variables indicating high ex-
penditures (top 15%) on hospital and outpatient care for the last three 
and the last five years, and high expenditures on prescription drugs, 
transport, and durable medical equipment for the last year, the last  
three and the last five years (table 6.2). But while these variables only 
have a small impact on the predicted loss for subgroups of ltc users, 
including hce is important for reducing the predicted loss for subgroups 
based on prior hospital admissions for several diagnoses, e.g. heart fail-
ure, and asthma and copd. So while for some diagnoses prior ltc use  
is more important in reducing the predicted loss, for other diagnoses 
prior hce and DCGs causes the largest drop in the predicted losses.
Full model
When all information is combined in the full risk adjustment model,  
the predicted losses are substantially reduced for many of the subgroups 
we distinguished. For example, this full model reduces predicted losses 
sufficiently for all but seventeen diagnoses and for all but one type of 
treatment. Yet, including information on prior hce and the variables  
on ltc use also leads to predicted profits larger than 1000 euro for three 
diagnoses: hip fracture, chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus (table 
6.2) and other lower extremity fracture (not in table 6.2).
The initial predicted losses also vanish for the subgroups based on 
self-reported disability, health and socio-economic status when prior 
ltc use and prior hce are included in the risk adjustment formula. 
Although the loss is still larger than 1000 euro for persons who are  
unable able to perform at least one adl, it is no longer significantly  
different from zero (table 6.2).
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Incentive compatible model
All subgroups based on prior ltc use and listed in table 6.2 are large  
and generate a large predicted loss in the absence of risk adjustment. 
Yet, some of these subgroups are expected to give insurers perverse in-
centives because inclusion of enrollees in these subgroups is financially 
attractive and can be easily manipulated. For example, the required  
additional spending for admitting a person for a single day in a nursing 
home (about 190 euro – see appendix) is much lower than the subsequent 
increase in the risk-adjusted capitation payment of 11299 euro for the 
subgroup of people who are admitted to a nursing home for 1-90 days. 
The appendix shows that when an individual uses ltc during a given 
year, in the next year the insurer would be compensated for most  
of the loss if risk adjustment were based on prior ltc utilization.
The trade-off between incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk 
selection is also relevant for some subgroups based on prior hce and 
health care use. For some subgroups, the inclusion criteria are set at  
low levels because very few individuals use these services, e.g. individ- 
uals with high expenditures on transportation or medical equipment.  
As a result, for these groups the minimum amount of expenditures is 
lower than the increase in the risk adjustment payment. Therefore,  
the subgroups based on only high expenditures in the previous year  
are omitted in the incentive compatible model. For DCGs and sub-
groups with high hce in successive years the incentive problem is  
expected to be limited (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).
 
Leaving subgroups that were expected to compromise insurers’ incen-
tives for efficiency out of the incentive compatible model has a small 
effect on the overall predictive power of the model: the incentive com-
patible model has an R2-statistic of 0.70, compared to 0.73 for the full 
model. A comparison of the results of the full model and the incentive 
compatible model at the subgroups level reveals that removing these 
risk adjusters does not only affect the predicted losses for the subgroups 
that are no longer included but also the predicted losses for subgroups 
based on hospital diagnoses and treatments and for the subgroups 
based on detailed survey information on health and disability. Yet, the 
impact on the predicted losses for these other subgroups is often fairly 
limited. Therefore, further reduction of the number of subgroups in  
the risk adjustment model may be considered. 
6.5  Conclusion and discussion
In the Netherlands and several other countries, public ltc insurance  
is offered by non-competing agents that are not at risk for providing  
43 An alternative solution  
to the problems caused by 
risk selection would be to 
deny ltc users to switch  
from one insurer to another, 
yet this alternative would 
substantially reduce the 
insurer’s incentives to act  
as prudent buyers of ltc  
for this group and would 
increase their incentives  
to keep out future ltc users  
if risk adjustment is 
inadequate.
44 In addition to the incen-
tives for efficiency and for 
meeting consumer prefer- 
ences that managed compe- 
tition may create for insurers, 
it may also affect overall 
efficiency by facilitating 
innovation through tri-
al-and-error by insurers.
45 Risk adjustment may  
not only be used to equalize 
insurer payments and their 
expected costs but also in  
the context of capitated and 
bundled provider payments.
46 Risk adjustment based  
on multiple years of use may 
be more useful for home care 
than for institutional care 
because of the limited aver-
age length of stay at a care 
facility.
47 In addition, incentives  
for risk selection may be 
reduced by including more 
subgroups, e.g. based on 
socio-economic status and 
more specific information  
on prior use of durable medi-
cal equipment that indicates 
disability (see e.g. van Kleef 
and van Vliet, 2010) as risk 
adjusters.
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coverage. This situation is suboptimal because it provides these agents 
with little or no incentive for efficiency and cost containment. In the 
Netherlands, the government proposed to incentivize insurers to increase 
efficiency and innovation of ltc provision by putting them at risk for pro-
viding ltc coverage and allowing them to compete for customers and 
thus let them reap the benefits of improvements in quality and reduced 
expenditures. Introducing financial risk would be easy but might lead  
to socially undesired outcomes in terms of equity and efficiency. 
To maintain universal access in a competitive ltc insurance market,  
an adequate system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies is imperative. 
Without adequate risk adjustment insurers face strong incentives to  
deter subgroups that generate predictable losses, e.g. by excluding rele-
vant benefits from the benefit package or by lowering the service level  
or the quality of the contracted provider network that they offer to  
these subgroups (Cao and McGuire, 2003). We have investigated the 
scope for risk selection and the feasibility of a ltc risk adjustment  
formula that sufficiently reduces insurers’ financial incentives for risk 
selection 43. The attractiveness of managed competition vis-à-vis alter- 
native ways to organize ltc insurance depends inter alia on the ability  
to prevent risk selection 44. Little is known, however about the feasibility 
of adequate risk adjustment for ltc. Hence, improved knowledge about 
the extent to which risk adjustment can successfully reduce insurers’ 
incentives for risk selection helps us to better evaluate the feasibility  
of managed competition in ltc insurance 45.
Our findings demonstrate that a model that is only based on demographic 
characteristics performs poorly: subgroups that may be identified based 
on their prior ltc use, prior hce or other individual characteristics are 
predicted to generate large losses to the insurer in case of annual con-
tracts with community rated premiums. This means that in this case, 
insurers will face very strong financial incentives to discourage these 
subgroups from joining their plan. 
Subsequently, we investigated the impact of ii) including individual- 
level information on prior health care and ltc use and ii) excluding risk 
adjusters that compromise insurers´ incentives for efficiency. Not surpris-
ingly, prior use of ltc services is the best available predictor of future ltc 
use and its inclusion substantially reduces incentives for risk selection. 
The main drawback of this risk adjuster is that it simultaneously reduces 
incentives for efficiency. This problem may at least partially be overcome 
by i) including indicators for having used ltc for multiple years because 
it may be harder for insurers to manipulate use and expenditures for mul-
tiple subsequent years than for just one year 46 and ii) by optimizing the 
DCGs for predicting ltc expenditures 47.
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An important finding is that in addition to prior ltc use, prior hce  
and inpatient diagnosis and treatment information also prove to be  
vital: predicted losses persist for certain categories of hce and for some 
inpatient diagnoses that occur mostly among the frail elderly even when 
prior ltc use is taken into account. These diagnoses probably indicate  
a negative health shock that leads to increased formal ltc use. However, 
including all available risk adjusters in the model does not fully eliminate 
the potential for risk selection. While the predicted losses disappear  
for health, disability and socio-economic characteristics that can be  
obtained from a survey, risk selection on the basis of some inpatient  
diagnoses and treatments as well as prior ltc use remains feasible.  
An insurer can easily identify most of these subgroups, e.g. the subgroup 
of patients who received short-term institutional ltc, were admitted to  
a hospital for a hip fracture, dementia-related problems or asthma or 
copd, or who had high hce in 2004 but not in 2003 or 2002. Yet, includ-
ing these variables in the risk adjustment formula is not an option,  
as it would give insurers an incentive to overprovide these types of 
health care. 
Ideally, risk adjustment is based on data on individuals’ underlying 
needs for care but such information is rarely included in administrative 
data and insurers’ ltc claims data. As a consequence, in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere, risk adjustment in ltc will have to rely on prior utiliza-
tion and expenditure data, which is likely to not only reduce incentives 
for risk selection but also incentives for efficiency. Most of all, our find-
ings highlight the interrelatedness of elderly care, medical care and  
social care. This implies that, in order to prevent risk selection, any risk 
adjustment formula needs to take into account the potential simultane-
ous or subsequent use of these other types of care. Therefore, our find-
ings also have implications for the reverse relationship: taking into 
account prior ltc use should also be considered and studied for  
optimizing risk adjustment in health insurance.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and discussion 
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7.1  Main findings
LTC financing influences use 
The share of elderly is projected to double over the next decades and 
therefore population ageing will continue to increase ltc expenditures, 
according to many studies. Because some insurance against ltc expen- 
ditures is desirable and because the market fails to provide adequate 
insurance coverage, the government intervenes and in most countries  
a substantial amount of ltc expenditures are publicly financed. For this 
reason, public policy reforms may change the level and the growth rate 
of ltc expenditures. This thesis explains how policy changes influence 
ltc use, how policies may keep ltc financing efficient and affordable 
and what side effects these policies may have.
LTC financing affects how much and which types of ltc individuals use. 
Differences in ltc financing therefore lead to differences in the relative 
importance of each of the personal characteristics that are associated 
with ltc use, i.e. determinants of ltc use. As chapter 2 shows, the most 
important determinants of ltc use in the Netherlands are disability  
and informal care availability and, to a lesser extent, illness and general 
health. This set of determinants closely mirrors the criteria that deter-
mine the eligibility for public ltc insurance benefits.
When population ageing causes an increase in the prevalence of disa- 
bility or one of the other determinants of ltc, then the use of informal 
and formal ltc use is expected to increase too. Yet, the cross-sectional 
differences and the differences over time in the prevalence of disability 
among the elderly and in the supply of informal care are very small  
at the national level and may therefore only partly explain differences 
across countries and over time in the prevalence of ltc use. Instead, 
these differences may be caused by institutional differences. 
In the first part of this thesis, I explain how ltc use is associated with  
the way ltc is financed. The prevalence of the determinants of ltc 
among the elderly is fairly similar in the Netherlands and Germany,  
yet in the Netherlands formal care use is much higher, while in Germany 
informal care use is more frequent (chapter 3). Differences in the eligi-
bility criteria for public ltc insurance benefits and in the generosity of 
these benefits between the Netherlands and Germany help to explain 
this. The eligibility criteria for public formal ltc use are stricter in 
Germany than in the Netherlands and therefore coverage is more com-
prehensive in the Netherlands. In addition, co-payments are higher in 
Germany. Both differences make formal care use less accessible and  
less attractive for large groups of potential users in Germany relative  
to the same groups in the Netherlands. 
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In addition to this difference in the overall prevalence of ltc use,  
there are two other differences in use across subgroups of the population 
that are related to ltc financing. First, in Germany the use of formal ltc 
is lower among low-income elderly than high-income elderly after con-
trolling for health and disability, while there is no difference in formal 
ltc use between income groups in the Netherlands. This difference may 
be explained by the difference in comprehensiveness of the public insur-
ance coverage and the difference in co-payments, which are on average 
lower in the Netherlands than in Germany and are income-related in  
the Netherlands but not in Germany (see above). Second, in the 
Netherlands, the probability of formal care use is higher for individuals 
who have a spouse who is disabled and therefore less able to provide 
informal care, while in Germany the spouse’s ability to provide informal 
care does not influence formal care use. This difference is also related  
to a difference in eligibility rules: eligibility for some types of formal ltc 
is conditional on the availability of informal care within the household 
in the Netherlands but not in Germany.
Within the Netherlands, the use of formal ltc has changed over time 
(chapter 4). More specifically, two potentially related trends stand out. 
First, the elderly less often choose to move to a nursing home or resi- 
dential home than before; second, the prevalence of homecare use has 
increased. Like the difference in ltc use between the Netherlands and 
Germany, the changes in formal care use are not explained by changes 
in its determinants. Instead, the changes in the prevalence of ltc use  
are associated with changes in the relationship between formal care use 
and its determinants. These changes in the relationship may in turn be 
influenced by changes in government policy that increased the supply  
of home care and encouraged and facilitated the elderly to live at home 
longer. Together with the main findings from chapters 2 and 3, these  
results indicate that the way ltc is financed has a major influence on  
the relationship between individuals’ characteristics and their ltc use.
LTC financing influences incentives for users, insurers and providers  
of LTC
As I describe in the first part of this thesis, ltc financing not only affects 
how and by whom ltc expenditures are paid for but also affects the type 
and amount of ltc that each individual chooses to use and thus the level 
of spending. LTC financing affects use and expenditures by altering in-
centives to users, providers and insurers: there is no incentive-neutral 
way of ltc financing. 
As highlighted in the introduction and in chapter 2, the Netherlands  
is an outlier in terms of ltc financing and expenditures: Dutch public 
insurance coverage is very comprehensive and both its public and total 
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ltc expenditures per capita are the highest of the oecd countries.  
The Dutch outlier position in ltc financing is further described in  
chapter 5. In chapter 5, I describe how four countries in which ltc is 
partly covered by public insurance – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland – have attempted to limit the negative effects of moral 
hazard, which is one of the main threats to the efficiency and affordabil-
ity of public ltc insurance: through cost sharing, centralized eligibility 
assessment, managed competition and other demand-side measures.
In comparison with the other three countries, the use of demand-side 
measures to curb the negative effects of moral hazard is relatively limit-
ed in the Netherlands. That is, the level of cost sharing is lower than in 
the three other countries, the benefit package is more comprehensive 
and insurers are not incentivized to act as a prudent buyer on behalf  
of their enrollees. In the Netherlands, expenditure caps at the regional 
level have traditionally been the preferred strategy to contain ltc ex-
penditures. These expenditures caps are set by the government and 
based on prior regional expenditures 48. A court decision in 1999 limited 
the use of these expenditure caps as an instrument to contain costs.  
In this decision, the court ruled that budgetary considerations were not 
a valid reason to limit access to ltc services that were covered by public 
insurance. This court decision heralded a decade in which the Dutch 
government increasingly struggled to keep ltc expenditures in check 
(Schut and van den Berg, 2010). This case shows that there may be limits 
to stringent rationing through budgets in the case of fixed entitlements 
and public ltc insurance because the enrollee’s legal entitlement to  
care may be upheld. 
One way in which the demand-side measures may be expanded is 
through the introduction of elements of managed competition, i.e.  
by allowing insurers to compete for customers and to contract care  
providers for their enrollees. To ensure that these competing insurers  
are cost conscious, they may be paid through capitation payments that 
transfer some of the financial risk from the government to the insurers. 
Yet, these capitation payments make it profitable for insurers to attract 
customers for whom the expenditures are expected to be lower than  
the capitation payment and dissuade other potential applicants (risk 
selection). Therefore, the capitation payment needs to be risk-adjusted: 
for each subgroup of the population, it needs to be equal to – or at least 
close to – their expected ltc expenditures.
In chapter 6, I propose a system of risk-adjusted capitation payments 
based on the available administrative data and show how risk adjust-
ment aligns the capitation payment with expected expenditures for 
most, but not all subgroups. To reduce the incentives for risk selection, 
48 As beneficiaries may  
apply for cash benefits  
rather than service benefits 
and because these cash ben- 
efits are not included in these 
regional budgets, the budget 
constraint is not binding: 
applicants can opt for a  
cash benefit rather than 
in-kind services to avoid 
waiting lists if these services 
cannot be provided because 
the budget is depleted (Schut 
and Ven den Berg, 2010).
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the model heavily relies on prior use. While prior ltc use is a good  
predictor of future use, risk adjustment based on prior use also reduces 
the insurers’ incentives for efficiency. In health insurance, this undesired 
side-effect has been reduced by i) carefully selecting diagnoses that can-
not be easily manipulated or avoided and ii) using indicators for multi-
ple years of use. The latter may be a solution for types of ltc that are 
typically used for a longer period but the former may be difficult for  
ltc use without additional knowledge about the underlying health  
condition because most patterns of ltc use cannot be linked to a  
single condition.
The evidence on the determinants of ltc use from chapter 2 and 
the (limited) experience with risk adjustment for ltc expenditures from 
abroad suggest that a risk adjustment system may be further improved 
by including more subgroups based on their health or disability and the 
informal care that is available to them. The former two may be approxi-
mated by information on use of other government programs related  
to ltc and health care but information on informal care availability  
is unlikely to be found in administrative data.
7.2  Implications for policy and future research
Policy implications: LTC expenditure growth is at least partly a choice
When population ageing causes an increase in the prevalence of disa- 
bility and other determinants of ltc use, ltc expenditures most likely 
increase too. However, the findings from chapter 3 and 4 suggest that 
changes in the financing and organization of ltc may change the rate  
at which aggregate ltc expenditures grow and that these differences 
contribute more to variation in the prevalence of ltc use among the  
elderly than differences in observable characteristics of individuals  
like health and disability. Although the increase in the number of elderly 
in the population may still be larger than the decrease in the probability 
of ltc use among the elderly resulting from policy changes and therefore 
aggregate ltc expenditures will still grow, the rate at which they will 
grow will be lower. This means that the ltc expenditure growth rate  
is at least partly a choice. 
Governments have a number of policy instruments at their disposal to 
curb the negative effect of moral hazard and influence ltc expenditure 
growth. These instruments target either the incentives of suppliers of  
ltc or the incentives of users and insurers. The effectiveness of supply- 
side rationing may however be limited when users have a legal entitle-
ment to care. This limitation may have contributed to the recent reforms 
of ltc financing in the Netherlands. These recent reforms aim to contain 
costs by i) limiting the legal entitlement to some types of ltc and ii)  
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intensifying demand-side measures for the other types of ltc. The  
legal entitlement to domestic help has been limited since this type of  
ltc has been transferred from the public ltc insurance scheme to the 
tax-financed Social Support Act in 2007. Because the Social Support  
Act is tax-funded, the act is not a legal basis for claims to ltc. Instead, 
the outcome is defined: the municipalities, who are now responsible for 
organizing and financing domestic help, ought to enable the disabled to 
run a household and participate in society. Each municipality has the 
freedom to further specify (and re-specify) the outcomes that it aims  
to achieve and to decide which means it uses to help inhabitants with 
disabilities. This freedom means that municipalities limit the amount  
of support that they finance when the budget is reduced: municipalities 
may choose to limit their role to acting as a last resort for applicants who 
cannot organize domestic help and sufficient informal care themselves 
and paying only for a minimum amount of support for this small group 
of applicants. 
For other types of ltc, the demand-side measures are intensified and 
expanded (the latter reform option) to counter moral hazard and to curb 
expenditures growth. For example, the income-related co-payments 
were transformed into income- and asset-related co-payments in 2013. 
More importantly, in 2015 a major reform transferred the financing of 
medical home care to the Health Insurance Act. This reform affects the 
potential to keep negative effects of moral hazard in check. It means  
that care providers rather than an independent central agency will as-
sess an individual’s eligibility for home care. Eligibility for ltc has been 
determined by independent regional authorities since 1997 and was cen-
tralized in 2005 (rmo, 2010) in order to reduce the ability of suppliers  
to influence demand: the need for ltc is less objective than for some 
forms of medical care and therefore supplier-induced demand has been 
a major concern 49. The end of the centralized, independent assessment 
of eligibility for home care implies that insurers may need to focus on 
other instruments to keep supplier-induced demand and moral hazard 
in check.
The transfer of coverage of medical home care to the Health Insurance 
Act also means that for this type of care the existing demand-side meas-
ures will be complemented by managed competition. Managed com- 
petition among insurers requires adequate risk adjustment. While the 
analysis in chapter 6 is about a ltc insurance system that is fully sepa-
rate from health insurance, most of the insights about the design of risk 
adjustment for ltc are also applicable to the current Dutch situation.  
In chapter 6, I conclude that the determinants of ltc expenditures differ 
from the determinants of health care expenditures, so the risk adjustment 
formula that is based on limited demographic information and prior 
49 Under the former public 
ltc insurance scheme,  
in some cases the power  
to assess the eligibility of 
users had been delegated  
to care providers, which  
were audited by the govern-
ment organization that de-
cides on eligibility for public 
ltc. Lindeboom et al. (2014) 
describe that the timing and 
the frequency of these audits, 
which are the two of the main 
dimensions determining how 
strict the audits are, had little 
impact on the number of 
applications. While these 
findings may suggest that 
supplier-induced demand 
may not be a major concern, 
Lindeboom et al. (2014) point 
out that the audits may not 
have affected the suppliers’ 
behavior because noncompli-
ance with the rules for deter-
mining eligibility was not 
punished.
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health care use needs to be adjusted and expanded to ensure that in- 
surers do not incur a substantial loss on home care users. The insights 
from chapter 6 help to enhance our understanding of the size of the  
subgroups generating a substantial predictable loss, to understand the 
effect of a risk adjustment model that is similar to the one presented in 
chapter 6 on these predictable losses, and to understand which addition-
al information may be used to reduce the predictable losses. 
Two caveats apply when using the results from chapter 6 in the current 
Dutch context. First, expenditures on home care are much less predicta-
ble than expenditures on institutional care, both for the government and 
for insurers. One of the reasons for this difference is the lack of routinely 
collected information about the supply of informal care: because infor-
mal care use is strongly related to formal home care use, the supply  
of informal care has a large impact on the demand for formal care. 
Informal care supply is difficult to account for, yet important. Because  
of this strong relationship between formal and informal care, health  
insurers will be able to influence informal care use through the formal 
home care that they pay for and organize. Health insurers face a major 
challenge as they are responsible for achieving the optimal balance  
between formal and informal care. The legal obligation to organize  
adequate care makes them a Stackelberg-type leader when setting  
the amount and the types of formal care that their enrollees receive:  
the supply of formal care (and its price) will be observed by potential 
caregivers, who adjust their supply of informal care (Cremer et al., 2012). 
On a higher level, another challenge arises: how to set the incentives for 
health insurers such that they incorporate the full costs and benefits  
of informal care in their decisions?
Second, the relationship between personal characteristics and home 
care expenditures may differ from the relationship between these charac-
teristics and institutional care expenditures. For example, in chapter 4,  
I showed that an increase in the disability level of an individual always 
increases the probability of institutional care use, while an increase in 
disability only leads to an increase in the probability of home care use 
up to a certain point and causes a decrease in this probability after this 
point. As a result, if a risk adjustment model contains multiple risk ad-
justers that are correlated with a dimension of disability, this model  
will either overestimate the expenditures on home care for enrollees 
with severe disabilities or will underestimate expenditures in lighter  
cases or both.
The transfer of home care coverage to the Health Insurance Act causes 
an additional problem. Home care is to some extent a substitute for  
110
the institutional care that is covered through the new Long-term care 
Insurance Act (Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; McKnight, 2006; Guo  
et al., 2014). Therefore, in addition to risk selection, health insurers have 
another, potentially more effective way to reduce their expenditures on 
home care enrollees, i.e. by facilitating a nursing home admission or  
by not investing in support that facilitates a prolonged stay at home. 
Currently, insurers are not rewarded for preventing nursing home ad-
mission, while postponing nursing home admissions has been a major 
policy goal since the 1970s. A good system of risk adjustment does not 
suffice to solve this problem: from an insurer’s perspective, paying for 
(some) home care will always be more expensive than institutional care 
that is paid for through another public insurance scheme. Only capita-
tion payments that are based on prior home care use or that reward  
the insurer in another way for enabling frail elderly to continue to live at 
home may effectively counteract insurers’ incentive to substitute institu-
tional care for home care. Of course, the incentives for municipalities  
are affected in the same way: municipalities may shift ltc expenditures 
to other payers by reducing expenditures on domestic care and thereby 
changing the demand for home care and institutional care 50.
Is the Dutch outlier position justified and sustainable? An agenda  
for future research on LTC financing
The main findings and the policy implications that I presented in this 
chapter raise a set of new questions about the appropriate design of ltc 
financing and about its impact on access, on the allocation of resources 
and on the outcomes for ltc users and their informal caregivers. 
The Netherlands spends much more on ltc than virtually all other  
oecd countries and most of these expenditures are public; is this outlier 
position justified? That is, do these additional expenditures also yield 
additional benefits, e.g. in terms of an increase in life expectancy or in 
the health and well-being of the care recipient and in terms of reduced 
negative externalities on the health and labor market status of spouses, 
children and other potential informal caregivers? And what is the nega-
tive impact of public expenditure cuts? Do they have the exact opposite 
impact as budget expansions? And how successful are efforts to limit  
any negative effects of budget cuts, e.g. by facilitating the use of illiquid 
assets to finance private expenditures or by better targeting the insur-
ance benefits? 
To answer the question whether the Dutch outlier position is justified, 
future research may look at the design and the impact of ltc financing 
reforms. One prominent set of recent policy reforms, which has not 
been evaluated so far, are ‘ageing in place’ policies that encourage and 
facilitate the elderly to continue to live at home. Like the introduction  
50 The direction in which  
the demand for home care 
and institutional care chang-
es depends on whether these 
types of care are substitutes 
or complements to the do-
mestic care that the munici-
pality organizes.
51 Goncalves and Weaver 
(2014) summarize the litera-
ture on the impact of home 
care expenditures on spend-
ing on other types of ltc  
and hospitalizations and 
show that in Switzerland 
spending on home care has  
a small effect on hospital 
stays and gp visits.
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of managed competition and the financing of domestic help through  
the Social Support Act, ageing in place policies may have an impact on 
the health and well-being of the users of these types of care and on ltc 
expenditures. However, these reforms may also have knock-on effects: 
demand for other types of care and services may change as well. If, for 
example, elderly who continue to live at home but who would have been 
admitted to a nursing home a few years ago are more often admitted  
to the hospital for emergency treatment, the additional health care  
expenditures resulting from the hospitalizations may offset at least  
some of the gains resulting from the ageing in place policies. 
Another issue requiring further attention is whether health insurers, 
who finance home care, and municipalities, who finance domestic  
help, are able to shift the costs of ltc to other parties. Recent research  
by de Groot and Allers (2014) suggests that much of the variation in the 
use of domestic help at the local level cannot be explained by observable 
demographic characteristics. However, it is not clear whether these and 
similar differences at the local and regional level have persisted for years 
or whether some of them have been caused by stricter budgets for do-
mestic help. If empirical evidence indeed shows that low ltc spending 
by insurers and municipalities causes higher expenditures on other 
types of care that are paid for by another party 51, an important follow- 
up question has to be addressed: how to reset the incentives for these 
agents such that their interests become better aligned with the interests 
of society, e.g. through improved risk adjustment for home care?
The answers to these questions will reveal whether high public ltc  
expenditures are justifiable and how ltc financing may be improved. 
The answers will not only be relevant for the Dutch situation but are  
also highly informative for other countries which are struggling with 
similar challenges and are considering similar solutions.
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Table 1.1 Summary of the differences between curative care and LTC
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics for the study sample for the transition model
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Table 2.3 Utilization model: coefficients and average partial effects
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Average partial effect
Formal care coefficient
Standard error
Average partial effect
Table 2.4 Transition model: coefficients and partial effects
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Table 3.1 Sample selection and attrition: descriptive statistics
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Table 3.3 Results for multinomial probit regression1
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Table 3.4  Decomposition results (Use Netherlands – Use Germany)  
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics LTC use and its determinants stratified by year (weighted)
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Table 4.2 Average partial effects institutional LTC use, stratified by year
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Table 4.3 Average partial effects no LTC, homecare and institutional LTC use
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Po
lic
y 
m
ea
su
re
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 e
ffe
ct
  
on
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 e
ffe
ct
  
on
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 L
TC
Figure 6.1  Distribution of LTC expenditures in 2005 of LTC users in 2005
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Table 6.2 Predicted losses for selected subgroups
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Appendix Table A1 Coefficients of risk classes included in the risk-adjustment model
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Appendix Table A3 Predicted losses for subgroups based on HCE in 2000-2004*
No risk adjustment
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Appendix Table A4  Predicted losses for subgroups based on diagnosis information  
from 2004 hospital admission data
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Appendix Table A5  Predicted losses for subgroups based on the General Survey  
of Living Conditions (POLS) 2004
No risk adjustment
Demographic model
Prior ltc model
Prior hce and dcg model
Full model
Incentive compatible model
Subgroup size
Prevalencea
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English
Should we rethink the way in which long-term care is financed?
Long-term care (ltc) aims to help individuals to cope with their im- 
pairments. LTC may be provided at home or in an institution and it  
is composed of informal care – provided by family members, friends  
or neighbors – and of formal care, which is provided by professionals. 
LTC is mainly used by the elderly. The share of the elderly in the popu- 
lation will increase sharply over the next decades, and therefore ltc  
expenditures are expected to increase as well. 
In many countries, a large share of total ltc expenditures is publicly  
financed. An increase in ltc expenditures that exceeds the growth of  
the Gross Domestic Product (gdp) means that ltc expenditures will 
crowd out other types of government spending, that the tax revenues 
need to go up or that the bill is passed on to future generations. In all 
cases, the increase in expenditures may challenge the support for public 
ltc expenditures. This threat is particularly serious in the Netherlands 
because of its outlier position with regard to ltc financing: the public 
ltc insurance scheme is more comprehensive and public ltc expendi-
tures are the highest among the oecd countries.
Excessive ltc expenditure growth may be avoided. One of the ways  
in which ltc might be kept affordable, is to change the way in which  
it is financed. LTC financing arrangements affect the incentives for us-
ers, potential users, insurers and providers of formal and informal care. 
These incentives in turn affect the decisions that these individuals make 
and thus the quantity and the types of ltc that users end up using. 
In my thesis, I describe ltc financing alternatives and their conse- 
quences for the allocation of ltc. This thesis consists of two parts.  
In the first part, I investigate how alternative ways of financing and  
organizing ltc are associated with differences in ltc use. In the second 
part of this thesis, I study how the government may intervene to keep 
ltc affordable and efficient.
Part 1: How are the financing and use of long-term care related?
To study how ltc financing alternatives are associated with differences 
in ltc use, I first analyze which personal characteristics determine ltc 
use and changes in ltc use in the Netherlands (chapter two). Use of  
informal care and use of formal ltc are both associated with disability, 
health status and the absence of an able informal caregiver within the 
household. In addition, the use of formal care is higher among women 
and increases with age. Studying changes in ltc use reveals that the  
onset of formal care use is associated with deteriorations in the care  
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recipient’s health, more impairments and the loss of one’s spouse,  
which may indicate a decline in the availability of informal care and 
support. These findings on the determinants of ltc use in the Netherlands 
are in line with the eligibility criteria for publicly financed formal care. 
The guidelines stipulate that access to formal care is only determined  
by the applicant’s health and impairments and, for some types of ltc, 
the availability of an informal caregiver within the household. 
In chapter three, I compare the determinants of ltc use in the 
Netherlands and in Germany to understand how differences in ltc  
use are associated with differences in ltc financing. Although the  
overall prevalence of ltc use is comparable in these two countries,  
patterns of ltc use differ: the prevalence of using formal care is higher  
in the Netherlands, while informal care use dominates in Germany. 
This difference may be explained by differences in ltc financing because 
ltc financing affects the incentives for users and hence may affect their 
choices regarding the amount and the types of ltc that they use. The ltc 
financing systems in the Netherlands and Germany are similar in many 
aspects but public ltc insurance coverage is more comprehensive in the 
Netherlands than in Germany. Furthermore, while in Germany the eligi-
bility for public insurance benefits only depends on the care recipient’s 
health and impairments, in the Netherlands for some types of ltc eligi-
bility for public insurance benefits also depends on the absence of an 
informal caregiver. 
A decomposition of the differences in use reveals that they are not the 
result of differences in the composition of the study samples. Instead, 
the differences in use are the result of differences in the comprehensive-
ness of public ltc insurance coverage and eligibility rules. The results 
furthermore suggest that the equity in access to ltc may be reduced 
when coverage is less comprehensive and the ability to care is not taken 
into account: formal care use is unrelated to income in the Netherlands, 
but in Germany use of formal care is lower among the poor than among 
the rich. 
The financing and use differ across countries but may also change over 
time within a country. Chapter four aims to explain the drop in the rate 
at which the population aged 65 and over lives in a nursing home or res-
idential home that occurred in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2008. 
The Dutch government has been promoting substitution of home care 
for institutional care for decades and between 2000 and 2008 a series  
of policy reforms was enacted that facilitated the elderly to live at  
home longer. 
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To find out how the policy reforms and the change in use are related,  
I decompose the differences in the probabilities of use of institutional 
care and homecare in two parts: the part that is related to changes in the 
distribution of the personal characteristics that determine ltc use and 
the part related to changes in the relationship between the determinants 
and ltc use, which is affected by how the system treats individuals with 
these personal characteristics. This decomposition reveals that, in the 
absence of changes in the way in which the system treats disability and 
other determinants of ltc use, the use of institutional care would have 
increased rather than decreased because of increases in the prevalence 
of disability and the mean age of the population aged 65 years and over. 
Yet, this increase is more than offset by changes in the relationship be-
tween institutional care use and its determinants. Much of the resulting 
drop in the rate of institutional care use is the result of a drop in the use 
of institutional care by individuals with no or mild disability; the proba-
bility of institutional care use does not decrease for individuals with  
severe disability. 
The finding that institutional care use decreased among respondents 
with no or mild disability but not among those with severe disability 
suggests that ltc use was better tailored to need in 2008 than in 2000. 
Furthermore, our findings show that policies that aim to help the elderly 
to continue to live at home, e.g. through home care, may be effective  
in keeping ltc expenditures in check.
Part two: How can the government intervene to achieve its goals?
To keep ltc affordable and efficient, the government may provide com-
prehensive public insurance coverage. Yet, like private ltc insurance, 
public ltc insurance suffers from the negative consequences of moral 
hazard: high ltc expenditures and a suboptimal allocation. These nega-
tive consequences may be limited by restricting the demand or the  
supply of ltc.
In chapter five, I describe how four European countries with universal 
public ltc insurance curb expenditures through demand-side rationing 
targeting consumers – measures that aim to keep the demand for formal 
care in check, e.g. cost sharing and coverage restrictions – and managed 
competition, which aims to incentivize insurers to act as prudent buyers 
of ltc for all enrollees. 
All four countries – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
– use demand-side rationing, yet they differ in which types of measures 
they use. Furthermore, the exact design of the measures differs across 
these countries. These differences in the design may affect the impact  
of the measures on efficiency and universal access. That is, for example, 
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the four countries have all introduced co-payments but differ in the way 
in which these co-payments are designed. High co-payments may have 
a larger impact on demand and thus improve efficiency. But they may 
also cause consumers who need formal care to forego this care, which 
would lead to a less efficient allocation of resources and hence the net 
effect of the size of the co-payments on efficiency is not clear a priori. 
High co-payments may increase the inequity in access to ltc, especially 
if they are not related to the care recipient’s income and wealth.
Unlike demand-side rationing, which is used in all four countries, man-
aged competition has only been expanded from health insurance to ltc 
insurance in Belgium and Switzerland – and recently to home care in  
the Netherlands. Its impact on efficiency has not been evaluated so  
far and may depend on whether a number of preconditions may be  
fulfilled, e.g. whether insurers have instruments that enable them to 
counter moral hazard, whether there is a sufficient number of critical 
consumers and whether they may be given appropriate financial 
incentives. 
Only when insurers bear financial risk, they may have financial incen-
tives to organize ltc efficiently. Yet, financial risk for insurers alone is  
not sufficient to guarantee this. When financial risk is combined with 
mandatory community rating and open enrolment, it is attractive for 
insurers to select enrollees whose expected ltc expenditures are lower 
than the community-rated premium that they pay. These incentives  
for risk selection are usually limited through risk-adjusted subsidies. 
Hence, adequate risk adjustment is a necessary precondition for man-
aged competition. 
The extent to which this precondition may be fulfilled is examined  
in chapter six. There is little experience with risk adjustment for ltc  
insurance and the experience with risk adjustment in health insurance 
may not be easily transferable because there are fewer ltc users than 
there are health care users and because expenditures conditional on  
any use are high and persistent, which makes it easy and attractive for 
insurers to detect enrollees who are expected to yield a loss for them. 
Furthermore, ltc expenditures heavily depend on the supply of infor- 
mal care and information on informal care use is often not available  
for risk adjustment. 
For many subgroups of enrollees that generate a predictable loss for  
insurers, a risk adjustment model based on prior use of ltc and health 
care and on demographic information reduces this predictable loss. 
However, a substantial loss persists for some large groups of enrollees 
who used ltc or health in the prior year. This finding means that further 
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refinements of the risk adjustment model may improve the incentives 
for insurers to act as prudent buyers of ltc. 
While the use of information on prior ltc use in a risk adjustment  
model reduces the insurers’ incentives for risk selection, it also reduces 
the insurers’ incentives for efficiency because it means that in some  
cases expenditures are fully or partially paid for through increased risk 
adjusted subsidies in subsequent years. Hence, in this form, reducing 
the insurers’ incentives for risk selection comes at the cost of reduced 
incentives for efficiency. This tradeoff may be avoided i) by replacing 
information on prior ltc use by information on the underlying deter- 
minants of ltc or ii) by only including information on prior use that 
cannot be manipulated easily. 
LTC expenditure growth is at least partly a choice
This thesis shows how ltc financing influences the incentives for indi-
viduals and for insurers. In turn, incentives for individuals and insurers 
are associated with how much ltc is used and which types are used by 
whom. These findings mean that the ltc expenditure growth rate may 
be influenced through policy reforms. Therefore, while population age-
ing is expected to increase ltc expenditures, the ltc expenditure growth 
rate is at least partly a choice. Future research may show how recent ltc 
financing reforms in the Netherlands affect ltc use and expenditures, 
both in the short run and the long run. These reforms may also be used 
to study how ltc expenditures affect the health of the elderly and their 
demand for health care. The evidence on the impact of ltc financing 
that this research would provide may shed light on whether the Dutch 
outlier position with respect to ltc financing is sustainable and on 
whether it is justified.
153
Nederlands
Moeten we de manier waarop de ouderenzorg gefinancierd  
wordt heroverwegen?
Langdurige zorg helpt ouderen en gehandicapten om met hun beper-
kingen te leven en hun zelfstandigheid zoveel mogelijk te behouden. 
Langdurige zorg wordt thuis of in een zorginstelling geboden door  
professionals (formele zorg) of door familieleden, vrienden of buren 
(mantelzorg). De grootste groep gebruikers van langdurige zorg zijn  
de ouderen. Aangezien als gevolg van de vergrijzing het aantal ouderen 
sterk toeneemt, stijgen naar verwachting ook de uitgaven aan langdurige 
zorg voor ouderen (vanaf nu: ouderenzorg).
In veel landen wordt een groot deel van de ouderenzorg publiek  
gefinancierd. Als de uitgaven aan ouderenzorg sneller groeien dan  
de economie gaan de extra uitgaven ten koste van andere publieke uit-
gaven, moet er meer belasting worden betaald of komt de rekening ten 
laste van toekomstige generaties. In alle drie de gevallen leidt de stijging 
mogelijk tot een afname van de steun voor de omvangrijke herverdeling 
die het gevolg is van publieke uitgaven aan ouderenzorg. De stijging van 
de publieke uitgaven aan ouderenzorg bedreigt de steun hiervoor in alle 
landen maar de dreiging is bijzonder groot in Nederland omdat 
Nederland een bijzondere positie inneemt wat betreft de financiering 
van de ouderenzorg: de publieke ouderenzorgverzekering biedt zeer 
omvangrijke dekking en de publieke uitgaven aan ouderenzorg zijn  
de hoogste van alle oeso-landen.
Ondanks de vergrijzing is een sterke stijging van de uitgaven aan oude-
renzorg wellicht vermijdbaar. Mogelijk kan de ouderenzorg betaalbaar  
te blijven door bijvoorbeeld de financiering ervan aan te passen. De ma-
nier waarop de ouderenzorg wordt gefinancierd beïnvloedt namelijk 
voor gebruikers van ouderenzorg, verzekeraars, aanbieders van formele 
zorg en (potentiele) mantelzorgers hoe aantrekkelijk elk van de typen 
ouderenzorg in financieel opzicht voor hen is. Uiteindelijk beïnvloedt  
de financieringsvorm zo mogelijk ook welke keuzes ze maken. 
In mijn proefschrift beschrijf ik hoe de financieringsvorm de financiële 
gevolgen van keuzes beïnvloedt en hoe de financiële gevolgen van keu-
zes op hun beurt de besluiten van individuen en verzekeraars beïnvloe-
den. Dit onderzoek bestaat uit twee delen. In het eerste deel onderzoek 
ik de associatie tussen de manier waarop ouderenzorg gefinancierd 
wordt en het gebruik van ouderenzorg. In het tweede deel van dit proef-
schrift beschrijf ik hoe de overheid de betaalbaarheid en doelmatigheid 
van de ouderenzorg kan beïnvloeden door een publieke verzekering  
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in te stellen die een omvangrijke dekking biedt tegen uitgaven  
aan ouderenzorg.
Deel 1: Hoe hangen de manier waarop de ouderenzorg gefinancierd  
wordt en het gebruik ervan met elkaar samen?
Om de relatie tussen de manier waarop de ouderenzorg gefinancierd 
wordt en het gebruik van ouderenzorg in kaart te brengen, analyseer  
ik eerst welke persoonlijke kenmerken in Nederland gerelateerd zijn  
aan (veranderingen in) het gebruik van ouderenzorg (hoofdstuk twee). 
Uit de analyse in hoofdstuk twee concludeer ik dat beperkingen een 
goede voorspeller zijn voor wie mantelzorg of formele zorg gebruikt,  
net als de aanwezigheid van een mantelzorger. Daarnaast gebruiken 
vrouwen vaker formele zorg dan mannen en is ook de relatie tussen  
het gebruik van formele zorg en leeftijd positief. De analyse van veran-
deringen in het gebruik van ouderenzorg laat zien dat de kans dat res-
pondenten formele zorg beginnen te gebruiken stijgt als hun algehele 
gezondheid verslechtert, als het aantal beperkingen toeneemt en de 
echtgenoot of partner wegvalt, wat er mogelijk op wijst dat een echt- 
genoot een belangrijke bron van steun en zorg is.
De in hoofdstuk twee beschreven determinanten van het gebruik  
van ouderenzorg komen overeen met de criteria die bepalen wie in  
aanmerking komt voor publiek gefinancierde ouderenzorg. Die criteria 
bepalen dat de toegang tot zorg alleen afhankelijk is van de beperkingen 
en de gezondheid van de aanvrager en van de aanwezigheid van een 
potentiele mantelzorg binnen het huishouden van de aanvrager.
In hoofdstuk drie vergelijk ik de determinanten van het gebruik van  
ouderenzorg in Nederland en Duitsland om te laten zien hoe verschillen 
in het gebruik van ouderenzorg gerelateerd zijn aan verschillen in de finan-
ciering ervan. Hoewel de prevalentie van het gebruik van ouderenzorg  
in Nederland en Duitsland gelijk is, gebruiken ouderen in Nederland 
vaker formele zorg, terwijl in Duitsland ouderen vaker alleen mantelzorg 
gebruiken. Dit verschil kan mogelijk verklaard worden door verschillen 
in de manier waarop de ouderenzorg in deze twee landen gefinancierd 
wordt want de financieringsvorm beïnvloedt hoe aantrekkelijk elk van 
de typen ouderenzorg in financieel opzicht is voor gebruikers en beïn-
vloedt op die manier mogelijk ook wie ouderenzorg gebruikt, en of dat 
mantelzorg, formele zorg of een combinatie daarvan is. 
De manier waarop ouderenzorg gefinancierd en georganiseerd wordt  
in Nederland en Duitsland is grotendeels vergelijkbaar, maar niet vol- 
ledig identiek. De dekking die de Nederlandse publieke verzekering 
biedt is namelijk veel omvangrijker dan die van de Duitse publieke  
verzekering. Daarnaast zijn de criteria op basis waarvan bepaald  
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wordt wie toegang heeft tot publiek gefinancierde ouderenzorg verschil-
lend: in Duitsland spelen alleen de gezondheid en de beperkingen van 
de aanvrager een rol terwijl in Nederland het voor sommige typen ou- 
derenzorg ook van belang is of er in het huishouden een potentiele 
mantelzorger woont.
Uit de decompositie-analyse blijkt dat het verschil tussen beide landen 
in het gebruik van ouderenzorg kan niet verklaard worden aan de hand 
van verschillen in de samenstelling van de gebruikte steekproeven; het is 
gerelateerd aan verschillen in de omvang van de dekking die de publieke 
verzekering biedt en in de criteria voor toegang tot publiek gefinancier-
de zorg. De resultaten van deze analyse wijzen daarnaast erop dat een 
publieke verzekering die slechts weinig dekking biedt en toegangsbeslis-
singen die geen rekening houden met de aanwezigheid van mantelzorg 
leiden tot oneerlijke verschillen in de toegang tot ouderenzorg: terwijl 
het gebruik van formele zorg in Nederland niet gerelateerd is aan het 
inkomen van de respondent, maken in Duitsland de relatief arme  
respondenten minder vaak gebruik van formele zorg dan de rijkeren.
Hoofdstuk vier beoogt de daling in het gebruik van intramurale zorg  
in Nederland tussen 2000 en 2008 te verklaren. De Nederlandse over-
heid probeert er al decennia voor te zorgen dat ouderen langer thuis 
kunnen wonen en dat ze thuiszorg in plaats van intramurale zorg ge-
bruiken. Om die reden voerde de overheid tussen 2000 en 2008 een serie 
beleidswijzigingen door. Om erachter te komen of de veranderingen en 
de beleidswijzigingen gerelateerd waren, deel ik de veranderingen over 
tijd in het gebruik van institutionele zorg en in het gebruik van thuis- 
zorg op in twee delen: i) het deel dat samenhangt met veranderingen  
in de samenstelling van de populatie ouderen en ii) het deel dat samen-
hangt met veranderingen in de relatie tussen het gebruik van ouderen-
zorg en persoonlijke kenmerken. De relatie tussen het gebruik van 
ouderenzorg en persoonlijke kenmerken wordt mogelijk beïnvloedt  
door de rol die die kenmerken spelen bij het bepalen van wie toegang 
krijgt tot zorg. 
Deze decompositie van het verschil laat zien dat, zonder de veranderin-
gen in de rol die elk van de persoonlijke kenmerken speelt in de toegang 
tot ouderenzorg, stijgingen in de prevalentie van beperkingen en de ge-
middelde leeftijd binnen deze subgroep van de populatie ertoe zouden 
hebben geleid dat meer ouderen gebruik zouden hebben gemaakt van 
intramurale zorg in 2008 dan in 2000. Veranderingen in de relatie tussen 
het gebruik van intramurale zorg en persoonlijke kenmerken hadden 
echter het tegenovergestelde effect en dit negatieve effect was groter, 
waardoor het gebruik van intramurale zorg daalde. Een groot deel  
van die daling wordt veroorzaakt door een daling van het gebruik  
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van intramurale zorg binnen de subpopulatie met geen of slechts  
matige beperkingen.
Deze resultaten laten zien dat het gebruik van intramurale zorg in 2008 
sterker geconcentreerd was binnen de groep die deze zorg het hardste 
nodig had dan in 2000. Daarnaast laten ze zien dat overheidsbeleid dat 
ouderen faciliteert en stimuleert om langer thuis te wonen, bijvoorbeeld 
door het aanbod van thuiszorg te vergroten, mogelijk een effectieve  
manier is om de uitgaven aan ouderenzorg te beperken.
Deel twee: hoe kan de overheid ingrijpen om haar doelen te halen?
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift beschrijf ik hoe de overheid de 
betaalbaarheid en doelmatigheid van de ouderenzorg kan beïnvloeden 
door een publieke verzekering in te stellen die een omvangrijke dekking 
biedt tegen uitgaven aan ouderenzorg. Maar net als private ouderen-
zorgverzekeringen gaat een publieke ouderenzorgverzekering gebukt 
onder de negatieve gevolgen van moral hazard: hoge uitgaven en een 
suboptimale allocatie. Deze negatieve gevolgen kunnen ingeperkt wor-
den door de vraag naar of het aanbod van ouderenzorg in te perken.
In hoofdstuk vijf beschrijf ik hoe vier Europese landen met een uni- 
versele publieke ouderenzorgverzekering de uitgaven aan ouderenzorg 
beperken door middel van beleidsmaatregelen gericht op de vraagzijde: 
i) maatregelen gericht op consumenten, zoals eigen betalingen en uitga-
venbeperkingen, en ii) gereguleerde concurrentie, waarmee verzekeraars 
gestimuleerd worden om doelmatige ouderenzorg in te kopen voor al 
hun verzekerden.
In alle vier de landen (België, Duitsland, Nederland en Zwitserland)  
worden maatregelen gebruikt die zijn gericht op verzekerden. Maar  
er zijn wel verschillen tussen deze vier landen in het type maatregelen 
dat gebruikt wordt en in de vormgeving ervan. De verschillen in de 
vormgeving beïnvloeden mogelijk de invloed van de maatregelen op  
de doelmatigheid van de zorg en op de universele toegang tot ouderen-
zorg. Alle vier de landen berekenen bijvoorbeeld door middel van eigen 
betalingen een deel van de kosten van de gebruikte ouderenzorg door 
aan de gebruikers maar verschillen in de wijze waarop de hoogte van  
de eigen betalingen berekend wordt. Omvangrijke eigen betalingen  
remmen de vraag naar ouderenzorg waarschijnlijk sterker dan kleine 
eigen betalingen en hebben op die manier wellicht ook een sterker effect 
op de doelmatigheid. Maar omvangrijke eigen betalingen zorgen er moge-
lijk ook voor dat verzekerden die baat hebben bij formele zorg deze zorg 
niet afnemen en op die manier zou de doelmatigheid juist afnemen.  
Het totale effect van de omvang van eigen betalingen op de doelmatig-
heid van de ouderenzorg is daarom vooraf onduidelijk. Tegelijkertijd 
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leiden omvangrijke eigen betalingen mogelijk wel tot onrechtvaardige 
verschillen in de toegang tot zorg, zeker als bij het vaststellen van de 
hoogte ervan geen rekening wordt gehouden met het inkomen en  
het vermogen van de zorggebruiker. 
Terwijl alle vier de landen maatregelen gericht op verzekerden gebrui-
ken, hebben alleen België en Zwitserland gereguleerde concurrentie  
ingevoerd in de ouderenzorg. Het effect van gereguleerde concurrentie 
op de doelmatigheid van de ouderenzorg is niet bekend en hangt moge-
lijk af van de mate waarin aan een aantal voorwaarden kan worden  
voldaan, bijvoorbeeld of de financiële prikkels voor verzekeraars hen 
stimuleren tot doelmatigheid, of verzekeraars voldoende instrumenten 
hebben om moral hazard tegen te gaan en of er voldoende verzekerden 
zijn die op zoek gaan naar de verzekering die het beste bij hen past. 
Alleen als verzekeraars financieel risico op zich nemen, hebben ze  
prikkels om de ouderenzorg doelmatig te organiseren. Maar financieel 
risico is niet afdoende want als verzekeraars financieel risico lopen maar 
ook een acceptatieplicht hebben en verplicht zijn om een doorsneepremie 
voor hun verzekeringspolis te vragen, is het aantrekkelijk voor ze om 
verzekerden te selecteren voor wie de verwachte zorguitgaven lager zijn 
dan de doorsneepremie. Door middel van risicoverevening wordt gepro-
beerd om deze situatie te voorkomen. Een randvoorwaarde voor een 
positief effect van gereguleerde concurrentie op de doelmatigheid van 
de ouderenzorg is dus dat er een adequaat risicovereveningssysteem is. 
In hoofdstuk zes onderzoek ik de mate waarin aan deze randvoorwaar-
de kan worden voldaan. Er is weinig ervaring met risicoverevening voor 
de ouderenzorg en het risicovereveningssysteem voor zorgverkeringen  
is om een aantal redenen niet zomaar te kopiëren. Uitgaven aan oude-
renzorg zijn namelijk sterker geconcentreerd binnen een kleine groep 
gebruikers dan uitgaven aan curatieve zorg en gebruikers hebben vaak 
gedurende meerdere jaren hoge uitgaven. Dat maakt het voor verzeke-
raars eenvoudig én aantrekkelijk om verzekerden op te sporen op wie  
ze naar verwachting verlies lijden. Tot slot zijn uitgaven aan ouderenzorg 
sterk afhankelijk van het aanbod van mantelzorg terwijl informatie over 
het aanbod van mantelzorg niet op grote schaal beschikbaar is en dus 
niet gebruikt kan worden om het vereveningssysteem te verbeteren.
Een vereveningsmodel dat gebaseerd is op het gebruik van ouderenzorg 
en gezondheidszorg in voorgaande jaren en op demografische achter-
grondkenmerken beperkt het voorspelbare verlies dat verzekeraars  
zouden lijden voor veel subgroepen van verzekerden. Voor een aantal 
subgroepen van verzekerden die in het verleden zorg hebben gebruikt 
blijft echter een substantieel verwacht verlies bestaan. Dit resultaat  
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betekent dat verdere verbeteringen van het vereveningsmodel leiden  
tot sterkere financiële prikkels voor verzekeraars om doelmatige  
ouderenzorg in te kopen.
Hoewel het gebruik van informatie over het gebruik van ouderenzorg  
en gezondheidszorg in voorgaande jaren in het vereveningsmodel de 
prikkels voor verzekeraars verkleint om bepaalde verzekerden te selecte-
ren, verkleint het gebruik van deze informatie ook de prikkels voor doel-
matigheid voor verzekeraars: het gebruik van deze informatie betekent 
dat in sommige gevallen een verzekeraar extra zorguitgaven in een later 
jaar deels of volledig terugkrijgt in de vorm van een hogere verevenings-
bijdrage. Deze afruil tussen prikkels voor doelmatigheid en prikkels  
voor risicoselectie kan vermeden worden door i) de informatie over  
het gebruik van ouderenzorg in voorgaande jaren te vervangen door  
informatie over de persoonlijke kenmerken van gebruikers van ouderen-
zorg en ii) door alleen informatie uit voorgaande jaren op te nemen  
voor typen zorg waarvan het gebruik voor de verzekeraar moeilijk te  
beïnvloeden is.
Hoe snel de ouderenzorguitgaven stijgen is deels een keuze
Dit proefschrift laat zien hoe de manier waarop de ouderenzorg ge- 
financierd wordt invloed heeft op hoe aantrekkelijk elk van de typen  
ouderenzorg in financieel opzicht is voor gebruikers en verzekeraars. 
Het proefschrift laat daarnaast zien dat de keuzes wat betreft het gebruik 
van ouderenzorg inderdaad samenhangen met de financiële gevolgen 
ervan voor gebruikers en verzekeraars. Deze resultaten betekenen dat  
de overheid door middel van beleidswijzigingen invloed uit kan oefenen 
op de snelheid waarmee de uitgaven aan ouderenzorg groeien: hoewel 
die uitgaven naar verwachting verder zullen stijgen als gevolg van de 
vergrijzing, is de snelheid waarmee ze stijgen dus deels een keuze. 
Verder onderzoek zou uit kunnen wijzen wat het effect is van de recente 
hervormingen van de financiering en organisatie van de ouderenzorg  
in Nederland op de uitgaven aan zorg voor ouderen, zowel op de korte 
als op de lange termijn. Die hervormingen kunnen ook gebruikt worden 
om de invloed te achterhalen van hogere uitgaven aan ouderenzorg  
op de gezondheid en levensverwachting van de ouderen die gebruik  
maken van die zorg. De kennis over deze effecten van hervormingen  
van de financiering van de ouderenzorg in Nederland draagt bij aan het 
beantwoorden van de vraag: is de uitzonderingspositie die Nederland 
inneemt als het gaat om de financiering van ouderenzorg houdbaar  
en gerechtvaardigd?
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